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TODAY AND TOMORROW

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DEMOCRACY
Today and Tomorrow

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DEMOCRACY

TODAY AND TOMORROW

BY

EDUARD BENEŠ

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INTRODUCTION

In starting my lectures on the problems of democracy at the University of Chicago I stressed at the very beginning the feelings with which I took on my task.

Since my early youth I have admired the United States of America, its people, its advance and growth, which nothing can check, its noble traditions, its struggles for liberty, for democracy, for the free development of the individual and of the whole nation and state, and the great place in the history of modern humanity which it has acquired and which will be even greater in future.

In my own life and in the life of my nation the great national leaders of the United States had their important place, which they never have lost and will never lose. Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, as well as all the leaders of the democracy before, during, and after the World War, were also our leaders and our teachers. Our state was reborn to new free life with the assistance of the United States during the World War, and our democratic republic under the leadership of President Masaryk considered itself a small sister republic of the great American Commonwealth. We felt this not only because of the unforgettable assistance of the United States, but also because of the spirit, the ideals and traditions of freedom and democracy, which have inspired the United States of America since their independence, and which inspired also the war and postwar representatives of the Czechoslovak nation. The Czechoslovak people, even today, after the Munich agreement from October, 1938, and after their temporary

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annexation to the Third Reich in March, 1939, have not deserted these ideals, and will not desert them. They only await the moment when they will be able again to express and cultivate them fully and freely.

It would have been pretentious to speak about democracy in the country of traditional democracy with the hope of presenting new discoveries. I had no other intention than to present to my hearers a series of facts concerning the evolution of the European democracies in the last two centuries and to sketch in quite general lines a brief outlook for the future of democracy in Europe. Besides, I had come to the United States in order to learn something for myself about these matters from its citizens and to draw conclusions for myself, for my country and the rest of Europe from the experiences, discussions, struggles, and difficulties of this country.

My plan of lectures at the University of Chicago was, therefore, rather narrowly defined. I desired in the first place, to explain briefly the nature of the whole spiritual and political crisis of present-day Europe, as it strikes us in all the current events of internal and external life in the main European nations: I wanted to show how Europe, from the times of the American and French revolutions, fought relentlessly for democracy, and how the whole of the nineteenth century is filled by a hard struggle with all the political and moral problems with which democracy is today confronted. In this connection I had to undertake further to discuss that great milestone which the World War of 1914–18 represented for democracy and its development and growth in Europe and the world: in it culminates—in a certain sense victoriously—the gigantic century-old struggle for European democracy.

But soon after the conclusion of the Peace Treaties the old antidemocratic forces started again their ancient fight

against the new régime—and, even more importantly, *new* antidemocratic revolutionary mass movements entered the scene and began their relentless struggle against the young postwar European democracy, which in a large number of cases could not resist this new onslaught. I had to discuss, therefore, in some detail the reaction against it in the shape of present-day communism, fascism, and national socialism; and I wanted to demonstrate why and how the European democracies fell during the last decade and continue to decline so unhappily, one after another.

I further essayed to point out very briefly the difficulties of democratic ideology and practice, especially in foreign policy. Democratic international policy was and is represented by the League of Nations as an expression of international peaceful cooperation between the nations of the twentieth century. The League itself is the creation of postwar democratic ideology and political practice, and the gradual decline of European and world democracy necessarily caused also a decline of the League of Nations. In these lectures I tried to point out in very general and brief lines the main reasons for this decline.

The postwar confusion culminated fairly recently in the creation of conflicts between the postwar political ideologies—communism, fascism, national socialism, and democracy. I tried to explain the interrelation and the intellectual conflicts of these systems and the theoretical and practical relation of these dictatorial regimes to democracy. In full force and clarity it was desirable to see the whole present-day moral, political, and social chaos on the European continent and its necessary logical conclusion: *the protracted struggle between these systems, and thus the constant danger of conflicts, internal revolutions, and similar catastrophes.*

At the end I undertook to formulate and synthesise in

a final and very short chapter the conclusions which are to be drawn from these struggles and to give a cautious but objective and quite general forecast of the probable further development of democracy, which is fighting for its very life in the world today. I wanted to set forth my views on the future development of democracy—especially in Europe. I knew that difficult times are before us, that we should have to face almost insoluble problems and events which will cast a shadow on us and future generations.

But to me this offers no valid reason for despair or pessimism. Man, as long as he is alive, must never give up his optimistic idealism; he must never—even if he sees the real situation in dark colours—cease to hope for better times, and he must, most of all, never cease to work for them, never cease to struggle for them, and never be discouraged by any ill success along the way. This has always been the motto of my lifework.

An ideal life and world cannot, after all, be created on this earth. One can only fight for an ideal. The noblest part of human life is not the realisation of the ideal. It is natural that as soon as such an ideal is even partly realised, it immediately appears as everyday reality with all the difficulties of ordinary life which in their turn have to be removed by a new struggle. *But only a constant, idealistic, unrelenting struggle for an ideal is capable of exciting among men their noblest feelings, efforts, and deeds.*

I ask you to understand my discussions in this spirit. I speak here about democracy as its consistent and uncompromising champion, who knows, however, all its defficulties, weaknesses, and defects, through his own political career, and who does not hide these weaknesses in any way; and I speak also as its defender, who, even if he should see its defeat again and again, will return to the struggle for its rights and preservation. For democracy and

freedom are those forms of political and social life which mankind has achieved as its most perfect political forms in a struggle that has lasted for thousands of years. No other ideology can get rid of this historical fact. For democracy itself is developing constantly, is moving towards greater and greater perfection in a constant effort for better and better democracy. *Just because of this, democracy is an ideal, even while as a system it is also the incarnation of an ideal.*

Whatever has happened recently or may happen during the next years in Europe and in the remainder of the world, in the end this ideal must be victorious, as it is the expression of genuine human morality and modern civilisation and is alone worthy of twentieth century humanity. It will be victorious, because it is also the law of social evolution and of the philosophy of history.

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DEMOCRACY
Today and Tomorrow

Chapter I

THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EUROPE IN ITS RELATION TO MODERN DEMOCRACY

Feudal Society of the Middle Ages

Medieval feudal society in Europe of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries was divided into castes, and a social hierarchy was its leading principle. At the head of these classes stood the king or prince, whose temporal power was supported by the church and shared with the nobility. It was a monarchical and aristocratic society strengthened by the spiritual and temporal force of the church. It was in this sense also a theocratic society, since the Catholic Church was not only the unlimited spiritual authority but also a temporal power. Spiritual life in general was controlled by the church as the ruling religion. There was freedom neither of thought nor of belief. Philosophy and science were a part of orthodox theology.

The Catholic Church stood in the first place with the ruling castes, the feudal "estates." After it, followed the nobility; and finally the burghers. The king, who represented the state, was only the first among the other feudal lords, and he was dependent on them to a considerable degree. The sovereignty of the king, and, therefore, of the state, was limited by the rights of the estates, especially of the church and of the higher and lower nobility, and finally of the towns. In more advanced feudalism, in its later stages, certain rights were vested also in the people,

represented by the towns. The feudal diets were a kind of representative body of the separate strata of the nation and permitted some kind of freedom at least for a section of the citizenry.

The individual estates insisted very resolutely on their rights, were proud of them, and waged strenuous battles for them. From the history of all medieval European states we know of the conflicts between king and nobility, nobility and towns, king and church, king and burghers. State power was then divided among all these political sections, and in the period of moderate feudalism this division was a kind of guarantee of economic prosperity as well as of a certain kind of limited political freedom.

The medieval citizen was, of course, completely subordinated to the authority of his spiritual and temporal overlord. There was no real individual religious, political or intellectual freedom. Spiritually, medieval man was completely dependent on the church and its authority. Politically he was almost subjected to the authority of his feudal lord. Only the towns and their burghers had a certain degree of freedom. Otherwise the medieval citizen of feudal society was completely resigned to the "will of God" or to the will of his feudal lord.

But from the sixteenth century there began a progressive reaction against the feudal lack of freedom and political hierarchy. At first it was a spiritual and intellectual revolt. It appears first in the field of religion, in the intellectual struggles for freedom of conscience: hence it is later transferred to the region of struggle for political freedom. It begins with *Thomas Aquinas,* finds expression in *Machiavelli,* the *Protestant politicians, Bacon, Erasmus of Rotterdam, La Boëtie, Bodin* and many other less important thinkers, and culminates in the first proposal of a utopian socialist and democratic State, by *Sir Thomas More.*

All the main ideas which stimulated the time of revolutionary individualism in the eighteenth century were even then hotly discussed: the right of property, freedom of conscience, and other rights of the individual, the right of revolution, slavery. All this was under the influence of the return to classical individualism and of the whole intellectual revolution that accompanied *the Renaissance and Reformation.*

If we want to judge the present state of democracy correctly, we must look at it from the historical point of view. All the three main periods of European development which preceded the realisation of democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—*the centuries of feudalism* (the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth), *the centuries of absolute monarchy* (the seventeenth and eighteenth), and finally *the period of the American and French revolutions*—give us graphic instruction as to how modern democracy originated, how it developed, and even how it is likely to develop in future.

The Period of Absolute Monarchy

The decay of the feudal state and society was largely the result of a struggle among the governing classes and castes. They fought either each other or the feudal monarch. The feudal estates were not always able to yield to the legitimate interests of the nation and the State as a whole, and their blind egoism caused the downfall of the whole fabric of feudal society. This was the main factor that aided the creation of a state absolutism by the monarchs of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What happened was in a certain degree similar to the relentless struggle of political parties in the twentieth century which ended with the downfall of democracy and the establishment of a dictatorial régime in a number of states.

The victory of the absolute ruler over the feudal estates repressed for a time the small beginnings of the political individualism and desire for freedom which had been growing in the feudal diets of the sixteenth century. And in ideas and in politics we enter into a period of absolute monarchy which lasted for almost two centuries. The old feudal rights of the nobility were slowly absorbed by the central power of the king. The absolute monarchy usurped all legislative and executive power, abolished the feudal courts, whether aristocratic, ecclesiastic, or municipal, abolished local taxes and dues and replaced them by royal taxes, suppressed the influence of the estate diets, centralised all administration with the help of a new organisation of state bureaucracy, and finally established a standing army. Thus it unified the whole state, concentrated all sovereignty in its central organs, and *created the conception of a unified, centralised, and despotically ruled modern state, in contrast to the old feudal state,* whose power was distributed among the separate classes or estates.

The state became identified with the person of the monarch who was its genuine embodiment. The king was God's representative on earth and sovereign over the other feudal lords and aristocrats, who gradually entered the military and administrative service. The king was the only source of authority, was free and sovereign, and responsible for his deeds only to God. The state saw its destiny as a constant extension of its power abroad and the strengthening of royal power at home.[1]

The church continued its old task of caring for the spiritual life of the subjects, but its temporal power declined sharply. In its place a new relation between church and

[1] According to HOBBES, one of the main philosophers and propagandists of absolute monarchy, force and power are the foundations of the state. By them the state is preserved and exalted.

state developed: the church became the main support of absolute monarchy, and the monarchy, in turn, became the main support of the church.[2]

The individual as such, the citizen of the régime of absolute monarchy, had no special political rights, any more than in the feudal régime. The interests of the individual were absorbed by the interests of the state, represented by the king. The so-called "natural rights" were not acknowledged: all political power was derived from God, absolute monarchy was responsible to him for everything, and the "Grace of God" supported and preserved the absolute ruler.

The state of absolute monarchy obviously shares a majority of its political principles with feudal monarchy, though it has some special characteristics of its own. The absolutist monarchical state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries preserved, of course, the old medieval authoritarianism of the church and feudal nobility, the lack of political, spiritual, and moral freedom, the absence of legal consistency and even a constant tendency to direct lawlessness.

Period of the French and American Revolutions as Preparation for Modern Democracy

The intellectual development and the political events which caused the downfall of the European absolutist monarchies are well known.

The French Revolution destroyed both the last relics of

[2] As to freedom of conscience and religion, the state was a servant of the church, and suppressed all schisms, since they were supposed to weaken the state and to spread disorder and rebellion among the subjects. The state had the right to use any means to preserve its power and coherence. Machiavelli became the teacher on this point not only of all feudal lords and princes, but also of all absolute monarchs.

feudalism and the absolutist superstructure of the previous two hundred years. It opened the way to the development of modern European democracy. And it must be very strongly underlined just at the beginning of this chapter how the political ideology of the French Revolution, the foundation and preparation for this new European democracy, was largely inspired by the development of *parliamentarianism and constitutionalism in England* and the *American struggle for independence with its political practice and theory.*

Spiritually the struggle on the European continent for democracy, leading to a modern outlook, was a reaction against the intellectual and moral system of the medieval church, against the survival of feudal society and of aristocratic and absolutist monarchy. It was a struggle of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for the creation of an intellectual and moral system of liberalism and individualism. It took up again the ideas which the Renaissance and the Reformation had brought into political thought and modern political science and which were further elaborated in the course of the whole eighteenth century, beginning with the important work of the English philosopher, JOHN LOCKE, who was the first great pioneer of modern liberalism in the history of philosophy and political science. The French Revolution itself was, then, the expression of all this intellectual activity from the time of medieval philosophy, from *Thomas Aquinas,* through the Renaissance and Reformation, *Machiavelli, Sir Thomas More, Bacon, Descartes, Pascal, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Locke* and *Hume, Thomas Paine, Hamilton, Adams* and *Jefferson, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant* and *Fichte* up to recent times. Here culminated the intellectual struggle for the freedom of the individual, since it decreed and

published a *codex of unchangeable natural rights* of the free human personality and established a new modern legal society. The *Declaration of Human Rights* by the French and American revolutions was a political and philosophical act, in which the intellectual and political efforts of five centuries (or even, one could say, the struggle for the political development and organisation of society in all ages) was concentrated. It was the triumph of reason and the freedom of conscience, science and research, the triumph of rationalism as a philosophical method and system against the old medieval scholastic philosophy, Catholic theology and religious intolerance. The "Cult of Reason" during the Revolution was extravagant, but it was a characteristic sign of the time.

The French Revolution thus became by the declaration of human rights the expression of the whole school of philosophy which for centuries fought for the recognition of the so-called *"natural rights"*—that is, for the innate rights of man, the equality of human beings in general, the equality of peoples, nations, and races—and an expression of the whole universalist philosophy which we today call the *philosophy of humanity*. It gave vivid actualisation to spiritual, intellectual, and religious freedom and to the whole principle of toleration and free discussion. To it also the modern age owes the foundations of the liberal economic system of the past and present century.

The rule of reason and freedom of thought made the development of the natural sciences, research, and technology possible, and, by formulating the modern theory of evolution and progress, created our whole modern world of inventions, of sciences, of economic expansion, and the industrial and commercial transformation of a number of European states and nations: *in economics and social pol-*

icy it created the nineteenth century world of industrial bourgeoisie; *in politics,* the régimes of constitutional and liberal democracy; *in philosophy,* the world of intellectual, religious, and cultural freedom and toleration; *in science,* the great expansion of the natural sciences, technology, and science applied to *practical life in general.*

The French revolutionary SIEYÈS, in his well-known book called "What Is the Third Estate?" written in the enthusiasm of the beginnings of the French Revolution as a sort of political preface to the practical activity of the revolution, is one of the greatest intellectual pioneers of the coming modern democracy. On the other side of the ocean there was THOMAS PAINE in his books "Common Sense," "The Rights of Man," and "The Age of Reason"; and I mention him especially because of his theoretical work, without forgetting the achievements, theoretical and practical, of the great American pioneers of freedom and democracy, Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Hamilton, John Adams, and, of course, Jefferson. All these continued in the tradition of the philosophers and prophets of modern political liberalism and individualism whom we have enumerated above. The torchbearers of the American and French revolutions spread an enlightenment and vitality which is a kind of second Renaissance and Reformation that came two centuries after the first Renaissance and Reformation.

In practical *political life* the French Revolution was a reaction against the political régimes of the past, against the feudal régime and absolutist monarchy. It established a sense of impartial legality, valid for all citizens alike, and an equal judicature, just to all citizens. It abolished serfdom and the most important remnants of the feudal caste system as well as the religious privileges of all the churches,

establishing their equality, and at the same time introduced religious freedom and tolerance. Most important, it introduced the representative system with a right of representation for all classes of the population and with a right of participation in the political life of the state and nations. It gave freedom of conscience, science and art, freedom of industry, commerce, and economic activities generally, freedom to dispose of property and new property rights. In brief: not only in philosophy and thought, but also in practical political, social, and economic life, it laid for the nations of Europe the foundations of modern life, *on which are built the European society of the nineteenth century, the society of liberal bourgeoisie first and of the industrial and capitalistic bourgeoisie a little later, especially in the West of Europe.*

On the whole this philosophy was *rationalist, equalitarian, universalist, and humanistic, and proclaimed international brotherhood. It was liberal and democratic in the synthetic sense in which we use the term today.* It became the foundation of the society which developed towards the end of the nineteenth century in mature nations, especially in France and England, the Scandinavian States, in Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland. From there the influence of these ideas and institutions spread all over the European continent.

Such was the intellectual and moral development which gradually created a system of modern democratic thinking, from the feudal period to the time of the French Revolution, through the Renaissance and Reformation, the medieval political thinkers, the intellectual pioneers of the French Revolution and the architects of modern political individualism and liberalism. In practical politics *a régime of liberal, constitutional democracy, with its centre of gravity in an industrial bourgeoisie,* followed the decay

of feudalism, the development and fall of absolute monarchy on the European continent, the slow forging of the modern English constitution and of the American and French revolutions.

The French Revolution is, therefore, a great landmark between two epochs of European and world history. If we reflect on the development of present-day Europe and the world, and if we want to gain a correct perspective of present-day democracy and its future development, we have constantly to return to this starting point of modern Europe and to these foundations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and we must set them against their background.

The ideology of the great French Revolution also brought about the triumph of *the idea of nationality,* which, in its modern form, could find its political and cultural expression only when the medieval caste-system had fallen, and when the masses had found a voice in cultural and political life, creating distinctive national civilisations with astonishing speed. The idea of nationality in its modern European sense was the noble flower of individualism and romanticism, and grew out of the "enlightenment" and the French Revolution. I shall discuss this question in more detail later.

Development of Liberal Bourgeois Democracy Up to the Appearance of the "Fourth Estate"

Feudal society before the French Revolution was controlled by the social values and authority of the chief estates, the aristocracy and the church, acting through the prerogatives of the monarchy. The prerogatives of the monarchy continued in the system of the authoritarian

state with some changes: the central power of the state and king were strengthened; the authority of the church limited more to the spiritual field; while new functions in civil service were given to aristocracy. This prerevolutionary order was, as we saw, overthrown by the French Revolution. *The third estate—the bourgeoisie, or burghers*—was drawn into the struggle for power, and a new order was eventually created which in Europe is called *"bourgeois civilisation"* or *"bourgeois liberal democracy"—middle-class liberal democracy.*

But revolutionary liberalism, political individualism, and the philosophy of human rights, which had disintegrated the society of estates and absolute monarchy in Europe and had brought a new element—the *bourgeoisie*—into the social structure of the nineteenth century, had, in the very act of building a new order of bourgeois civilisation and democracy, prepared the way for *a further logical development which began to disintegrate bourgeois democracy.* The gradual realisation of human rights, together with the creation of modern industrial capitalism, had awakened to political life a *"fourth estate,"* as we call it in Europe—*the workman and the small peasant*—and had led it to demand a share in the new social order *for the most numerous class of all.* Once democratic ideas were abroad, it was inevitable, for the fundamental principle of democracy is the consistent rule of the whole people—not of an estate, not of a party, not of several estates or parties, but *the rule and government of all estates, all parties, the whole nation.*

This completely natural development is, on the one hand, a struggle against the survivals in the practical conduct of a new postrevolutionary bourgeois society of aristocracy, theocracy, and the general prerevolutionary anti-

democratic elements. On the other hand, it is only a logical extension and development of spiritual, political, and social forces present even in the bourgeois revolutions of France and America. This was apparent in the revolutionary upheaval of 1830 in France, in the first labour disturbances in the thirties of the nineteenth century in England, in the first struggles for liberalism during the first half of the nineteenth century in Germany, and even in the Decembrist movement around 1825 in Russia. *The revolution of 1848 in Europe, seen in its proper political and social context,* is the culmination of a period of romantic struggle *for social freedom,* as a corollary of the *political* freedom won by the French and American revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century.

In this revolution the "fourth estate" proclaimed to the world its political existence and made in Europe its first organised appearance. Later, in the next decades and in the rising of the Paris commune in 1870, the labouring class assumed a pugnacious attitude. *From the eighties, first the workmen, then the peasants and the lower middle class, very emphatically claimed their share of power, of government, and of benefits from the new social order.* After 1848, political doctrines, organised movements and parties arose which defended the interests and rights of the urban working classes; and from 1880 movements and parties were organised among the peasants and the lower middle classes. The equalitarian and humanist, cosmopolitan and pacifist philosophy of the French Revolution had logically led to a protest against all social and economic privilege and to a gradual realisation of political and social brotherhood to be expressed in a new democratic and equalitarian social order, as well as to a general fraternisation in the field of international politics.

The trend towards a greater political role of the fourth estate did not, of course, stop with sentimental enthusiasm for social justice. The working class constructed fighting organisations, whether political parties or trade unions; it adopted the old idea of class differentiation in society, which had been revived by the first socialist thinkers during the French Revolution (Barnave), by the first pioneers of the English working-class movement (Owen) and especially by the socialist revolutionaries in 1848 (Louis Blanc and Proudhon in France, Marx and Engels in Germany).

Organised political working-class parties began, then, to build their policy systematically on the new doctrine of class struggle, and the social problem was thus transferred from the field of moral reflections to that of scientific study. In the struggle against conservative and liberal parties for a new social order, scientific and sociological laws of development and the material power of the popular masses and their organisations were increasingly stressed, rather than abstract principles of humanitarian morality. This organised international socialist movement—especially in the industrial states of Europe—became step by step a new political power in the second half of the nineteenth century. *It was a time of struggle for scientific, class-conscious, Marxist socialism.*

After the fall of the Second Empire in France in 1871, that system of parliamentary and liberal democracy which characterised Europe up to the War of 1914 became established politically. It was a system of more or less free constitutionalism, *built on the rule of political parties.* At first there were two opposing camps of parties, the liberal and the conservative. From 1880 an organised working-class movement was added. Later a peasant party followed, and thus in most European states, especially in states of mixed nationalities, a larger number of parties were established,

divided into three main groups: conservative, liberal, and socialist.[3]

In this way, after the victory of the third estate in the course of the nineteenth century, and after the creation and stabilisation of national cultures and several national

[3] The representatives of the fourth estate—the socialists—were, it is true, in opposition to the liberal bourgeoisie; but on the whole they remained faithful to the principles and philosophy of the French Revolution and frequently even emphasised them more than the other parties: they remained adherents of a universalist philosophy of humanity, they advocated the equality and brotherhood of all peoples, nations, and races, they were pacifist and cosmopolitan, they even specially stressed internationalism and the solidarity of all working classes all over the world. *In this respect they remained sons of the French and American revolutions: they wanted to be genuine and really consistent democrats.*

They diverged, however, from the whole tradition of liberal bourgeois democracy on two important points:

(1) The development of capitalism and economic liberalism and their well-known excesses in the exploitation of labour induced them to demand a limitation of the economic freedom of the individual, to ask for far-reaching social legislation and for greater interference of the state in social and economic questions in general. They wanted thus to strengthen again the central power of the state, and to extend its functions, especially on the social and economic field. They elaborated their views on these matters in the well-known *theory of a collectivist, socialist state.* Thereby they raised again, though in a new form, the age-old difficulty of the right relationship between the individual and the state, the problem of the freedom of human personality in democratic society in its relation to the sovereign rights of the state, which is harder to solve in a democratic state than in any other sort of regime.

(2) The second important difference was in the *theory of class struggle:* they considered the working class as a special class which was politically and economically disinherited. They detached themselves, therefore, from the bourgeois liberal and democratic class, and proclaimed that the difference of classes would be abolished for good only in a new social order, in which the state, by reason of its new collectivist constitution, would make all citizens equal, not only politically—as was done by the revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie—but also socially and economically. Through the doctrine of class struggle the socialists, however, drew near to communism, which followed all the consequences of this theory and advocated the dictatorship of the proletariat as its logical outcome, thus actually denying the essential principles of modern democracy as it was created by the liberal French and American revolutions.

states in Europe during the same period, in every state and European nation a share of power and better conditions of life were demanded by the "fourth estate": *the workmen, the peasants, the lower middle class.* And this becomes *one of the fundamental political questions of the new European society at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century; this became* also *the last stage of the fight for European democracy on the basis of the principles of the French Revolution.* The question of how to transform the *political* liberal democracy into a new kind of *social and economic* democracy arose.

This new fundamental question was strongly underlined and made more urgent by the World War of 1914–18, and was brought to the very forefront by the great Russian Revolution. After the war it assumed fresh and tremendous importance in the dictator states. They reject, it is true, most resolutely all forms of *political* democracy, but *at the price of fullest emphasis on social problems.*

In such a way the bourgeois postwar European society is just now waging a new life-and-death struggle of enormous dimensions. It is a struggle both for the preservation of *political* democracy against the right-wing totalitarian dictatorships on the one side, and for the solution of *social* problems in the spirit and in the framework of political democratic institutions against the communist system on the other.

In my opinion, *it is a struggle for the transformation of the old, purely political bourgeois democracy into new higher and at the same time deeper and more perfect democracy which I will call humanitarian democracy.* This system should try to save the political and personal freedom and dignity of the individual citizen and, on the other hand, should prepare the transformation of the present

liberal economic and social system into a more human and more just society, with a higher degree of social and economic justice.

This would be, then, *a new phase of democratic experience*. While trying to preserve in principle the old individualist *political* philosophy of the French Revolution, modern democracy in its present and most advanced stage must try to apply its principles of *liberty, equality, and fraternity also to the social and economic fields*. It must put right every social and economic injustice in bourgeois democracy, counteract the defects of modern industrialism and capitalism, and it must try to transform the present political European bourgeois democracy into a social and economic democracy.

The great dilemma which modern European democracy is facing today is: totalitarian fascist and national socialist authoritarianism on one side, and Marxist socialism and communism on the other side. How democracy will try to save its existence, accepting in this dilemma a new, modern shape—that is today its life-and-death question. This question is almost insoluble—and still, it can be resolved and it *must* be resolved.

I shall return to this fundamental question of contemporary European democracy in my conclusions in the last chapter.

Parallel to the development of a movement for political and social justice and democratic equality in Europe and in the world, and as its natural and necessary consequence, advances relentlessly *the gradual emancipation of the oppressed and subject nations in Europe and the growth of the idea of nationality*. From romantic and sentimental patriotism, through a proud and justified national self-respect, it progresses up to the present extravagant and ex-

aggerated nationalism of the fascist colour. Along with the struggle for democracy and in close connection with it, the whole of the nineteenth century is filled with the strenuous fight of the small European nations for cultural and political revival and finally for their formal independence as states.

Inspired by the ideology of democracy, the small nations were carried also into the practical political life of Europe. Step by step their fight for democracy as well as for their independent existence undermined the coherence of the old European states with several nationalities: the small Balkan nations freed themselves; ancient Austria-Hungary and ancient Turkey shook under the impact of national struggles and drifted inexorably towards disintegration, while the postwar Soviet Russia accepted voluntarily the liberation of the small Baltic nations. If we survey in this light the history of the nineteenth century and glance at political maps of Europe today and a century ago, we are astonished at the changes this has produced.

Let us add that at the same time, in the period in which this social evolution of Europe has taken place, from the time of Napoleon, a *hegemony of great powers* had been created in Europe: Great Britain was putting the finishing touches on her Empire; France from 1830 slowly built a new colonial empire, mainly in Africa and the Mediterranean; Russia expanded via Siberia to become a neighbour of Japan; Prussia gradually unified Germany and pushed Austria-Hungary to second place in Central Europe; Italy finally became also unified and joined the great powers.

Thus the European world at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, after passing through more than a century of rapid change from the French Revolution up to 1914, was at the time before the

World War torn by three great groups of ideas and interests:

(a) The struggle for the realisation of political democracy as the inheritance of the American and French revolutions. This struggle was after 1880 transformed from a striving for political democracy into a struggle for social and economic democracy.

(b) The struggle for the realisation of justice to the nationalities, the emancipation of the oppressed small nations and the creation of national states. This struggle also is an inheritance from the French and American revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century, and is actually an essential part of the development of modern democracy.

(c) The struggle for the position in power politics of the European great powers, which became stabilised in their positions in the course of the nineteenth century, and which at the end of the nineteenth century watched one another's further development with mutual suspicion. Several of these powers expected that the struggles for political democracy and for social and economic rights and the struggles for the emancipation of the nationalities would disrupt certain states and would raise for the remaining great powers the question of who was to inherit their possessions, either on the Continent or in the colonies.

Almost inevitably such speculations envisaged an approaching World War.

The French Revolution, the Fight for Democracy, and the Present Crisis of Europe

In our sketch of the intellectual and political development of Europe since the French Revolution we have thus come up to the World War and its relation to the rise and growth of European democracy, and arrived at the present-day moral and political crisis of Europe.

Speaking of the great achievements of the French Revo-

lution on the field of democratisation of Europe and of the world, I know, of course, that like every great revolution or other great historical event, the French Revolution was a very complicated social phenomenon and not only provoked great political and social currents toward the democratisation of modern society, but also gave origin to other different movements which *could act in just the opposite direction.*

But, underlining the processes of the democratisation of Europe and the world as the special side of the consequences of the French Revolution, I did not intend to judge and evaluate *all sides of this great historical event* nor to embrace its entire content—politically, economically, socially, and morally. I merely emphasised *the most characteristic* and most important side of the French Revolution and its results.

The French Revolution has spread throughout Europe and the world the principles of moral and intellectual liberty and of political and social equality. The French Revolution has changed in Europe the conceptions of the relation between men, classes, and nations in the sense of the ideas of humanity; the unhuman civil and criminal law, the unhuman treatment of the Jews, the unhuman religious persecution and intolerance—all that was abolished. The French Revolution—as it was already pointed out above—has liberated from all medieval restraints the hidden moral and physical energies of modern man, has given him opportunities of enormous spiritual and material development. It has created in this way the whole nineteenth and twentieth centuries of modern science and arts, modern technology, modern economic and industrial development, and of the whole spiritual and material wealth, as we know Europe in the period between the fall of Napoleon in 1815 and the World War in 1914.

But the French Revolution created many other currents and had other consequences which are practically the basis of the profound crisis of the present Europe. The French Revolution established economic freedom, which has created modern capitalism and industrialism and which has, on the other side, provoked the creation and evolution of socialism and communism. The French Revolution was universalist, cosmopolite, and therefore internationalist, but gave new formulation to the idea of nationality and the real basis of the nationalism of the nineteenth century. This nationalism, on the other side, laid down the foundations for the new chauvinism of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The French Revolution was universalist and pacifist. But through the Napoleonic Wars it created for the first time in Europe the popular mass army and gave to the modern world the conception of the war, not of armies, but of peoples. Through Napoleon the French Revolution prepared also the conception of the modern nationalist and totalitarian dictator. Guglielmo Ferrero is right when he says that the first model of the totalitarian dictatorship of our postwar period was Napoleon.

All this means that the present-day crisis of European democracy is but a continuation of the spiritual, political, and social fight which began under the French Revolution, and that all the present quarrels about the political and social ideas and systems—either dictatorship or democracy, either freedom or fascism and communism—had their origin in the destruction of the feudal and monarchistic society and in the attempt of the French Revolution to lay the foundations of the equalitarian, humanistic, and universalist modern society.

If we examine attentively the results of the last World War of 1914–18 from the same point of view as we have just

done those of the French Revolution, we come to exactly the same conclusion: it had the same results for the idea of democracy, for the idea of nationality, for the idea of social justice, for the idea of peace and militarism, for the idea of freedom and dictatorship.

All this means that the fight for the freedom of human personality and dignity, the fight for the free development of man and the nation, which had been the main and fundamental aim of the French and American revolutions, continued during the entire nineteenth century, was newly put before the man of the twentieth century in its whole tragic profundity in the last World War and forms the real content of the moral, intellectual, and political crisis of the present Europe and the world. In the last period of European history (since 1932) it is almost completely hidden under the power-political aspirations for the domination of small nations and colonies of the great dictatorial powers and under the fear of world social revolution of the ruling classes in the western European democracies.

Chapter II

THE WORLD WAR AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE DEMOCRATISATION OF EUROPE

The Power-Political Causes of the War

The World War of 1914–18 had far-reaching power-political consequences. In the first place, it fundamentally changed the political map of Europe. It caused, however, much political change in the rest of the world. From an economic and social point of view, too, it brought about great upheavals; for this reason it is rightly referred to as a *world revolution.* There is no doubt that in the future the World War will mark a new epoch, just as the French Revolution, which produced the European bourgeois world, did as regards Continental Europe.

In stating these facts, I wish only to emphasise the point of view of those who argue that the World War in a political and social respect caused a fundamental and decisive move towards the democratisation of the whole European world, and it did this to such a degree that it may be characterised aptly as a struggle for world democracy. This holds good in spite of the fact that present-day development of Europe is temporarily tending in an opposite direction.

The World War had, of course, as its immediate origin the power-political dispute, the issue of which involved the Balkans, Constantinople, the Black Sea Straits, and the heritage of Turkey in general. The direct impulse and pretext which brought it about was the conflict between

Austria-Hungary and Serbia. It was, first and foremost, an Austro-Hungarian-Russian dispute; in the background of it, however, stood Germany with her more or less official schemes which were known as Pan-Germanism.

Austria-Hungary wanted to prevent Serbia, partly from forming a union with the Croats, partly from gaining any further national territories from the Turkish heritage; Austria-Hungary also wanted to maintain for herself the route to Salonica and thus to render impossible any realisation of the idea of national unification and liberation of all southern Slavs. The effect of a Serbian success upon the other nations within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and upon their struggle for liberation would have menaced the continued existence of the Empire, and in any case the dominating position hitherto held by the Germans and Magyars there. Budapest feared this just as much as Vienna. The humiliation of Serbia in the war evoked in the year 1914 was therefore intended also to stop the advancing internal decay of the Habsburg Empire, or at least its transformation in accordance with the federalistic demands of its individual nations.

The conviction that the Habsburg Empire could maintain itself only by means of dualism which would involve the unmistakable predominance of the Germans in Cisleithania-Austria and the absolutist supremacy of the Magyar aristocratic caste in Hungary was an axiom of the Austro-Hungarian prewar policy. The foreign policy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire accorded with it, and it entailed also the dependence of the Empire upon Berlin.

Germany supported this policy of Vienna and Budapest chiefly because it made it possible for her to carry out her own power schemes. The decisive factor in the policy of Germany before the war was what during the war became known as the Pan-German ideology; it constituted the vast

consciousness of national power and resources on the part of the leading circles in Germany and, indeed, of the whole nation, and it was intensified by the militaristic spirit not only among the leading circles but also in current public opinion; in a considerable section of German literature, scholarship, and the arts, and in social life as a whole this had been elaborated into a regular system which formed the German prewar political philosophy of power. It was associated with the consciousness that the German nation had a special mission in Central Europe and, indeed, throughout Europe and in the whole world at large, and that it was entitled to hold sway over the whole of Central and Southeastern Europe, to gain predominance in the Near East and in Africa and, altogether, to be the leading factor in these areas; the other nations living there were intended to accept, to assist and to tolerate this leadership and domination. All this was proclaimed as if it were something obvious and best in accordance with the development and mission of the German nation, something, moreover, which had found its best expression in the vast military, technical, economic, financial and, indeed, power-political development of prewar Germany.

The Germany of Bismarck had brought chiefly economic prosperity to the German nation, and in this prosperity it had begun gradually to submerge all the idealism, both of the people and of the German national élite. The outward display, the prosperity, the wealth, and the enormous advance of prewar Germany, all of which bestowed upon her the consciousness of strength and authority, caused such an increase of materialism in every aspect of German life that scarcely anyone ventured to foresee the evil effects of this development. They were revealed only with the outbreak of the war and by the manner in which Germany waged it.

This growth of materialism meant that such conceptions as authority, strength, size, command were everywhere given precedence over justice, rights, ideas, discussions, and liberty. Schools, universities, men of learning, and authors helped to promote this great national expansion then regarded as natural, reasonable, irresistible. When put into practice this trend of German thought displayed itself with the support of Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans, for this policy was merely preparing the ground for the expansion of Germany. Berlin realised the weakness of Vienna and Budapest, and was aware that in a struggle against the schemes of Russia in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean Straits, and in the Near East they could and would be only an implement and an auxiliary, but that the real master of the situation would be Berlin. Prewar Turkey, seeing herself menaced by collapse, sought in Berlin a support which would at least enable her to go on vegetating, more especially as Russia, with schemes for finally securing the Byzantine heritage and free access to the Mediterranean, was her archenemy.

In this sense Germany made systematic preparations—and in doing so she was conscious of her internal powers of expansion and of her technical, economic, and financial resources—for the conflict to secure supremacy in the Balkans, the Straits, and the Turkish heritage. She was resolved to undertake a military struggle not only against Russia, but also against France, the ally of Russia, and it was her intention then once more and finally to put into operation the above-mentioned political programme. This was conceived for the purpose of securing once and for all the predominating influence throughout Central Europe, in Austria-Hungary, in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, in North Africa, and in various parts of Turkey. This was

the policy which was expressed by the famous slogan of "Berlin-to-Baghdad."

If we add to this those features which characterised the internal political life and régime of prewar Germany—that is, the lack of true parliamentarianism, the restricted freedom, the influence of Prussian Junkerdom, bureaucracy, and militarism, the faint-heartedness of liberalism, and the doctrinaire non-revolutionary character of German social democracy—we can realise the spirit in which Germany entered the World War.

Prewar Germany was not, of course, only the Germany of Bismarck and the Kaiser; there was also the German spirit as represented by such men as Herder, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, Beethoven, Mozart, Kant, and the circle of the Humboldts. There were two Germanys before the war, the Germany of the Kaiser and Ludendorff and the Germany of Herder and Goethe—just as there are two Germanys today, the Germany of Hitler and Goebbels and the Germany of Thomas Mann.

In comparison with Germany, Austria-Hungary did not outwardly produce the impression of being a state so much animated by the philosophy of crude power. It lacked the strength of any national idea, or of Prussian militarism and order, or of a well-established administrative and state unity. On the other hand, it had the advantage of an old dynastic idea, of the power and influence of the Catholic church, of the long bureaucratic experience of the old nobility and also of the Magyar political régime which in many respects equalled and even exceeded the prewar violence of Prussianism.

On the whole, the two states were directed by a purposeful political absolutism, supported by the dynasty, the military and aristocratic bureaucracy, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the caste of landowning aristocracy and the special

militaristic system which in Germany was based upon the carefully elaborated programme of political and economic expansion in Central and Southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Near East, and North Africa. The control and rule of the mosaic of small nations in all these territories was to be in the hands of the German nation. This was to be its special national mission in Europe and in the world.

The Rise of a New Democratic Ideology During the War

The speed and force with which Germany realised her political and military plans in the early months of the war, the precision and thoroughness of her military machine and operations, which allowed her to crush almost all her adversaries and to occupy one Allied state after the other, quite logically turned the attention of the governments and public opinion of the Allied countries to a new question. How, they asked, will it be possible in future to prevent the political expansion of the autocratic states of Central Europe, to find guarantees against their irresponsible absolutism and militarism after the war, and so to achieve a more permanent peace?

This obviously concerned *the fundamental war aims of the Allies.* The *struggle against militarism* and everything that was called *Prussianism* became the battle-cry and the focal war policy of the Allied powers. The more Germany was victorious in the field, the more strongly the Allies felt the necessity that she should be decisively defeated as a military power. From the end of 1916, in all Allied countries, and especially in Great Britain, a military victory over Germany and the annihilation of her military system for the future became necessary conditions of any peace.

This first aim of the destruction of German militarism and all that was meant by prewar Prussianism was soon *supplemented by further war aims* which followed from it logically. It was necessary to find guarantees in *a complete reorganisation of Europe,* and especially of Central Europe, as regards *both internal and foreign policy,* a reorganisation which would prevent the recurrence of an attack and would meet the interests and needs of the Allied states. This meant that it would be essential to introduce *real constitutionalism and a free democratic régime,* first of all in Germany, and then all over the territory of the Habsburg monarchy. Poland had to be liberated, and greater rights or even full freedom had to be given to the Slavonic nations of the Habsburg Empire; a new arrangement had to be found for the Balkans. In short, the idea of a freer, democratic régime in Germany and in the whole of Central Europe, as a guarantee against the misuse of these states and nations by their absolutist dynasties and governments, was soon supplemented by new needs and wishes of the Allied powers, which were *both ideal and practical.* Briefly they wanted *to draw a new map of Europe by liberating the oppressed nations of Central and Southeastern Europe.*

The Allied powers were, then, almost forced to adopt the *third great idea,* which during the war assumed such paramount importance: the idea of the liberation of the oppressed nations.

The war started with a provocative ultimatum to the small nation of Serbia and with an invasion of her territory. Immediately afterwards Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium, and almost the whole country was occupied, in defiance of every principle of international law. *These facts, from the very beginning, determined every*

moral judgment on the war. Allied propaganda was able to use them as a strong moral weapon against the Central powers and coined the slogan—for the reconstruction and liberation of the small nations, which at first was adopted for almost sentimental reasons. Originally the Allies thought only of Serbia and Belgium, but later the slogan was slowly transformed into a general principle and was extended to include all the other small nations, especially when Germany and Austria-Hungary occupied the Balkans, Poland, and the Baltic states, conquered the Ukraine and Finland, and subjected Rumania, forcing her to accept a very harsh peace.

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the idea of nationalism is a product of modern times, a result of Renaissance and Reformation philosophy and of the humanitarian philosophy of the French Revolution, which proclaimed the rights of man and of the citizen. The principles of freedom and democracy were applied not only to individuals, but also to the nation as a whole. As the Great War was a struggle of Western democracy against Central European and Eastern European absolutism, its consequences necessarily became the culmination of the European development during the last century, with its struggle for the independence of the oppressed nationalities.

In the Allied countries *there grew slowly, during the course of the war, from these three main elements a new ideology of the nature, meaning, and general purpose of the World War.*

The development of Allied ideology culminated in the answer of the Allied powers to President Wilson in the Note of 10th November 1917. After the well-known peace offer of the Central powers of the 12th December 1916,

President Wilson—who wanted to explain the real meaning of the war to the American and world-wide public, and who wanted to give a clear political and moral direction to his country during these great events—addressed to both warring camps a request for a formulation of their war aims in exact terms. The Central powers gave an ambiguous and evasive answer. The Allied states, however, were not only forced to think over their plans and to put them into concrete form in their answer, but also to *found them on great political and moral principles of universal validity,* which would be acceptable to and accord with the political conception of the United States of America.

Thus these three main principles which I have just mentioned were organised into a complex system of ideas. The pronouncements, speeches, and messages to Congress of President Wilson that during 1917 and up to April 1918 followed after this new determination of the European Allies and after that new orientation of their policy gave to this system that importance and prominence which later could not help revolutionising the whole world in the sense of the democratisation of the whole contemporaneous society. The United States and President Wilson became, therefore, for a time the chief exponents of this democratic ideology, especially in the eyes of the small European nations.

The rise, spread, and general acceptance of this ideology were, of course, also supported by the *political activities and propaganda of all the smaller States and nations* which were oppressed by the four absolutist powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Tsarist Russia. They all understood that the Great War was an opportunity, in which the nations waging war would be forced to make concessions to those whom they ruled—and that applied to both camps. After all, such a policy was forced not only on

Russia but even on Great Britain after the War. (Think of Ireland, Egypt, and Iraq.) *The Russian Revolution* supplemented and completed this development a little later, as it shook the whole of Europe and changed many of the aims, plans, wishes, interests, and needs of the war.

The Governments of France, Great Britain, and Italy succumbed rapidly to the force of this new ideology and realised clearly that it undermined the very foundations of the warring Central European states. In their successive pronouncements they spoke more and more, therefore, of the danger menacing Western civilisation from absolutist Central Europe, of the peril to the principles of democracy and liberty, of the rights of Belgium and Serbia and the small nations in general.

As they were responsible for the fate of their own countries in a war, they judged, of course, these questions at first from the individual—sometimes purely selfish—point of view of their own states: they again and again sought ways to come to a quick peace, especially with Vienna. In the beginning they were content to proclaim the idea of national liberty only in the sense of self-government or a federalisation of Central Europe. Only the continuation of the war, the impossibility of detaching Austria-Hungary from Germany, the increase of the propaganda of the suppressed nations and the superhuman exertions of Germany for the realisation of her Pan-German plans with the fullest support of Austria-Hungary, forced the Allies to go even further, to consider more deeply the meaning of the war and to look also for the advantages which could accrue to them from a more consistent application of the principle of nationality. Thus the great powers found the way to the small nations in Central Europe during the war: these then became their natural allies and their valuable assistants in the struggle for new political aims and ideals.

At that time and because of all these events people began to understand also the full meaning of Pan-Germanism.

Pan-Germanism in its prewar form was an extremist exaggeration and a complete perversion of the philosophy of nationality. While the idea of nationality is the direct expression of the respect of men belonging to one nation for men belonging to another nation, and is, therefore, the expression of the philosophy of pure humanitarianism, Pan-Germanism is a philosophy of force and of the domination of small nations by greater ones. *Pan-Germanism, as it was systematised by German philosophers and politicians, was the negation of the modern idea of nationality, of the principle of equality among people and nations, of the principles of democracy.* It was the negation of everything that Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States had represented before and during the war, both in political and in social ideas.

The present German dictatorship under the name of National Socialism is but a worse new edition of the old imperial Pan-Germanism—worse in theory, worse in practice, worse in immorality, cynicism, and the use of Brute Force, worse in all means and methods that it uses in order to realise its European and world-wide domination.

The struggle between the Central powers and the West thus became, in one important respect, a struggle for the realisation of one of the great ideas of this war, of the idea of nationality by a practical political reorganisation of the future Europe. The World War, by assuming the character of a struggle for the democratisation of the modern world, stressed as one of its essential factors the idea of nationality and the struggle for the national independence of the oppressed nations.

The Entry of the United States of America into the War and the Importance of the Russian Revolution for the Democratic Ideology

It is not necessary to examine in detail all the individual messages of President Wilson, issued during the war, in order to prove these conclusions. They contain a number of main principles which guided his whole policy, and which in the course of time forced themselves on the policy of the Allies. At the end, even the Central powers tried to use them, in order to save, by their help, what could no longer be saved in the moment of defeat. Their first formulation is not always clear and exact even with Wilson, but in the course of time it became more precise, and in the spring of 1918 his whole system of ideas was, in main outlines, presented to the public opinion of the world as a picture of a new, better, and more perfect political life after the war.

In politics these pronouncements opposed to the system of Prussian absolutism, aristocratism, and Central European theocracy the ideas of Anglo-Saxon democracy—especially as they had developed in America and as Wilson understood them from the point of view of his own presbyterianism and puritanism; to the policy of militarism, the idea of disarmament and arbitration; to the alignment of blocs of powers and secret diplomacy, the idea of a League of Nations; to the subjection of small states and nations, the principle of self-determination, the principle of democratic discussion and free decision; to the exclusive rule of the seas, their freedom and accessibility, open to all nations; to the unlimited economic struggle, the idea of greater economic freedom leading to economic cooperation.

Those in Europe who during the war stood for these ideas believed that the United States and President Wilson, both, because of their power and authority at that time and of their principles and consistency, would not cease in the struggle until the states opposing their political system had been forced to surrender. They believed this the more since the United States had no direct interest in the war and no special war aims of its own. The United States was, of course, guided by its interest in the survival of the Western European democracies, and by the democratic ideology and the principles of its President; Wilson understood correctly that the main question of the World War was not a question of this or that frontier in Europe, of this or that minor state in Central Europe, but the great question of the reorganisation in the democratic sense of a whole great part of old non-democratic Europe, and to a certain extent of the rest of the world.

The pronouncements of President Wilson, with which he reacted to some of the war activities of the Central powers, to their direct démarches at Washington, or to the pronouncements and diplomatic steps of the Allies, and in which he justified the entry into the war and the whole policy of the United States—all repeated again and again the idea of a new democratic era, of a struggle against militarism, imperialism, and the subjection of small states and nations, and of a League of Nations which would prepare a democratisation of international politics and international political life. The principle of the *self-determination of nations* was, for the first time, officially formulated by him.

Pronouncements of such a character, from such an authority, announced to the world as the political plans of the most powerful state, which had remained neutral for a long time, created a new mental atmosphere in Europe.

This, of course, affected the governments and the public opinion of Europe to such an extent that they in their turn speedily accepted this new democratic ideology and not only fashioned of it a powerful weapon of propaganda, but in the course of 1918 and immediately before the end of the war made it the very foundation of their war aims and of the whole of their policy.

The Russian Revolution in both its stages, the liberal bourgeois and the communist stage, completed this development as it occurred at a time when the United States and President Wilson were already engaged in diplomatic battle with the Central powers, and was one of the greatest events of the whole war period in its extent and repercussions on politics and ideas.

All the revolutionary Russian governments, whether liberal bourgeois or socialist and communist, had not only pronounced most decisively against absolutism, militarism, and the war aims of the Central powers, but also proclaimed quite clearly the idea of self-determination of nations and accepted in such a way the programme of President Wilson in principle.

All discussions of war aims, which since the Russian Revolution the Allied governments had to define more and more clearly, were under the influence of the ideology of the great revolution. The idea of freedom for all nationalities did not disappear from them, even when communism came to power in Russia. Most importantly, however, new unconquerable forces, ideal and moral, arose through the Russian Revolution, almost automatically, as in any revolution. All political thought on the Allied side was impelled by them in the direction of Wilson's ideas. In the states of Central Europe which were direct neighbours of Russia, these forces made indelible impression: they revo-

lutionised the masses, menaced autocracy of every kind, broke up the states of mixed nationalities, and made further waging of war difficult for the Central powers, though, on the other hand, the governments of these states tried skilfully to exploit the revolutionary chaos in Russia for their own ends. The Russian Revolution, by the mere fact of its existence, canonised, as it were, the philosophy and ideology of the war, as they had been accepted by the Western powers, at first only timidly, and then more firmly in the Note to President Wilson of 10th January 1917, and as they had been codified by Wilson himself in his messages.

In its communist stage the Russian Revolution went, of course, much further and forced all states to pay much more attention to economic and social questions in the solution of the problems of peace. Beside the question of political democratisation it enunciated in such a way the *demand for a social and economic democratisation.* By this peculiar development and by its far-reaching influence the Russian Revolution transformed the further stages of the war, slowly but more and more effectively, and in any case, at least *partly* into a kind of world revolution.[1]

[1] President Wilson himself in his message of 10th June 1917 to the Russian revolutionary government combined the events of the Russian Revolution in its first stage with the plans and the political programme of the United States during the war. It was the moment when Western Europe watched with apprehension the struggle in Russia against the extremists, especially the communist extremists, against anarchy in the state and against the dissolution of the army, against the incorrect explanations by the extremists of the war aims and policy of the Allies. Wilson understood the danger to which the new Russia was exposed and the crisis through which her young democracy was passing, and wanted by his message to assist the democratic Russian government in their struggle for the consolidation of the state and the preservation of the newly born democratic régime.

Everybody then understood the stress which Wilson, in his Note to the Russian government, laid on the struggle against the autocracies and for the liberation of small nations from a foreign yoke. And even though this

All these ideas were, after all, nothing substantially new. They were only an expressive formula for the political, economic, social, and moral development through which Europe and the whole world had passed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and just before the war. This development was enormously accelerated by the war and was not concluded with the signing of the peace treaties: it is again more actual today than ever before; it is still a matter of conflict in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (in Germany, Italy, Russia, Poland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, practically the whole Mediterranean, etc.); and it is spreading to Asia in different forms.

The world will be forced to deal with these questions for a long time to come: the postwar crisis is characterised by a struggle either for the destruction or for a further development of these democratic ideas which were stirred up in such a great degree by the war, and which for a while were completely victorious. Today out of the postwar confusion, the postwar nervousness, discontent, and unrest there arises against them an authoritarian reaction which

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message had not the effect on the internal development of affairs in Russia which the democratic Allied side had desired, still it meant the identification or at least the coordination of Wilson's theories on war aims with the main principles of the Russian Revolution in the struggle for world democracy and for the self-determination of nations. It was a reassertion of the new democratic ideology of the war in a moment of supreme historical and political importance, a new and solemn declaration of democratic philosophy and political morals, in which, during the whole remainder of the war, right up to its victorious end, the United States, the Russian Revolution, and the Western democracies were united officially. The meaning of the World War was defined by it for all these participants quite clearly and definitely.

tries to prove that just these ideas of political democracy were guilty of the present chaos, unrest, and discontent. On the other hand, the same authoritarian reaction tries to exploit these ideas to the limit, by pressing the principle of self-determination to its most absurd consequences and by increasing postwar nationalism to a paroxysm of hate. I shall describe this development more fully later.

Humanism, the Renaissance, and the Reformation are the foundations of modern political individualism. The Cartesian philosophy, the liberal philosophy in England, the French encyclopedists prepared this development, which led to the English, American, and finally French revolutions, to the break-up of the medieval conceptions of feudal aristocracy and the laying of the first foundations of modern constitutionalism. America and the whole of Western Europe (England, France, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian states, Switzerland and partly Italy) were in the vanguard of this development, which created modern man free from absolutist bonds, and proclaimed a philosophy of humanity, respect for every human being, a philosophy of social and political equality and of modern political democracy.

These nations and states of Western Europe and America had gone through the fire of political revolution in the previous centuries, and in their struggle for a gradual realisation of the ideals of modern democracy have also experienced *spiritual* revolution. By their *political* revolutions they created the conception of the modern citizen, who rules himself, rules for himself, rules by himself. Lincoln speaks of the government of the people, by the people, for the people.

Prewar Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan states, and Turkey, in spite of their long political evolution and their old political traditions, in spite of many political

changes in Europe in the Middle Ages and later in the centuries before the World War, never actually experienced such a revolution, either political or spiritual, as the states of Western Europe and America had undergone.

In Austria-Hungary absolutism ruled up to 1848. The revolution of that year was very imperfect and had little permanent effect: absolutism soon re-established its rule, and the whole period of constitutional government—since 1860 and since the establishment of the Dual Monarchy of 1867 and '68—was actually a veiled absolutism. The time from 1867 up to the Great War was, in the Danube Monarchy, a long struggle for the preservation of the external and internal *status quo* (of the absolutist and aristocratic structure of the Habsburg Empire), combined with the national oppression of the non-German and non-Magyar nations, a struggle against all attempts for a more liberal régime, for a freer treatment of the Austro-Hungarian nationalities and for a constitutional federalisation of the Habsburg Empire.

In Germany things were no better, though the absolutism and militarism of the Hohenzollerns gave the Empire more power and coherence, both internally and externally, and the discipline of the Germans bore it more patiently. In the old Turkey a kind of liberal revolution occurred only in 1908, on a smaller scale than that of 1848 in Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Under the circumstances then prevailing it was almost impossible to produce a spiritual revolution in the mentality of Central European citizens and to create a type of new democratic citizen. The prevailing medieval system prevented any more systematic mass education in humanitarian and democratic ideals, and, in states which consisted of several nationalities, prevented even education in national ideals, thus leading to a moral and intellectual

corruption of the masses among the oppressed nationalities.

The World War merely showed that Europe had already for a long time been divided into two opposing camps, not only politically, but also morally and spiritually. Those camps were: the Allied and the Central European. This does not mean that either of the opposing camps entered the war with this clearly elaborated political and ideological programme. Nevertheless, soon after the beginning of the war many of these ideas came to the fore more or less consciously in the politics of both camps. As I have explained before, both these tendencies found their full expression only during the course of the war; according to the way both sides waged the war on the enemy, and especially, according to their military successes, they codified their war programmes.

Russia, of course—and this I must very strongly underline and quite objectively point out—belonged to the Allied side. This fact does not make an exception to my general thesis of the démarche of the World War. Quite to the contrary! Even there these tendencies were apparent. Governed as it was by Tsarist absolutism, with a powerless parliament, with masses quite uneducated politically, with impossible social conditions and a corrupt bureaucracy, with bad methods of administration and a medieval political, economic, and social structure, Russia belonged in spirit and by its stage of development to the group of the Central powers. This was true even though, by the interests of her foreign policy and her ambition, she was brought into the Allied camp and actually was the first of the great Allied powers to join in the war against Central Europe. And all that happened in Russia after the war proves that this assertion is exact.

This view of the nature and meaning of the Great War

was not and is not, of course, accepted everywhere. One theory about the character and the nature of the war simply contrasts two great blocs of powers with all their material power, state against state, as if it had been at first only a question of the prestige of one dynasty or state, wishing to punish the irredentist intrigues of little Serbia, and as if the whole war had been *only a gigantic imperialistic struggle for political power between two groups of world states.* Others—especially socialists—formed the theory of a *capitalist war,* which was waged for colonies and for economic expansion to the East, for the control of Asia and the market of the world. Finally others saw the war as a struggle between *two nationalisms,* as a struggle between the nations on the basis of the pure idea of nationalism: especially some nationalist circles in Germany, mainly at the beginning of the war, talked for internal consumption about the Cossack danger to Europe or about the war of the Teutons against the Slavs, a phrase which was repeated after them by Czech and Russian nationalists.

To pick out one of these factors and to explain the World War by it, is, however, a very one-sided simplification and a superficial interpretation of the history of the last decades. It is certain that the war was waged also for these things. But it was not waged merely for them: one must go more deeply into an analysis of the development of Europe and of the whole world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in order to define correctly the whole character of the World War in all its essential points.

The Great War was a social phenomenon of such an extent and such astonishing complexity, involving such number of political, economic, technological, psychological, and biological factors, that the unifying formula about its nature and meaning must be sufficiently large to contain

all special sections of this world-wide, vast and far-reaching event: political, social, economic, national, cultural, and moral. Otherwise we cannot understand what has happened since the war and what is happening in Europe at the present moment.

We must therefore investigate not only from what political, economic, moral, and philosophical causes the World War arose, but also, how it was waged, what moral and material factors, what main ideas and what main interests were victorious or came to the fore in the course of the war, and finally what was its positive result, why and how it ended, and how all this appears to us from the standpoint of the present great postwar crisis. *Only a synthesis of all these different elements enables us to define correctly what the World War was from the point of view of a philosophy of history.*

I draw therefore this conclusion from my previous observations: In the Great War two sides fought with each other which had two completely opposite political philosophies, two completely opposite views of the structure and development of modern society, and of civilisation in general. In this struggle the ideology and the philosophical conception represented by the Central powers was defeated. This was true even of states on the side of the victorious Allies which by their social structure and ideology belonged to the world of the Central powers. The collapse of Tsarist, absolutist, and autocratic Russia is the most obvious example. The victory of the Allied and Associated nations was not only a military victory; it was, first of all, a spiritual and moral victory of free nations in one of the greatest historical fights for the new free modern man, for the free modern nation and for the free modern state.

The present events in Europe simply mean that this whole struggle has been renewed with all the old intensity

and with methods sometimes even morally worse and more brutal. In 1939 Europe is in the same gigantic struggle for the same high principles of freedom and humanity as it was in 1914—with this great difference, of course, that in the last war and during the twenty years' policy after the war, Europe has passed through another great revolution and lived a considerable number of years under the régime of liberty. And peoples that have once lived in freedom never can forget it. The present fight for this freedom will therefore be finished again with a great and, I am convinced, a decisive victory for freedom and democracy in Europe.

The Results of the Great War from the Standpoint of Democracy

The results of the World War, judged from the point of view of postwar democracy, were and are even today enormous, although postwar events destroyed some of them and weakened the value of others considerably:

1. The war destroyed four great absolutist empires (Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Germany, Russia). Three of them became republics; their dynasties were banished, and considerable territories were taken from them and assigned to independent states. Out of the fourth empire—Austria-Hungary—six national states were formed (with considerable national minorities) and all these states were democratised either completely or to a considerable degree.

2. With the acceptance in broad outlines of the principal of national self-determination as a consequence of the democratic development of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the war solved the question of the independence and national unification of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Albania,

and it completed at the same time the national unification of Italy. In the spirit of this development, too, the relation of the British Dominions to Great Britain was revised, the problems of Egypt, Ireland, and Iraq solved, and a system of colonial mandates under the aegis of the League of Nations created.

3. In all these states, and in consequence of the war in other states as well, the ruling dynasties were overthrown, the system of aristocratic bureaucracy and the dominance of the military caste were abolished, the privileges of the churches were curtailed, and the churches themselves became democratised. Through these changes political power was gained by large masses of the people, by workmen and peasants, besides the urban middle classes. In most of these countries far-reaching land reforms were carried out, and the privileges of the landed aristocracy abolished. State constitutions, political institutions, and public corporations thus became much more genuinely democratic.

4. The social question and the problem of a just distribution of income became the main preoccupation of internal politics in most European states. In some states socialist parties came to power, in others the bourgeoisie or middle class was forced, at least for a time, to share political power with them. Even in states like Great Britain, a first socialist government was installed in 1924, and in France in 1936, while other Central-European and Scandinavian states went through this development even earlier. The Russian Revolution injected social consciousness into the problems of the war, and into postwar politics and, by creating a communist and soviet state in old Russia, stirred hopes of *social revolution, aiming at a social and economic democracy as a logical result of political democracy*. This, after all, continues a problem for Europe and the world even today. Just this possibility, just this danger of social revolution after the war, was one of the most important reasons for the decline of the postwar democracies.

5. As a logical consequence of the war—whether we interpret it as a shifting of political power, or as the realisation of self-determination, or as the raising of social and economic

problems inside the states—there arose the great problem of how to solve *the great international power-political and economic questions* on a basis of economic justice: this involved the freedom of the seas, the colonies, the economic resources of the world, and the distribution of raw materials. These power-political economic questions were not settled then, and therefore *a struggle is being waged around them now.*

6. Finally the idea of democratising international politics was expressed most forcibly by propaganda during the War. An attempt was made at the Peace Conference to realise it by the acceptance of three great principles of a *new democratic international order:* the limitation of armaments, the settlement of international conflicts by agreement, and the establishment of an international judiciary (in connection with the idea of economic and military sanctions). These three principles were elaborated into a whole political system and were incorporated in the *Covenant of the League of Nations,* which for a number of years after the war gave directions to European and partly to world politics and gave a new democratic character to a whole period of postwar international politics.

The Peace Conference and the Peace Treaties as an Indication of the Democratisation of Europe—Their Antidemocratic Inconsistencies and Weaknesses

The Peace Conference on the whole confirmed by its deliberations this European and world-wide political development and social and economic life of modern humanity. *The principle was accepted in theory.* It was also applied to a number of practical political matters after the War, and it was even most solemnly proclaimed as the guiding idea for the future political and moral development of Europe.

The Peace Treaties themselves, first of all, confirmed the military defeat of the absolutist powers. Having changed very profoundly the whole map of Europe and

the world, they attempted to apply the principle of the self-determination of nations in establishing several new young national states or completing and unifying other already established small nations and states, solved several colonial problems in this spirit (mandates) and made possible the internal democratisation of all the states concerned by legalising the results of the upheaval of the war period. The main step towards a democratisation of international politics taken by the Peace Conference was, of course, the establishment of the League of Nations with all its consequences—the establishment of permanent international democratic cooperation in politics, the founding of an international law-court and of the International Labour Office, which was the most convincing proof that the Peace Conference wanted to stress the coming economic democratisation and the social and international importance of the solution of economic problems, both national and international, in a spirit of greater social justice.

But we should not be objective if we did not point out at once that the Peace Conference and the statesmen who had to decide in Paris the practical application of the democratic principles were not quite consistent with the accepted democratic ideology of war; and the creation from the Peace Treaties of the so-called *"Versailles-Diktat"* gave to the opponents of democracy the first strong basis for the criticism of the entire work of the war and postwar democracy.

We all know, of course, that in the world of affairs, especially in politics, this or that principle is frequently accepted easily, quickly, and completely enough, but that its practical realisation is possible only gradually, step by step, in the course of a long evolution. Very often we must have the courage to accept first an incomplete and

imperfect solution with the idea of beginning immediately to change it for the better in the following period. Even the greatest revolutions, while proclaiming their principles in complete and radical intransigence, had very soon to resort to compromises. This is the very essence of life and is in the nature of all politics: democracy especially cannot escape it. The Peace Treaties, of course, which did not try to be and could not be a very radical or complete expression of the postwar world revolution, had to seek for compromises in their solutions. They could only recommend the evolutionary application of democratic principles which through the war had begun to stir so effectively. These compromises have been frequently pointed out as the great sins of the Peace Treaties. And they were naturally the first features to be exposed to the fiercest attacks, and not only endangered most seriously the permanence of the Peace Treaties themselves, but have had also a certain degree of responsibility in the decline of postwar democracy.

Such criticisms are justified to a certain extent, even though I should reject too extreme and general a condemnation and I must consistently point out that all these compromises could have been—and should have been —gradually adapted and improved in a spirit of justice by democratic evolutionary methods and not by brute force, revolution, and new injustices. A number of successful compromises were actually achieved by negotiation and agreement after the war.

This can be demonstrated by reference to several groups of disputed questions. I shall discuss them only very briefly and give but a general summary here:

The Peace Treaties are, first of all, criticised because they did not apply the democratic ideology of the United States—expressed in the fourteen points of President Wil-

son which Germany and her Allies accepted at the end of the war as the basis for peace—to the question of national self-determination. The Peace Treaties, say these critics, created a number of new national states with considerable national minorities and thereby committed injustices and undemocratic inconsistencies against the defeated nations.

It is true, continue these critics, that these new states were forced to accept treaties about the protection of racial and religious minorities. But the big powers did not assume any such duties, and, besides, the smaller states did not respect these treaties: the great powers and the League of Nations, whose duty and purpose it was to redress grievances, either did not want to or could not do anything.

The second great injustice of the Peace Treaties was, they say, in the imposition of reparations on the defeated states. The amount and extent of the reparations were criticised rather than the principle itself. The quarrels on reparations continued about ten years; the original decisions were several times revised and new compromises reached. Today this question has, we know, lost all practical importance, although for a long time the imposition of reparations on Germany has been many times invoked as one of the reasons for the economic collapse of postwar Germany—which contributed in such a great degree to the fall of German postwar democracy.

The third great disputed problem of the Peace Treaties, from the point of view of democratic ideology during and after the war, was the question of disarmament. The desire for a limitation of armaments was an important motive in democratic ideology during the war. The struggle against Prussian militarism, which had to be destroyed, must lead to a limitation of armaments—and not only a limitation but a kind of *general disarmament*. However, in the Peace Treaties a limitation of armaments was im-

posed only on the defeated states. On the other states the Covenant of the League of Nations merely laid a moral obligation to prepare a plan for a general limitation of armaments. This obligation was not, however, kept at all, say the critics from the defeated countries. The last attempt—the Disarmament Conference of 1932—was a failure and resulted in new and general rearmament in all the states of both former opposing camps.

A fourth complaint against the Peace Treaties is no less far-reaching and decisive for the present state of Europe and the world: the demand for a just international distribution of the world's sources of economic prosperity, a just access to raw materials and new possibilities for a better economic development for highly populous states—Germany, Italy, Japan—was never met.

On the contrary, the possibilities of better economic development were taken away from Germany by the seizure of her colonies, which brought to a head her internal social and economic problems, as we see it today. To Italy and Japan, these critics say, no proper consideration was given in these matters during the Peace negotiations. And hence arose, as a natural consequence, the present conflicts in China, in Africa, and in the Mediterranean.

Finally, as the fifth complaint against Allied inconsistency in the application of democratic ideology, the policy of the League of Nations during the last twenty years is cited: the League, they say, has become simply an instrument of the policy of several great powers and a group of their friends. The League was inconsistent, not bold enough, too partial, and even unjust to a number of states.

These problems of foreign policy played a large part in the development, the crisis, and the fall of postwar democracy, just as did the difficulties inherent in democracy as a régime of international politics. The criticisms here

enumerated concern both individual clauses of the Peace Treaties and the postwar execution of the detailed arrangements made by the Paris Conference, and, therefore, affect the postwar policy of all European states. I shall come back to these grievances in another chapter, and I shall indicate quite briefly and in principle in which degree they are just and in which sense they are not.

These are, of course, great controversies, the consequences of which are felt today all over the world. An objective politician, scholar, or observer cannot pass them over, if he discusses the development and the crisis of postwar democracy, or if he wants to form a correct and unprejudiced opinion of the political justification of these criticisms.

I draw, therefore, some general conclusions on the consequences of the war and the Peace Treaties from the point of view of democratic principles as follows:

The war and the Peace Conference proclaimed and *carried out the principles of modern democracy to a considerable extent* and stimulated after the war a great movement for a practical democratisation of Europe and the world. Morally and in any philosophy of history this attempt by the war and the Peace Treaties toward realisation of democratic principles was undoubtedly *a great advance in human civilisation.* It will be recorded as such in the history of humanity, with thanks to its authors and executors, in spite of the mistakes which were made at the Peace Conference and in spite of the present-day return to anarchy, to the violent struggle of interests and ideas, the coarsening of international discussions and relations and the collapse of international law and morality in Europe. *The meaning and the importace of the World War will be characterised as an advance of democratic, equalitarian, humanistic, and pacifistic spirit as well as the*

spirit of national and social justice in the history of Europe and the world.

Of course, the war (and the Peace Conference), besides these positive achievements, had their *negative side.* Besides meritorious achievements, they *committed also some errors.* Like every human work they could not be without defects, and like every great upheaval in human history they had provoked very contradictory results. The same conclusion we have drawn from the events of the French Revolution are, therefore, valid for the events of the Great War (and the Peace Treaties):

The events of the Great War and its consequences advanced the idea of political liberty, justice, and equality, and they prepared the period of authoritarian dictatorships in some parts of Europe in creating the real totalitarian war of the masses of the people against other peoples *(der totale Krieg*—Ludendorff) and in concentrating the whole energy of the nation in the dictatorial war state machinery and its executive power; they gave large and just application to the idea of nationality and prepared at the same time the basis for the most violent nationalisms which have ever arisen in the history of mankind (Germany, Italy); they provoked the strong currents of pacifist and disarmament ideas and established the great peace instrument, the League of Nations, and laid down, at the same time, the foundations for the most formidable popular mass armies which have ever been known in history. They emphasized the idea of social and economic democracy and justice and helped to accelerate the Russian Revolution, which created for Western European middle-class society the danger of communistic social revolution.

In this way the World War in ideology is simply the continuation of the ideological struggles of two concep-

tions of the world and human life which had their origin in the great French Revolution, which developed in more normal forms during the whole nineteenth century, and which came to violent explosion after the war and especially in the moral and intellectual struggles in Europe between 1930 and 1939. *The present struggle between the ruling governmental systems, democracy, fascism, national socialism, communism—combined with the power-political conflicts between the great powers and the attempts to enslave again the smaller European nations—is the formula which is the exact expression of the present European crisis and the tragedy of postwar Europe.*

The special mistakes, which were committed after the war by both of the former opposing camps in their international policies, only aggravated the natural ideological difficulties and conflicts of postwar democracy and contributed largely to endanger the good work of the war and the Peace Treaties. But in spite of all that, *much of the policy of the war period and a number of postwar consequences do constitute a gain for humanity morally and politically and an undoubted moral and political progress in the history of civilisation.*

Chapter III

THE DOWNFALL OF THE POSTWAR DEMOCRACIES IN EUROPE AND ITS MAIN CAUSES

The Unpreparedness of the European Nations for a Democratisation of Europe and the Difficult Life of the European Postwar Democracies

We have seen how the principles of democracy were, in large degree, introduced, through the war and after the war, as a working régime in the great part of Europe. Besides the United States, Great Britain, Scandinavia, Belgium, Holland, France, Switzerland, Spain, Germany, Italy, all the new Central European states, the Baltic states, some states in Asia and South America, all the British Dominions, realised a high degree of democracy: especially the new states in Europe gave themselves, when internal upheavals were accomplished, constitutions which vied with one another in democracy. The Soviet régime in Russia stressed the well-known argument against its critics, that the system of soviets, continuously renewed and democratically elected, is genuine democracy.

But we should be shutting our eyes to clear facts and committing a great political blunder if we did not realise clearly that in all these countries these newly born democracies started existence with enormous initial difficulties.

First of all, the democratic régimes in the individual countries clashed with a great diversity of internal conditions, with differences which were determined historically, were unavoidable stages of evolution, and had been

formed by the natural state of affairs in these countries and nations.

There were differences of development and education, of civilisation, of natural qualities and character in the nations in question. The nations of the Balkans and of Central Europe were less prepared for democracy than, for instance, the Scandinavian nations. There were natural or historical differences in the social and economic structure—which plays such an important part in a democratic régime: the structure of Switzerland, Finland, or Czechoslovakia is essentially different from the social and economic structure of Poland, Hungary, or even of Germany. Finally there were the differences caused by the former prewar political régimes in the states concerned. But as any nation or state, even after a revolution, can seldom if ever free itself completely from its past, all the postwar states in Europe, and beyond it, took over a good deal of their traditions, institutions, administration, education, and without exception many customs, manners, and methods from their old political life.

The individual European postwar democracies were, simply as democracies, extremely different from one another, both in external character and in internal quality, that is, in maturity, stability, firmness, and perfection. From the West to the East of Europe there existed a whole scale of democratic régimes, different in details, different in the systems of suffrage they had adopted, in the greater or lesser degree of freedom, with different kinds of relationship between the executive and the legislative, with differing degrees of development and maturity and, therefore, with different degrees of internal firmness and resistance, according to the internal and international conditions and relations of this or that state.

This peculiar situation was the first, and of course only

one, of the difficulties which European democracy had to face: it was one of the causes of the instability of the democratic régimes in Europe. As soon as the democratic régime in some European state was endangered or fell, for reasons often purely local and peculiar to that state, it became a danger to all democratic régimes anywhere in the neighbourhood, where conditions were either similar or equally uncertain, or even less certain and less stable. We can best demonstrate some of the essential features of European postwar democracy and its special difficulties after the war by this diversity of conditions in the individual states, in which postwar democracy had to take shape and assume, therefore, different stages of development.

In 1918 American, British, French, Scandinavian, and Swiss democracy had already gone through at least a century and a half of growth and struggle. The majority of the postwar democracies, because they were newly created, had no traditions, and had many difficult conditions of development and growth. Germany, for instance, before the war had a Parliament and universal suffrage, but no genuine, fully developed democracy; and the power of the military caste, the aristocratic bureaucracy and landed nobility, together with the dynasty, was such that postwar conditions would have required a much more profound revolution than was actually carried out in Germany, for democracy to acquire permanent power among the people and the institutions expressing it. And that was in *Germany*, a nation, after all, which was considered mature and highly civilised!

In the smaller Central European states conditions were frequently even more difficult. A number of them had before the war little or no experience with Parliamentary government. Several of them introduced universal suf-

frage for the first time. In many states the masses of peasants and workmen now entered political life for the first time. In others illiteracy was widespread among the population, and political education almost nonexistent. The social and economic standard was frequently so low as to be quite incomparable with that of the Western European democracies. Great masses of the people were almost completely unprepared for the political conduct of their own affairs.

The destruction of the four great empires, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Russia—all absolutist régimes of dynasty, church, army, and landed or bureaucratic aristocracy—caused, it is true, everywhere social and political revolutions; but at the same time raised so many difficult political, social, and economic problems, that these new democracies were born in great birth-pains and inherited difficulties almost unexampled.

The collapse of each of the four great empires came unexpectedly. The masses of ordinary people were not prepared for it. Therefore, the old antidemocratic forces necessarily preserved much of their power and resistance in this upheaval. In Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Austria the old bureaucracy, the nobility, the military, and the great landowners remained untouched, on the whole. The workmen and peasants assumed power either only for a short period or not at all.

Czechoslovakia was an exception, as the overthrow of an *alien* Austrian and German rule meant the *complete* removal of the foreign church hierarchy, the foreign dynasty, the foreign army and foreign bureaucracy, and was followed by a far-reaching land reform. The people of Czechoslovakia assumed the powers of government quite literally and completely. Moreover, their historical tradi-

tions were and are strongly democratic. Already in 1415 they started with John Huss the first revolution for religious liberty and tolerance; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they made two political and religious revolutions against the Habsburg oppression; in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, inspired by the ideas of French Revolution, they began their national democratic renaissance for the reconstruction of their independent national life. And since 1848 their political education had been quite consciously undertaken by the national political opposition, which aimed at liberating the nation and founding a democratic Czechoslovak state. But Czechoslovakia was, with its century-old political fight and popular revolutionary political experiences, actually the only exception in Central Europe. This explains to a considerable extent the vitality of Czechoslovak democracy throughout the twenty years since the war and also during the last great international crisis.

After the World War revolution a changed Europe had arisen. But no revolution ever produces immediately a satisfactory new régime of its own, and even less could be hoped from a revolution that came as a result of such a terrible war as the War of 1914 to 1918.

The revolution of 1918, which gave rise to postwar democracy, besides, carried with it into the newly established democracies innumerable special difficulties, growing pains, and new problems. Postwar democracy in Central Europe needed to overcome the great difficulties inherited from the preceding régimes and, at the same time, to solve the very difficult political, social, and economic problems caused by the war and the revolution. Among its immediate tasks I may mention the drafting of

new constitutions, the solution of the unemployment problem, social services, land reform, the currency problem, the financial heritage of the war.

All this led to a natural, but at the same time extremely dangerous situation, which was characteristic of the postwar democracies: because of all these postwar difficulties, *their existence was menaced all the time. They lived in permanent insecurity.* They have seemed to be immature, disordered, undisciplined; they frequently wavered from left to right and from right to left. Extremes of all kinds occurred in them. They sometimes succumbed to left extremism and were endangered by communism. This drove them easily enough to right extremism or reactionary tendencies. They had financial difficulties, and their budgets were not always balanced. All the well-known difficulties of democracy in general—exaggerated party feeling, a press given to agitation, new people in power, newly nominated, unprepared, and therefore often incompetent, and sometimes even a corrupt bureaucracy; a lack of proper leadership (the last especially) appeared, of course, in these young democracies in the most varied shapes. In such a way they compromised to a certain degree the institutions and the régime of democracy more than in older states or in democracies which had stood the test of time.

All that does not, of course, condemn democracy as a régime; *it shows only that democracy is a benefit always in danger and always to be defended, cultivated, guarded, and improved,* as well as the need to adapt democratic institutions to meet new circumstances, and to justify these adaptations constantly to the masses of the people.

These naturally difficult conditions of life for the young European democracies must be kept in mind when we hear acid criticisms against them from all sides. They

excuse their defects to a considerable degree. We must never forget this.

Main Reasons for the Decline of the European Democracies

To analyse all the other causes of the decline of postwar European democracies would require the writing of the whole history of postwar Europe and a detailed investigation into all the different internal problems of the states in which authoritarian régimes became established. Because of necessary limitations we may be able to point out only some of the essential causes of this change: we can get at least a glimpse into the nature of the development that has taken place and understand its great significance in the history of postwar Europe.

I have stressed in the preceding pages the difficulties into which postwar democracy in Europe was born and the enormous troubles of its life, growth, and struggle for existence: the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe had emerged from a war, which in itself always constitutes a difficult and profound crisis. They inherited all the problems which, through the war, had arisen on the territory of the four defeated states. These states were destroyed by war, were disrupted, dismembered, and had to be newly rebuilt, and the new democracies had to bear the hard consequences of this heritage with all its tragic struggles, mistakes, and pains.

I have also pointed out that every one of these states had its own special conditions to face. The situations and degrees of maturity of these democracies were therefore very different: every state had its own problems, its special needs, which had to be met by special methods. But a common feature of all these states was that the trans-

formation into democratic régimes had come about suddenly, had found them unprepared and immature: therefore their struggle for the establishment and preservation of their new democracy against all the forces of reaction was superhuman and almost hopeless. They had, besides, to destroy the survivals of the past, all the conservative forces that wanted to return to prewar conditions.

These were the *general* difficulties and conditions under which the new democracies were built, which prevailed at the beginning of their struggles and which had to be taken into account everywhere. Besides these two main causes (and a number of others less important) of the downfall of the European democracies, there were, however, *a few essential factors* which slowly brought Central and Southeastern Europe under authoritarian régimes and created the Europe of today.

In my opinion, an exact analysis can distinguish four other main categories of essential and decisive determinants of events:

1. *Communism*—its rise during the war, its struggle after the war, the problem of social revolution in the individual states and of world revolution according to the policy of the Comintern, the danger which postwar bourgeoisie saw in communism for quite comprehensible reasons, and the struggle of communism in the first postwar years against middle-class political democracy, a struggle based on the Marxist theory that bourgeois democracy is just as much an enemy of the revolutionary proletariat as Fascism itself.

2. *Fascism,* which created an antidemocratic philosophy and was and is the *direct* enemy and negation of democracy, a complete theory of *antidemocratism.* It rallied round it all the conservative forces in the individual states, and for the attainment of its victories used two main political factors:

a. Nationalism in the fiercest form, stirred up to fever

heat, to which it gave a new theory, and which it exploited effectively and at the same time made an expansive and dynamic element for the use of the state inside and outside its boundaries.

b. The fear of all conservative bourgeois elements of communism and social revolution—the fear which, especially in the last period, became quite conscious, under the influence of Nazi propaganda. The middle classes realised that political democracy, carried to its logical conclusion, could lead to social and economic democracy, and therefore began to see in the authoritarian régimes salvation from a social revolution of the working and peasant classes.

3. *The deficiencies, weaknesses, and of course great mistakes of the individual democracies,* which it was apparently impossible to avoid, are the third category of facts which played a specially important role in the downfall of European democracies. There were the excesses of the party system, its mistakes and exaggerations; the slowness and inefficiency of democratic methods of work and leadership during times of crisis and at moments when quick action and quick decisions were necessary; the partiality, corruption, and incapacity of bureaucracy, subjugated very often to the exaggerated party spirit; the deficiencies, mediocrity, and mistakes of the democratic leaders.

4. *The mistakes and deficiencies in the foreign policy of the great democratic Western European states* after the war, both in the League of Nations and in their individual policy.

I shall discuss in the following pages more in detail these and other causes of the downfall of the democracies (some of them of minor historical and political importance).

Communism and Its Postwar Policy Against Democracy

A considerable share in the downfall of postwar democracies must be ascribed to communism with its whole

theory and practice and its practical political activity since the war.

Postwar communism started from its well-known theory of class struggle, as it had been formulated long before the war by Marxist socialism and had been accepted officially by the prewar socialist parties in Europe (except Great Britain). Another starting point was the practical policy of some of these parties during the war, especially their attitude towards the war.

The socialist parties which belonged to the Second International—these were largely the socialist parties from the Central powers and the neutral states—were against the war on principle, against the victory of either party, and made no distinction between the two camps in the question of war guilt. They did not believe that any one side during the war had more right in its case than the other: they did not, in particular, share the view that the World War of 1914–18 was a war for democracy, for justice, or for the rights of the oppressed nations.

The war to them was a struggle of two bourgeois camps, fighting for political and economic power and for world domination at the expense of the proletariat: no good could therefore come out of the war for the working class. It would have been necessary to transform the war into a struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie in order to carry out a social revolution which would establish a new and just society in Europe and throughout the world. That is why they defended neutrality, wanted a speedy peace, spread resistance against war in their states and advocated preparations for a revolution after the war, convened the well-known congress at Stockholm and even during the war met at the congress of socialist parties with communist leanings in Switzerland (at Kiental and Zim-

merwald—the last being attended by Lenin and Trotsky).

At the end of the war and immediately after it communism penetrated into the masses of the people and into all socialist parties in Europe. We can account for it by the influence of the old Marxist theory, the practice in neutrality and revolution of some socialist parties during the war, and finally by the influence of the postwar upheaval, the financial bankruptcies and economic catastrophes and the social radicalism of the soldiers returning from the war. The Russian Revolution and the establishment of a Soviet communist order gave an unexpected impulse and hitherto unknown force to this development. In a number of states communist revolutions or at least attempts at them actually took place. Hungary had its Béla Kun, Bavaria its Kurt Eisner. In Prussia attempts were made by Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. In Bulgaria there were attempts at a communist agrarian revolution. Communist activities were undisguised in Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Greece.

The example of the Russian Revolution was so striking that a complete division between socialists and communists took place among the working classes. The Second International split into the *Second* and *Third*. The Third International quite definitely took up a position directed against the bourgeoisie, declined any cooperation with the postwar democracies, and was so convinced that the World War had shaken the whole foundation of modern bourgeois society, and that a social revolution was imminent, that international communism gave to its international organs the practical task of preparing it directly and of inciting it wherever possible by concrete plots, plans for the disintegration of bourgeois society, by a kind of sabotage of democratic institutions and often by measures

of violence. We all remember this active work of the Third International from the end of the war up to about 1928–30.

I have always opposed this activity for two reasons. First, I have always rejected orthodox Marxism—and the resulting policy of class war transferred to the international field—together with the orthodox objections of the socialist parties against cooperation with the progressive bourgeoisie. I was always in favor of social justice, which ought to be realised by evolutionary methods and not by violent and sanguinary social revolution or the dictatorship of the proletariat. And, secondly, I am firmly convinced that the communists and the Third International were mistaken in considering Western European bourgeois society after the war as being at the end of its power and ripe for decay amid anarchy and chaos.

I knew that Western Europe especially had a middle-class social structure which was very firm and was able to resist the attack of Eastern or Central European communism. I have always voiced warnings against the social utopianism which dreamt of creating at once and immediately out of war and revolution a new society which would be almost a paradise. On the contrary, I believed that such a new society would always have more initial difficulties and deficiencies than the society just destroyed. Therefore we must consider the political practice of postwar communism as one of the historical errors, the consequences of which were and are for democracy very far-reaching.

Starting with these two points, theoretical and practical, postwar communism coined the slogan that democratic bourgeoisie and the rising fascism are one and the same thing, that both are equally enemies of the workingman, and that it is therefore necessary to fight and even to destroy both ruthlessly and without compromise. One cannot,

they said, speak of a lesser and a greater evil and accept a compromise policy of the lesser evil. The downfall of the ruling democratic bourgeoisie would, according to the leading exponents of international communism, lead inevitably and immediately to the social revolution in which they believed. Therefore, the sooner the downfall, the better.

Thus in several European states we saw during the critical postwar years a curious spectacle: communism with all its powers trying to destroy the socialist parties and the liberal bourgeoisie, believing in its own speedy triumph. At the same time it frequently left full scope and freedom to fascism and authoritarian conservatism to destroy democracy from the other side. And so there were even times in certain European states when both extreme camps were indirectly and unintentionally helping each other in the destruction of a liberal or socialist democratic stronghold.

It is therefore natural that some of the methods of fighting and some of the opinions on individual questions were identical in both extreme camps. In the first years after the war the communist parties quite systematically and consistently combatted anything which came out of the Peace Conference—especially the Versailles Treaty—using the same arguments as fascism. Similarly for many years they opposed quite sharply the League of Nations and changed their point of view only when, in 1932–33, both democracy and the League of Nations were already considerably endangered and weakened by the authoritarian régimes.

The communists in their daily agitation frequently attacked democracy with slogans which were later taken up by the authoritarian régimes, generalising the different mistakes and deficiencies of the régime or its representatives (corruption, attacks on the leaders, etc.), criticising

the parliamentary policy of the socialist parties with a continual clamour for action, exploiting the economic crisis of 1929 and unemployment against democracy and the socialists, and playing on the tendency of youth toward extremism of all kinds.

It is true that after 1930–32 the policy of communist parties changed slowly, that the mistakes of procedure were frequently acknowledged and repaired: attacks on democracy ceased almost completely, and attacks on democratic and socialist parties were moderated; in some states, like France, even cooperation with them was started. The attitude towards the League of Nations changed completely, and efforts for the preservation of peace replaced completely the Comintern policy of world revolution.

I draw, then, the conclusion that postwar communism and its postwar policy up to about the year 1932—up to the downfall of democracy in Germany—had a considerable responsibility for the collapse of certain European democracies.

It was more than natural that the authoritarian régimes exploited with great success the passive political factor, which was a necessary consequence of this postwar communistic policy: *the fear of communism and social revolution in all conservative, and also in liberal, bourgeois circles in the Western European states.* This fear was for years fostered by propaganda of both Russian and native communism, which proclaimed that the social revolution was at the door, and that it must inevitably follow as the necessary consequence of every major crisis in Europe. The propaganda of fear, of exaggerated and blind fear, of fear which was only an expression of incapacity for combating communist agitation and for carrying out an effective social policy, was exploited by the authoritarian

régimes systematically, consistently, ruthlessly, and effectively.

Germany was, in spite of this fact, the first state which as early as 1922 had concluded a treaty of friendship and alliance with Soviet Russia. The Nazi régime prolonged it and signed it again. Italy was the first among the great powers of Western Europe to establish contact with the Soviet Union and to conduct systematic commercial relations with it. And for a certain period Germany and Italy exploited their contacts with the Soviet Union quite effectively in their diplomatic game against France and Great Britain and their political supporters.

A change took place, however, when after 1930 cooperation between the Soviet Union and the rest of Europe appeared possible, and when it seemed likely that the Soviet Union would enter the League of Nations and play its special role in European politics as a decisive factor in the struggle of the Western democracies with the Central European authoritarian régimes.

The fiercest propaganda against the internal situation in Russia was combined with attacks against anybody who, starting from the only reasonable point of view—that European peace can be safeguarded only if no great European power, either Germany or Soviet Russia, will be excluded from European cooperation—took a more liberal view of bolshevism and worked for systematic cooperation with Soviet Russia in the European balance of power, who wanted to create a European community in which the interests of all states would be respected in loyal cooperation, and from which the Soviet Union and its régime would not be excluded. This became in 1933 one of the main instruments in the struggle against all democracies in European politics. In this conflict democracy was even officially proclaimed first the nourishing ground

of bolshevism, dangerous to all neighbours with a totalitarian régime, and finally simply a brand of bolshevism.

Russian communism was described in the darkest colours: preparing a world war, a world revolution, aiming at the destruction of all civilisation and culture, undermining all European states and working for the speedy collapse of bourgeois society. This was coupled with propaganda against internationalism and anti-Semitic propaganda. Moreover fear of an imminent communist revolution was constantly spread in every country. Communism, it was said, would establish a reign of terror against the middle classes, would murder every one of its members, would set up the rule of the mob and make an end to the present state of European civilisation.

At the same time it was skilfully, though cautiously, suggested that the downfall of any authoritarian régime in Europe would have as certain consequence the establishment of a communist régime in the country concerned, and it was especially emphasised what it would mean also to the French and British bourgeoisie if anything of that sort should happen in Germany, Italy, or Spain.

This propaganda did not flinch from using all sorts of distorted news and even manufactured lies. For instance, propaganda directed against democratic Czechoslovakia throughout the years 1936, 1937, and 1938, from several directions, used quite conscious inventions which had been already denied a hundred times and did not have the slightest factual basis. This propaganda tried to depict that country, especially in Western Europe, as a seat and breeding ground of social revolution; it tried to discredit one of the most healthy postwar democracies in the eyes of the world and tried to frighten Western Europe with the assertion that contact and cooperation with her would support social revolution in Europe.

It would be a great mistake to ignore the great success which this propaganda had in some circles of Western European bourgeoisie. Many of its leading people thought that they actually had to choose between fascism and communism. They were prepared to drop democracy and to use the authoritarian régimes for their own salvation. The same situation was apparent in present totalitarian states at the moment when democracy there was approaching its downfall: the struggle of communism with totalitarianism threw the middle classes, and especially the richer circles—industrial and banking capital—into the arms of the dictators, whom they actually assisted to gain power.

As I have already stressed before the share of responsibility which must be ascribed to communism in the downfall of the European democracies, I must stress just as strongly now that while the fear of the European bourgeoisie and middle classes of a communist revolution was perhaps natural and comprehensible, it was absurdly exaggerated and was in itself a clear symptom of the weakness of the leading circles of democracy and of their inability to defeat communism by a reasonable, clear-cut, and courageous social and cultural policy.

One must regret this the more keenly as, by truckling to the totalitarian régimes, the bourgeoisie and the middle classes will not, in any case, preserve their power, influence, and rule. The authoritarian régimes make socialist experiments (German Nazism is a kind of *socialism,* and Italian Fascism is very near to *syndicalism*), even as did Soviet Communism; and they pursue these experiments more thoroughly, more ruthlessly, and on a larger scale than any democratic régime, because they do it by direct force and revolutionary methods.

A democratic régime means agreement, evolution, cooperation. This in itself can be a sufficient guarantee to

every class that there will be a reasonable solution, even if they are asked to make social or economic sacrifices.

Therefore the help that a section of postwar bourgeois democracy gave to totalitarianism against democracy, if only by its exaggerated fear of a communist revolution, was *one of its greatest mistakes. It contributed only to its own destruction.* It would have been possible to avoid both extremes, the left and the right, by a policy at once reasonable, ready for sacrifices, and courageous.

Exaggerated Nationalism of the Authoritarian Régimes as a Weapon Against the Democracies

In the struggle against democracy the authoritarian and totalitarian régimes used with great success one essential factor of their political ideology and their practical political programme: *their exaggerated nationalism.*

Fascism and Nazism accepted the idea of nationality just as it was handed down from the "Age of Reason." Since the French Revolution it had gone through a long development in the nineteenth century, had become part and parcel of the democratic faith and democratic ideology, as it was the application of democratic freedom and the principles of respect for humanity not only in individuals, but also in national groups. The idea of national self-determination, which had followed logically from democratic ideology and had been solemnly proclaimed in the World War, was resolutely taken up by the totalitarian régimes, was stressed as part of their ideology, as an essential and main article of their political creed, and as such was pushed to its last consequences.

This extreme jingoism received a new philosophical and moral basis: the nation and the national state is the highest social, political, and moral value in the world; every-

thing else must be sacrificed to it; all ethics can be founded only on the value represented by the nation, which is therefore the highest criterion of all moral and other values. To it, then, the individual must be subordinated in all things, everywhere, unconditionally and exclusively.

In other words, the nation is deified. It is for the benefit of the Nation that the whole life of society, state, class, and individual must be conducted. The Nation represents a living organism, in the biological sense; its life, growth, expansion, its prestige, fame, and honour must in the end decide the whole character of this or that national society and the whole life of every one of its members.

This philosophy was then transferred to the international field: it meant the application of modern vitalistic philosophy in international politics. Life is a struggle, and therefore the life of nations is also a struggle, a struggle for power, for predominance, for prestige, expansion, and a voice in deciding the fate of the whole world. The large and strong nations have a right to influence the fates of the weaker nations and to fight for them among themselves. International politics becomes actually nothing but a struggle for space, influence, expansion, and for world-rule by the big nations.

The present authoritarian régimes accept all the old absolutist theories about the nature, power, and jurisdiction of the all-powerful, absolute, deified State, and they even extend and magnify them. By identifying the state with the nation, from which all power is derived, they apply all their opinions and theories about the nation, *also the state* as such. So the will of the nation to power, expansion, and world-rule is ascribed to the state as well as to the nation, to the state as a political organisation, through which the life of the nation is lived. And thus the philosophy of national chauvinism, applied as it is to the state, becomes the

philosophy of the old, familiar *Imperialism* of a great power.

In practice the authoritarian states pursue a policy in which this sentiment of nationality is worked up to fever heat. Everything international, in whatever form, any pacifism, is proscribed, as these régimes take the attitude that might constitutes right, and that war is the highest expression of the power and spirit of a nation and state. They reject anything universal, as well as the concept of humanity. They consistently condemn, proscribe, and persecute all that was contributed by democracy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to a new higher morality and civilisation for the modern world of the twentieth century.

Some of the régimes add a doctrine of race and racialism, since they consider themselves a higher race, destined to a special mission of power in the world and to rule over other races and nations. Germans combine this policy of racialism with anti-Semitism and a fight against "Non-Aryans." Racial anti-Semitism, as a corollary of the excessive nationalism of the authoritarian régimes at the beginning of the twentieth century, will, in the history of mankind, remain an example of the decline of justice and humanity to depths which remind us of the worst religious persecutions in the Middle Ages.

Democracy, on the other hand, adopted the philosophy of humanity and proclaimed the principle of agreement instead of war, the toleration and respect of man for man and nation for nation, instead of narrow nationalism, the desire for peace and international cooperation instead of war, conflict, and expansion.

The two systems are completely opposite in their views on these questions. Hence it is only a step to accusations against democracy for its lack of patriotism, weakness, and

treason against its own nation, internationalism, subservience to foreign nations and Jewry, cowardice, and impotence in the defence of the country. The authoritarian régimes took this step very quickly, and in their struggle against democracy they went to great lengths in propaganda of this kind.

The masses of all nations and ages are peculiarly receptive to such views and sentiments, as in all these questions most people are oversensitive. This is a side of the human mind which is so open to the influence of demagogic and fanatical political propaganda—considering the low standard of education among the masses and their psychology—that those who enter this field can be almost always certain of success.

The authoritarian régimes—and this holds good of a number of big and smaller states—exploited these elements of political thought, life, and struggle ruthlessly and most successfully. Italy used the discontent felt after the war and following the Peace Conference. The defeat of Germany which weighed heavily on her national pride and actually hurt her national interests, and certain injustices which the Peace Treaties imposed on Germany, became in Nazi politics and propaganda an effective and even destructive weapon against German democracy, and indirectly against other democracies as well.

The fact that the liberal and democratic German governments in their postwar policy have not sufficiently profited by the great concessions made by the Allied powers, the fact that the authoritarian régimes knew how to use successfully their totalitarian ideology, their doctrine of national pride and national unity against the ideas of international solidarity of democracy, its disunity in party and parliamentary régimes, the fact that the authoritarian régimes knew how to identify the totalitarianism of political

life with the conception of a strong, proud, powerful, and successful nation—all this quite literally killed the European democracies.

As these so-called "dynamic" régimes could in their international policy use the very same methods against the other democratic states which they had used against their opponents in internal politics, and as the absence of any free criticism and the control of Parliament enabled them to risk everything, they achieved unexpected and surprising successes in international politics against the democracies—hesitating, unprepared, very often lacking courage, egoistically calculating or at times too conscientious and even too responsible.

The authoritarian régimes used under these circumstances the idea of nationality in their international struggle against the other states systematically and successfully: as Germany, in order to get rid of the Versailles Peace and to absorb Austria, to annex the "Sudeten Germans" and to undermine the foundations of Czechoslovak democracy, employed as instruments of her own expansion among them the views and policy of totalitarianism, and increased her influence among them so strongly that in all these states she was able to weaken all democratic tendencies and ambitions. The policy of the authoritarian régimes, in Spain, in the Balkan states, in northern Africa, in Asia (the Arabs), in the South American states has everywhere the same character.

The unpreparedness and calculating egoism of the European democracies in all these cases are one great cause of their unbelievable decline in comparison with the authoritarian states: the more so as the latter régimes quickly realised this fact and counted on it in their policy of expansion, which was assured of success in advance.

All this only strengthened the national pride of the au-

thoritarian states, their boldness, their expansiveness and gave to their régimes new power and new efficiency. All this, as I have said, literally killed the democratic régimes and democratic forces both within the state and in other states as well.

The idea of nationality—*pushed to its most absurd consequences, used in its most degenerated forms and modified in a kind of brutal, wild, and uncivilised unhumanity* —in its great and natural dynamic power, an idea which had grown out of democracy and which must be identified in its nature with the noblest principles of humanity, and was its child and logical expression, became in the hands of the totalitarian régimes simply one of the main weapons for the destruction of democracy and humanitarian principles in the Central European states.

Defects and Mistakes of the Democracies as a Weapon Against the Democratic Régimes

A. Inefficiency of Party System and Exaggerated Party Spirit

The third main factor which worked for the collapse of European democracy emanated from the democracies themselves—the unsuccessful, imperfect, badly guided, blundering democracies.

The authoritarian régimes, in their attacks on democracy as a political system, start with a criticism of the system of political parties, of political partisanship and the parliamentary régime, ruled by a system of political groups. This criticism is merciless and, although it contains a number of just charges, is on the whole unfair, since it generalises from single facts, exaggerates the well-known and unavoidable difficulties of democracy in general—diffi-

culties which exist in every other régime in the same, even if not in greater degree—and exploits the mistakes of an individual régime or personality in order to condemn democracy as a system.

First of all, this propaganda asserts that in the majority of the European democratic states there are too many political parties, and that they pulverise the state and nation, paralyse its very life, and make for an unstable, inefficient, and ineffective government, as they fight ruthlessly with one another. Under these circumstances, it is said, a parliament is only a place for valueless and aimless wrangles and discussions, addressed mainly to the street, so that the parliament finds it difficult to come to any decision. The same indecision prevails within the government itself. And when the government and parliament finally arrive at some decision, it is usually an inadequate compromise which does not satisfy anybody. At the most it respects the interests of a particular party group, but is not in the interest of the state as a whole or the broad masses of the nation.

Further, it is objected against the democratic system of government that it is too expensive, as it involves a deeply rooted necessity for all sorts of payments, sinecures, and subsidies, which are actually nothing but veiled or open bribery. The political parties simply divide the state—they reserve to themselves spheres of influence, look only after their adherents, press for favours in their interest, vote for bills drafted only for them, and thus plunder the state income for themselves and either directly or indirectly establish an all-infecting corruption.

It is alleged that parties not only seek to control the legislature in favour of their supporters and without regard to the interests of the state, but struggle especially for jobs, for economic and political positions, for sinecures, for power and influence in the bureaucracy, for subsidies, and,

by direct or indirect interference in the administration of the state, contaminate political personalities, the different organs of the bureaucracy, in brief the whole structure of the democratic system of government. A necessary consequence of all this is the political partisanship of the bureaucracy and a desperate struggle of all parties to get their own adherents into the administrative system at any cost. This means also that the civil service is deprived of any moral character, that its interest in the state is destroyed, that jobbery, servility, political shiftiness, injustice, and partiality are fostered.

It would be a mistake not to be conscious of the real weaknesses of democracy: only by analysing them and subjecting them to measured criticism can we overcome and abolish them. But, on the whole, this criticism of democracy by the authoritarian régimes is unjust, generalises clumsily, and exploits individual cases for a condemnation of the democratic régime in general.

It is true that new and young democracies succumb to these weaknesses more easily than old democracies. (In Europe, German democracy showed these defects more than British democracy, the small Central European democracies more easily and more extensively than the Scandinavian or Swiss democracy.) But the main point is that the distinguishing features of a totalitarian régime, those aspects of its legal system that sharply differentiate it from democracy, magnify the incidental and occasional weaknesses of democracy. In establishing the power of a single party over the whole state and making the whole state organism subservient to their party politics, they tend to demoralise the state administration, to favour toadyism, injustice, and partiality, to introduce a gigantic system of corruption into an uncontrolled state budget, to foster a struggle for jobs and sinecures. They establish all these

immoral manifestations of degenerated political life as a permanent system of government.

I do not want to say that similar things never happen in democracies. The fierce totalitarian criticism, though exaggerated and unfair, could sometimes honestly use some of the real weaknesses of democracy; and other of its facts were partially true. But in states where the democratic régime was weak or was threatened by other circumstances, where the masses of the people had not a long and high political education and a longer experience of a free political life, these critics had a greater success than they deserved or than was justified by the facts, and have had their disastrous effect: they largely contributed to bring this democracy to its final downfall.

Another effective weapon of the authoritarian régimes against democracy was and is the reproach of slowness, lack of courage and large-scale planning, of uncertainty in the government of the state, in administrative and legislative measures and in the business of government. We must admit the fact that the necessity for agreement between parties, for public discussion in Parliament and the press, for consideration of different interests and election dangers, make decisions slow in democracies. The decisions, when reached, are usually compromises, and therefore frequently lack boldness. They often are late and ineffective. The autocracies, by their quick decisions, have undoubted advantages over the democracies in this respect. To conceal this fact would be to behave like the ostrich who hides his head in the sand. But on the other hand it means that in the non-democratic systems of government there is no public control of the state administration, and that it must have such far-reaching consequences for the

whole state that the almost inevitable end of such a system must be and regularly is a state catastrophe.

It is true that democratic methods of state administration are the only right ones under normal conditions, and that they stand the test very well then; but in abnormal times, in times of war and revolution, they have certain great disadvantages in efficacy and speed as compared with the decisions of the autocracies, both in government and in administration. One must admit quite frankly that, in the present-day struggle between the two systems, the democracies cannot compete with the dictatorships in speed and efficiency of civil and military administration, nor in the quick strategy and tactics of diplomatic conflict.

Still, it is today a great obvious truth that the dictator states pay heavily for their advantages. Having no public control, they have no freedom, and, in spite of contrary assertions, their states are in dissolution, their nations deeply divided and demoralised. A liquidation or a further logical development of these régimes cannot take place without a crashing fall. Economically and financially they drift, in contrast with the democratic states, toward inevitable bankruptcy.

But at the beginning of a new dictatorship this may not be always and at once directly visible, or cannot find public expression. Thus, on the surface, the population sees largely the real or pretended results of their quick and efficient administration, hears the boldness of their decisions and other real or pretended advantages of the authoritarian régimes vaunted to the sky, even when they do not materialise. Thus for a time a considerable part of the population either sides with them against the democracies, or passively and indifferently, fearing the most violent reprisals in case of opposition publicly manifested, waits

with patience or hatred for a kind of inner or external catastrophe.

All authoritarian régimes attack with very special vehemence and hatred the political leaders of democracy; and there is no doubt that the democratic leaders and their defects and mistakes have their share of responsibility for the decline of democracy. They accuse them of lack of civic courage, of incapacity and lack of competence, of inclination to corruption, of dependence upon the anonymous electoral committees and different electoral tricks and plots, of a spirit of indecision, etc.

I shall come back to this important matter in another chapter.

But the democratic leaders were often deficient in another important respect. They became leaders after years of hard work, after a difficult, long career; and when they arrived at their position of leadership they frequently could not understand that democracy exhausts its leaders quickly, and that it is necessary to prepare new leaders to replace the old ones and to educate another generation of leaders.

The leading democratic circles frequently ignore these necessities, which contradict their natural inclinations: they stay in their places for a long time and do not make room for the young generation. Many of them become accustomed to a life in the limelight and only reluctantly leave its moral and material advantages, even if to do so is evidently in the interest of the democratic cause itself. Frequently they become too easy-going in their work: too frequently they succumb to the daily routine; they become estranged from the masses and their own environment; they become old, and with them their régime grows old.

Thus it becomes inefficient, ineffective, without drive and resistance.

Such leaders are not always able to defend democracy, to lead her successfully, to preserve her sufficiently, or to ensure her victory against the leaders of expansive totalitarianism, who are usually young and have come to power in a revolution.

B. SYSTEM OF TOTALITARIAN PROPAGANDA AND THE REGIMENTATION OF PUBLIC OPINION BY FORCE

We must add to this a further admission as to the success of the authoritarian régimes and the failure of the democracies in the matter of propaganda.

Since the war one has ceased to speak in the present world of politics of the formation of public opinion on internal and international politics by information, news service, and education. Their place is taken today by *political propaganda.*

Political propaganda, as it is understood and practised today by the authoritarian régimes, is a systematic distribution of tendentious, unobjective, partial, or frankly hostile information. Propaganda has become an organised dissemination, not of facts, news, or truthful statements, but of selected events and facts as one side or a particular régime interprets them. With the present-day increase of communications and other technical means—especially the growth of the press and the wireless—this organised medium of information has become an astonishingly effective weapon.

From the moment when this weapon had become the usual instrument of political struggle, either against a party inside the country or against an opposing state, the

principle recommending the use of all means, fair and foul, without restraint and reserve, was accepted in the propagandist battle. In this respect postwar methods of propaganda in several states surpassed even the greatest excesses of the propaganda used during the World War in ruthlessness, untruthfulness, and Machiavellism.

Authoritarian politicians in Europe do not flinch from admitting openly that the present propaganda is actually a war of a special kind; that, as in war, it is necessary to use all means, and that the only criterion of this propaganda and its methods must be the interest and success of the régime, state, and party it is serving.

Totalitarian propaganda inflicted gradually many defeats on the democracies by these methods. We must at least point out two characteristic facts:

1. The totalitarian régimes undermined the democracies, using all possible means and methods, the most violent, illegal, perfidious, and dishonest, by asking them at the same time to apply consistently the *principles of democracy,* especially those of freedom, honesty, toleration, and humanity. They always fashioned very sharp weapons against democracy out of disrespect for these principles. As soon as they came to power, they refused expressly and decidedly to preserve and to apply any one of these principles to their democratic opponents. They applied only the principles of their own régime to democrats: lack of freedom, intolerance, persecution of their opponents, the brutal power of the party, the régime, and the state.

A democratic régime, once defeated, cannot get back to power by normal methods, while the authoritarian régimes frequently appeal to the fact that they have reached power in a legal way. Moreover, the democracies were so honest and consistent that they did not want to take undemocratic measures for their defence and thus to become un-

faithful to their principles. This, too, is one of the causes of the downfall of the democracies in Europe.

2. Unfortunately we must also admit that the democratic régimes were not able enough to organise and properly exploit successful modern democratic propaganda. They were not able to resist effectively the attack of totalitarianism in this field by normal methods and political means.

First of all, democracy *could not and must not,* either in the information or in the education of its public opinion, use the methods of the authoritarian states. Democracy must rather respect truth, honesty, fair play, and a certain degree of freedom, if it wants to stand the test of its own public opinion and does not intend to commit suicide in the political arena.

Secondly, democracy did not succeed in devising a propaganda which, holding to the basis of truth, honesty, and fair play, while allowing a certain freedom even to a ruthless and brutal opponent, would have been successful in resisting the propaganda methods of its totalitarian opponent. Totalitarian propaganda counted on passion, feeling, instinct, and therefore on hate, intolerance, blind partisanship, mystical prejudices, and fanatical faith. Democracy could only appeal to reason, moderation, mutual respect and tolerance, education, and good will, to a discussion which would respect the objectivity and truth on both sides.

Under these conditions it was easy to foresee the results of the propagandist struggle among the politically inexperienced and not sufficiently educated masses of the people: in all Central European and Eastern European democracies there has up to now been nothing but failure of democratic discussion and the victory of ruthless totalitarian propaganda.

C. THE TOTALITARIAN RÉGIMES AND YOUTH

One of the assets of the totalitarian régimes in their struggle against the democracies was their success in winning youth to their side.

The reasons for this success are fairly obvious. Youth is always inclined to be radical because of its brief experience and its natural tendency towards idealism. It can be won most easily by that element in every kind of radicalism which seems inspired by generosity and by an honest and idealistic desire for something new and better. Everywhere youth wants change. Just because of its youthful, genuine, and frequently naïve enthusiasm, youth is easily won by radical formulas for producing a brave new world, in which the younger generation itself will enjoy the superior position that belongs to it by right.

We must add to this natural inclination of youth causes of a different order. Youth had suffered most by the unemployment after the war and especially during the depression of 1929–36. The old generation stood in their way too long. It was a natural development of postwar democracy and of the new, rather rigid stratification of postwar democratic society. The old postwar generation through its political activity had established itself firmly in responsible positions and had become almost indispensable. The younger generation was much later in gaining independence than in prewar times and economic security, and in taking an active part in public life.

The social policy of the democracies, besides, extended the life of the older generations, as it created for them good conditions of life and thus made them block the way to the rising generations by remaining long in active economic and political life. This alone made the democracies grow old—or at least they gave the impression of old ré-

gimes. They did not have the driving power and the desire for novelty which the authoritarian régimes cultivated. These, on the contrary, saw the difficulties arising from these conditions and demagogically curried favour with youth, opposed their régime against obsolete democracy as the régime of revolutionary youth and as the paradise of a new and young world.

One must admit with sorrow that the democracies neglected youth, on the whole. Many of their older representatives often repelled youth by their narrow-mindedness, egoism and lack of understanding. Those who did understand the situation, too frequently could not win youth for a reasonable, moderate, tolerant, compromising, and slowly moving, antiradical democratic régime, in competition with the demagogic and expansive revolutionary totalitarianism.

D. THE PACIFISM OF THE DEMOCRACIES AS A WEAPON FOR THEIR DESTRUCTION

I shall touch only briefly at this point on a further reason for the decline of the European democracies.

The democracies, according to their principles, proclaimed pacifism and opposition to war, and they were prepared to come to an agreement for a world-wide disarmament. They believed for a time in the efficacy of a policy based on the League of Nations and collective security; they believed that some agreement on disarmament would be reached, and they hoped that it would be possible to avoid war, at least for a considerable period. And even there, where the democracies (France, for instance) had some doubts about the possibility of disarmament, they felt morally obliged to pursue this pacifist policy, have defended these doctrines publicly, educated public

opinion in this spirit, and created thus in the democratic countries a quite special pacifistic atmosphere.

In a number of European states the army was therefore pushed into the background of political interests. This led to a considerable decline or neglect—at least during a certain period of postwar policy—of the defences of the state and the preparedness of the democratic countries. Several states—like Great Britain—disarmed on a considerable scale, especially for financial reasons; while others, like France, postponed many necessary military measures. During the postwar depression there was in the democratic states not enough money for the army, particularly since much was being spent on social services.

The authoritarian states, on the other hand, soon understood that they must win the army for themselves first of all, and they made the army first the basis and later the main instrument of their internal and especially of their external policy of expansion. Italy, Germany, Japan, and to some extent Russia and Franco-Spain are examples.

Moral and intellectual preparation for possible international conflicts was an especially serious question in both camps. The European democracies, especially the Western democracies, were educating their public opinion for peace, were conducting a propaganda against war, as they believed in peace, collective security, and the League of Nations. They frequently lulled their political circles into inactivity and an exaggerated belief or hope that there could be and must be no war. They weakened public opinion for any more resolute resistance, and even inculcated a general distaste for the idea that the democratic régimes should ever take up arms for any idea or interest. This state of mind became so general, particularly among certain leaders and certain classes of the Western democratic countries, *that the authoritarian governments and leaders*

considered and even publicly proclaimed democracy as the expression of cowardice, declaring that it would and must yield in every case when the authoritarian régimes would have the courage to threaten them with war and show the spirit of decision to carry this threat into action.

The authoritarian régimes, on the other hand, educated their public opinion into a pugnacious, expansive, and militaristic frame of mind; they all the time scared their masses with some real or imaginary foreign danger; they militarised youth from the earliest age; they constantly made extensive military preparations; and they kept their public opinion systematically in a fever of nationalist passion.

Thus when the tension between democracy and totalitarianism had reached its highest degree and threatened to explode, the totalitarian régimes appeared the stronger, with better military preparations and a more effective policy. I myself am convinced that they only *appeared* stronger. But it was sufficient that in a number of European conflicts the democracies remained at a disadvantage, and that they were at last systematically forced to retreat, to concede, to capitulate.[1]

All this inflicted much deeper wounds on the European democracies than may appear at first sight. As I have said before, unpreparedness, lack of courage, moral weakness, and calculating egoism combined with a lack of solidarity and unreadiness to help one another, produced *impotence* and a certain *unwillingness* of the European democracies to defend themselves and their friends by force of arms against the expansionism of the authoritarian régimes. The mistakes, deficiencies, and lack of courage of the lead-

[1] Manchuria and China, Abyssinia, the occupation of Austria, the civil war in Spain, the German-Czechoslovak conflict in September and October 1938, etc.

ing personalities were, of course, also of considerable importance. *This is one of the main reasons for the present desperate situation and for the decline of freedom and civilisation in Europe today.*

I do not want to say, of course, that the democracies should not defend and proclaim pacifism. I mean rather that they should cultivate a *healthy and sensible pacifism,* that they should have *foresight, courage, and less egoism, and that they should, above all, understand that it is sometimes necessary to fight resolutely and courageously for their ideals, principles, and peace—even on a battlefront—and they should be prepared to do this in time, before it is too late.*

E. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1929–36

To the internal weaknesses of the European democracies we must add several factors of minor importance which nevertheless contributed to the downfall of European democracy.

Among them I shall mention at this place only this one: the great economic and financial crisis of 1929–36 which lasted in Europe for seven years and made life difficult and sometimes even impossible for the European democracies. Its consequences in day-to-day economic and social policy were charged against the democratic régimes by a skilful propaganda of the totalitarians. Unemployment, the consequences of a deflationary financial policy, the collapse of banks, the deficits in community, town, and state budgets, the breakdown of many economic, financial, and insurance enterprises, all the daily catastrophes of families and the destruction of hundreds of thousands of livelihoods were simply ascribed to the mismanagement of the democratic system of government.

The public control of democratic régimes, the honesty and scrupulousness of the active politicians, made it impossible for them to conceal these facts: the necessity of having orderly budgets and public institutions forced them to point out themselves some irregularities in public administration which were inevitable in a time of depression —while the opponents of democracy pilloried the smallest incorrectness, incompetence or inactivity of the ruling régime ruthlessly and brutally, according to the principle that "the end justifies the means." A radical change, a growth of prosperity, an economic boom, an increase in productivity, and an end to the depression—all these depended on world trade conditions. But the impossibility of effecting economic and financial recovery in the teeth of adverse international conditions was an argument which either was not admitted at all or was simply suppressed by the totalitarians. Sometimes it was not sufficiently used by the defenders of democracy themselves.

The world depression between 1929 and 1936 played a decisive part in the downfall of German democracy. But it also inflicted very deep wounds on other democracies.

The Gradual Rise of Postwar Dictatorships in Europe

All these natural and inevitable difficulties of the young, postwar democracies, which were the unavoidable consequences of the World War revolution, provoked rapidly a great reaction: the new democratic European countries were soon very rapidly agitated by strong, antidemocratic movements, and step by step a number of these European states began to pass over to the authoritarian system.

While the first important step was taken by Italy in 1922, Hungary and Bulgaria had a kind of authoritarian régime immediately after the conclusion of the peace, even

though the internal structure of both these states had become undoubtedly more democratic through the events of the war. In Italy the Fascist revolution began with an uprising of the Blackshirts in September and October 1922. Fascism consolidated its position politically during the following year, and in 1924 the parliamentary anti-Fascist opposition was crushed for good. In these years Fascism developed from a simple political dictatorship of one party into a complete system of government, into a political and legal as well as a social and economic doctrine.

Today it is obvious that the Italian example and the Fascist doctrine made a much wider and deeper impression on Europe and the whole world than the democratic régimes in Europe would admit at the beginning and between 1923 and 1927. The influence of the Italian Fascist régime on the development of the European political situation undoubtedly was underrated for a certain time. Italian conditions were not well enough known, and more was expected from the Italian opposition than it was actually able to do. It is probable, too, that the exterior opponents of Italy and Fascism could not for various reasons (or did not want to) conduct a policy in opposition to Italian Fascism and to fascism in general in the field of international politics.

It must, besides, be remembered that from 1923 the dictatorship of Kemal Ataturk was established in full force in Turkey: his victory over Greece and his courageous modernisation of the whole social, cultural, and national life of Turkey endowed him with sufficient authority to preserve his dictatorship successfully up to his death in 1938.

Then followed successively the dictatorships in Greece, in Albania, in Bulgaria, in Poland (1926), in Lithuania, and in the two other Baltic states, in Portugal and in Spain

(General Primo de Rivera, 1926), and in Yugoslavia in 1927. From 1929 a fascist movement—Heimwehr—was being prepared in Austria, though it assumed full power only in 1933–34. From 1936 an evolution towards the authoritarian system began.

Finally, most seriously and most decisively, after the death of Stresemann in 1928, affairs in Germany developed towards a grave internal crisis. Every new election strengthened the position of the National Socialist party, until finally in January 1933 Nazism was called to power by President Hindenburg and Chancellor von Papen. *This actually decided the fate of European democracy.*

Even before these events the development toward an authoritarian régime had advanced considerably in Japan. This became obvious in the attack on Shanghai and Manchuria in 1931–32. The dictatorship of the proletariat had been, we may add, introduced into Soviet Russia as early as 1917, and had on the whole consolidated its position up to the death of Lenin in 1922, after having overcome all the difficulties of civil war, fanned by more or less open intervention from abroad. Soviet Russia, after the elimination of Trotsky, elaborated a stable political, legal, social, and economic system under the leadership of Stalin.

Eventually there remained in Europe: the British democracy; the Scandinavian democracies (with some authoritarian experiments in Finland; the French democracy (with some later attempts of the Right to install a system of greater authority after 1933); the Belgian democracy (with less important Rexism—fascism); the Dutch and the Swiss democracies.

In Central Europe only Czechoslovak democracy was preserved in isolation, at last completely surrounded by authoritarian régimes (with whom she had her difficulties of an international character and disputes about territo-

ries). From 1922 Czechoslovakia had to combat the ambitions of very small political circles (without importance but of fascist tendencies) among the Czechs themselves; but the real fight for democracy took place in Czechoslovakia after 1933, among the German minority, who came under the influence of Hitler's National Socialism in the German Reich. This agitation was, it is true, weak at first, but it disturbed Czechoslovakia's internal politics and was one of the pretexts for the events of September 1938.

This spread of all kinds of authoritarian régimes on the European continent is *the most decisive and most characteristic political phenomenon of postwar Europe.* It was most marked *on territory where the World War had had its most far-reaching effect, and where it had carried out the greatest territorial, political, social, and economic changes*—that is, on the territory of the four defeated empires, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Russia. And Italy was the closest and most direct neighbour of these territories.

This spread of authoritarian régimes in Europe determines the whole development of international and European politics. The present confusion, insecurity, and anarchy in culture, morals, politics, in society and economics, is both its consequence and its expression. All these facts represent the real tragedy of the European nations after the last world war and illustrate in full clarity the whole moral crisis of present-day Europe.

Chapter IV

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE DEMOCRATISATION OF EUROPE AND OF THE WORLD

The Development of the Idea of the League of Nations from the Earliest Times to the World War

A. THE THEORETICAL PREDECESSORS OF THE PRESENT LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The league of nations, created at the Peace Conference after the World War of 1914–18, is, in its origin, spirit, and the circumstances which accompanied its rise, absolutely modern and revolutionary. *It was possible only at a time which was characterised by a general revolutionary movement for the democratisation of all moral, cultural, political, social, and economic life.* It has, it is true, ideal relations with all the earlier attempts at the creation of a similar institution built for identical purposes; *but its present-day form and its present meaning belong only to the twentieth century as the century of postwar democracy.*

In speaking about the origin and activity of the League of Nations, one usually starts with its history and all its forerunners or attempts at similar institutions in the past. Since its main and essential task is the creation of conditions for the preservation and securing of peace, and the prevention of war, such an exposition is usually accompanied by an historical introduction on the development of pacifism and on peace efforts in general. I shall mention

these subjects quite briefly and only in order to stress the fact that the present League of Nations is actually a child of our postwar conditions and an expression of the democratisation of Europe and the whole postwar world.

The ideal of eternal peace and reflections about the ways and means to secure peace are almost as old as humanity. Such reflections have been preserved from early oriental civilisation, from the time of Confucius, from classical antiquity, from Zeno, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. Primitive Christianity fought against war in the name of Jesus; Tertullian and St. Martin of Tours formulated Christian objections to war very emphatically before the recognition of Christianity by the Emperor Constantine.

The first well-known example of a real peace organisation, one quoted even today as a precursor of the League of Nations, was the *Amphictyonic League,* in 497 B.C. This was a sort of federation of Greek states and communities, which agreed among themselves to preserve peace and met in a special Assembly to solve their common problems in a common Council.

At the time of Pericles similar organisations, like the *Confederation of Delos* and the *Athenian League,* were functioning. These leagues, too, solved disputed questions of the Greek communities by negotiation and discussion, and frequently applied the principle of arbitration.

Similar efforts were made also by medieval Christianity, which created the well-known institution of the *Treuga Dei,* the Truce of God, as it could not entirely stop the wars and conflicts of medieval feudalism: here belong also all the proposals for the creation of a League of Christian Nations, under the leadership of the Pope, for their com-

mon defence against the invasions of the Turks, Moors, and Mohammedans in general.[1]

In the middle of the fifteenth century the *Bohemian king, George of Podiebrad,* made a practical attempt to organise a Peace League, a pact for the protection of peace among the Christian nations under the leadership of the Pope.

The Swiss Confederation, founded by a pact concluded at Sempach in 1393, quite expressly aims at the creation of a defensive union of states for the preservation of peace. Arbitration in case of conflict was even then accepted and applied.

The religious wars and the post-Renaissance period in Europe represent a reaction against the early peace efforts. Then began the development towards a conception of omnipotent and absolute states. Machiavelli and Hobbes expressed the political tendencies of the time. The early tendency toward universality was replaced by efforts to build isolated, powerful national states. Philosophers and humanists, however, kept the idea of pacifism alive: *Sir Thomas More* wrote his "Utopia," *Erasmus of Rotterdam* his "Praise of Folly" and the "Complaint of Peace." But the highest fame was gained by the proposal of *the French king, Henry IV, and his minister, Sully,* at the end of the sixteenth century, known as the "Grand Design" (*Le Grand Dessein*).

This proposal aimed at the predominance of the Habsburgs in Europe. Europe was to be newly divided among fifteen states, which were to form a special common Coun-

[1] *Pierre Dubois of Normandy,* "On the Recovery of the Holy Land"; *Marsilius of Padua,* "Defensor Pacis," etc. *Dante* in his "De Monarchia" argues for the organisation of a world-wide empire, governed by universal legislation for the protection of peace.

cil for the discussion of important common matters; and, besides, a proposal was made—for the first time in history—to establish an international army and navy. Though we must not overrate this plan, it was nevertheless the first far-reaching attempt and became the starting-point of all similar later proposals. The idea of a common, international compulsory defensive action, of an international army and sanctions, had there its beginning.

Another great step forward in the theory of this policy was the book of *Emeric Crucé,* "Le nouveau Cynée." He went further than the French statesmen, proposing a world confederation, which would also include the non-Christian states, and in addition proposed for the first time clearly that war should be completely replaced by arbitration. During the latter half of the seventeenth century a number of sects, especially English sects, were formed with completely pacifist convictions, in contradiction to the official Catholic and Protestant churches, which admitted war.

Such a spirit permeated the "Apology" of *Robert Barclay,* published in 1676, and especially the well-known book of the Quaker *William Penn* called "A Plan for the Permanent Peace in Europe," published in 1694. Penn, on the whole, repeated the ideas of *Sully's* "Grand Design," and especially proposed the forming of an international court composed of all European states, which would secure a real rule of justice for the future.

Hugo Grotius's celebrated book "De jure belli et pacis" (1625) does not reject war, but for the first time in history tries to give exact and internationally valid rules for its conduct. Grotius thus became the founder of modern international law.

The great Czech emigrant, *John Amos Comenius,* who had to leave his country during the Thirty Years' War because of his religious convictions, was by his whole life-

work a great teacher of the nations and preacher of peace; and *Leibniz* in his "Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus" (1693), *Pufendorf,* and *Christian Wolff* continued in the spirit of *Grotius.*

Thus we arrive at the few classical writings of pacifist theory in the eighteenth century. Though every one of these books has its own characteristic features, due either to the individuality of the author or to the time, and is therefore out of date from a modern point of view, an interpretation of these books is still indispensable for anybody who studies the theory of pacifism, or the practical attempts to build up a peace movement and institutions, or the theory and practice of the present League of Nations.

First of all, there is the French book, dated 1713, of the well-known *Abbé de Saint-Pierre,* "Projet de paix perpétuelle en Europe" ("Project for Settling Perpetual Peace in Europe") and the criticism of this book by *Jean Jacques Rousseau* ("Jugement sur le Plan de la paix perpétuelle de l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre") printed in 1761. The Abbé de Saint Pierre continues in the tradition of the plan of Henry IV and Sully ("Grand Design"), demands the founding of a league of sovereign states, rejects war, proposes the establishment of an international court and of compulsory arbitration, military sanctions against an aggressor, and a common limitation of armies to an agreed level. Rousseau accepts the ideas of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre on the whole, corrects some of them, criticises some, and adds, in particular, the demand that a codex of international law should be formulated as the foundation for this new international order.

The English philosopher *Jeremy Bentham* in his book "The Fragment of an Essay on International Law" (1789) continues in this spirit by demanding a codification of

international law, the establishment of an international court and arbitration, military sanctions against an aggressor, limitations of armaments, and even liberty for all colonies.

The American and French revolutions, with their universalist philosophy and humanist theories of equality, liberty, and fraternity, strengthened these ideas and became their champions. The discussions in the revolutionary French National Assemblies show how the consciousness of the growing unity of the world and of cosmopolitism had become the property of all. The appeal by *Anacharsis Klootz* for the establishment of a unified world state in 1793 is only a symptom of this atmosphere.

The celebrated pamphlet of the German philosopher *Immanuel Kant,* "Zum ewigen Frieden" ("Towards Perpetual Peace") grew in this soil. Though it does not go as far as some of its precursors, being more reserved and less utopian, the little book of the famous philosopher of the eighteenth century exercised wide influence. It advocates equality and liberty for all citizens and demands the federation of free republics, that is, of the states which are built on the idea of freedom and equality of the citizens. It pleads for the limitation of the sovereignty of individual states and its replacement by a greater co-operation and security of the states. It demands a gradual abolition of standing armies and the establishment of an international court. As the ideas and doctrines on the nature and functions of the state in Germany from Hegel up to the present time are completely contrary to Kant's ideas, and as these new German ideas play an important part in present-day Europe, it is well to remind ourselves that one of the greatest German philosophers belongs among the fathers of the League of Nations and the champions of a philosophy of humanity and democracy, and that his work will

always be quoted among the classical contributions to the struggle of mankind for permanent peace.

The Peace Movement in the Political Practice of the Last Two Centuries

From the beginning of the nineteenth century ideas about the establishment of permanent peace invaded another field. Hitherto philosophers, moralists, and humanists had laid them down in writings, a number of which had become classical. Now they were taken up by peace societies, which under the guidance of practical men tried *to become centres of popular movements and to influence public opinion.* This development began in America about 1815 and thence spread to England and later to France and Switzerland.

A number of peace conferences were organised in connection with Cobden's Free Trade movement. The first was held in London in 1843. The Paris congress of 1849 had wide publicity, since *Victor Hugo* appealed there for the creation of the United States of Europe. Then followed further congresses largely led and organised by British, French, and American peace societies. They concentrated mainly on general questions and on propagating peace ideas, linking them with topical political problems such as free trade, the abolition of slavery, and objections to the Crimean War.

From the Crimean War and the Peace of Paris in 1856 nearly to 1870 the peace movement was almost silent. But as early as 1867, when Frédéric Passy began his agitation, the movement grew again in force, and neither the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 nor the Russo-Turkish War of 1876–77, nor the Berlin Congress of 1878 stopped it. On the contrary, during those years the peace movement grew

in strength; and, especially after 1870, the idea of arbitration became popular, as it had been given a practical trial in the celebrated *Alabama* case after the American Civil War. A movement for arbitration treaties between Great Britain and the United States, and then between other states, followed.

This agitation for arbitration was supplemented at that time by propaganda in favour of the codification of international law and finally by disarmament propaganda. Societies for international law were founded, and also institutes and periodicals devoted to international law. We are almost in completely modern times. From 1889 there were added the congresses of the Interparliamentary Union and the World Peace congresses as permanent international institutions.

During the few years just before the calling of the first Hague conference in 1899, the congresses of the Interparliamentary Union dealt quite concretely with the question of international arbitration and the creation of an international court and judicature. The World Peace Congress of 1893 in Chicago discussed a complete plan for the establishment of an international court, and the congresses of both organisations in the following years accepted with a proposal for such an international court or even complete texts of international arbitration treaties, which were to be submitted to the states as models for their acceptance and application.

The congresses of the Interparliamentary Union and the World Peace congresses between 1894 and 1896, and especially the congress of the International Parliamentary Union in Budapest in 1896, apparently decided the calling of the first Hague Peace Conference. The Budapest congress in its resolution directly addressed the states and demanded an official participation of governments in the

conferences of the Union, besides appealing to the Parliaments concerned to turn to their own governments and to demand from them the conclusion of general arbitration treaties and the establishment of an international court.

A Russian consular official who attended the congress made a detailed report on it to the Russian government and Tsar Nicholas II. All reports agree that the minister, Count Muravieff, used this information and induced Tsar Nicholas to take the initiative in this matter—apparently for reasons of Russian internal and foreign policy. *Thus on 24th August 1898 Tsar Nicholas II published his famous "rescript,"* that is, a circular note to the ambassadors at the Russian court about the calling of *a peace conference at the Hague.*

Its results are well enough known: it accepted an unimportant resolution about the limitation of armaments, but did good work in the question of arbitration. The Draft of a convention "for the peaceful settlement of international conflicts" is a great step forward on the road to peaceful international co-operation, and the whole session of the congress prepared the way for the present League of Nations. It made mediation possible in conflicts between conflicting parties, it envisaged the establishment of international commissions of investigation, and it established, first of all, an international court at The Hague.

The negotiations at this peace conference were difficult, and the main aim—compulsory arbitration and limitation of armaments—was thwarted, especially by Germany. At the time the conference was considered to be a manœuvre of some powers, especially Russia, against the others, in order to gain time for their own rearmament.

Nevertheless, the conference sets an important date in

the efforts to achieve more permanent peace and to reach something similar to what the League of Nations was and is today. Up to 1914 the Hague court was asked to judge fourteen international conflicts. It did this work well, and became thus the first important peace experiment of its kind in Europe and the world.

Further, under the influence of the Hague conference and the establishment of an international court, the idea of concluding arbitration treaties between states became pretty general. Up to 1909 were concluded no fewer than 314 international treaties containing clauses on arbitration; and at the beginning of the Great War in 1914, 194 such treaties were valid and functioning. The arbitration treaty between France and Great Britain of 14th October 1903 is one of the most important treaties concluded under the influence of the Hague agreements. It became the generally acknowledged model, according to which 162 new arbitration treaties were concluded between different states in the following years.

Between the first and the second Hague conferences, between 1899 and 1907, the peace movement, the Interparliamentary Union and the World Peace congresses continued their activities in all states of the world. The South African War, the Russo-Japanese War, the difficulties in Southeastern Europe, in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, increased tension in public opinion and encouraged further armaments, while the peace movement in the individual states increased its efforts even more in order to prevent war and rearmament.

In spite of this—or possibly just because of this bad atmosphere—the individual European states began to avoid the Hague court. Besides, the South African War and the Russo-Japanese War had weakened considerably the influence and importance of the first Hague conference. In

the years 1902 and 1903 a tendency reappeared, therefore, first in France and then later, during the Russo-Japanese War, also in other states, to return to the Hague resolutions and its peace methods. A direct intervention by President Theodore Roosevelt both accelerated the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan and encouraged the Russian Tsar on 14th October 1905 to call the second peace conference, which met at the Hague on 15th June 1907.

The second Hague conference dealt again with disarmament and arbitration, besides a number of questions concerning war and the conduct of war rather than peace. But it did not make much progress. As to disarmament, again there was expressed only the wish that the states should consider it; as to arbitration, it recommended that legal conflicts should be submitted to a new and genuine law court, the establishment of which was proposed, while political, as opposed to legal conflicts, should be submitted to the existing political Court of Arbitration. This was an important step forward, as the division of international conflicts into two types was kept for the future and was incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Even the second Hague conference did not, however, reach agreement about the introduction of compulsory arbitration in international conflicts—largely because of the opposition of Germany.

The second Hague conference gave new life to the peace movements in the individual states, gave new material for new congresses and especially for meetings of the Interparliamentary Union. Right up to the war all these movements were stronger than ever before and were a means of preparing international public opinion for the demands for a new international cooperation which were later formulated in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Let us add that the peace movement and the results of the Hague conference—especially its acceptance of the idea of arbitration—had also great results in the United States. From 1897 the government of the United States made three great attempts at concluding important arbitration treaties. The first attempt was made by the signing of the Anglo-American arbitration treaty of 11th January 1897, which went further than any similar treaty between great powers. The American Senate did not, however, ratify it. A second attempt was made in 1904–5, when the Secretary of State, Mr. John Hay, negotiated a whole series of new arbitration treaties. They met the same fate as the Anglo-American treaty in the Senate. The third attempt was made by the signing of twenty-seven arbitration treaties by Mr. Elihu Root. The Senate again added a limiting clause which deprived them of any importance or value. The same happened in 1911 under President Taft, when again a number of arbitration treaties, especially with Great Britain and France, were prepared. The Senate again opposed them.

The United States government finally, however, received the assent of the Senate—directly before the World War—to the coming into force of thirty arbitration treaties concluded by Secretary of State Bryan, which were negotiated during the winter of 1913 and later ratified during 1914 and 1915. Among them were also treaties with Great Britain and France. Germany refused to sign a treaty, and reiterated her refusal even during the World War, under President Wilson, when Bryan was Secretary of State.

I have discussed the history of the peace movement very briefly and sketchily, and have dwelt especially on the questions connected with the two Hague conferences and the efforts for disarmament and arbitration, for everything

that happened in the negotiations about the Covenant of the League and everything that was incorporated in it was anticipated by these precursors. It is important to recognise this intellectual development and this logical historical chain, in order rightly to judge the political and moral trend of evolution which led us to the Covenant of the League of Nations. We can also judge the trend today pulling us back again to the original methods of force and war, as they existed before this development.

The main thing, however, which I wanted to stress by a sketch of this development is this: From the earliest times up to the proposal of Kant and the time of the American and French revolutions, reflections about peace, about methods of peaceful agreement among the nations, about the limitation of armaments, about a new international life, remained on the whole reflections of individuals —thinkers, moralists, and utopians—or the projects of politicians, and never went beyond the stage of planning and proposals.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century this pioneer movement became more democratic and became a practical political activity: popular peace societies were founded, books, pamphlets, reviews were published, public opinion was formed: congresses met, permanent institutions were founded with such a programme—the Interparliamentary Union, the World Peace congresses, the International Peace Bureau, the Institutes of International Law, etc. Parliaments took up these matters; then other public assemblies, first individually in individual states, later on an international and world-wide scale. By the international cooperation the principles of such a peace policy were more accurately defined: general utopian demands and aspirations were transformed into exact legal formulae and conceptions. Sentimental enthusiasm about

peace and disarmament was transformed into concrete political demands which could be fulfilled. In the course of the discussion, which lasted a whole century, all the different problems and ideas were clarified that later were incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations in exact stipulations.

The struggle for these ideas was led throughout a century by the circles and influences which were inspired by the ideas of the French and American revolutions, by a religious faith in the goodness and equality of men in the spirit of the teaching of Jesus, by the democratic doctrines which had been spreading since the end of the eighteenth century in Europe and America. Conservative elements, whether in the governments or otherwise in political life, put obstacles in the way of these ideas for a whole century. *It was not possible to carry them through to the extent to which the Covenant succeeded as long as the public opinion of the world and all the democratic elements of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century in Europe and in America had not been won over by the propaganda struggle of a whole century.* It was not only impossible to incorporate these ideas in such a document as long as the world and public opinion were not prepared for it; it was even more impossible until the World War, as a great upheaval of the whole political world, had caused a revolution and a great democratisation of Europe and the world.

All the prewar practical attempts at the preparation of a League of Nations were comparatively timid, even if their early propagandists, especially in the eighteenth century, could be very radical. All the arbitration treaties up to 1914 were on the whole very cautiously phrased. Discussions and decisions, resolutions and demands on the question of disarmament, the limitation of sovereignty or

sanctions and collective security, did not go very far. However, all these main questions, which became the cornerstones of the Covenant of the League of Nations, are contained in the discussions of the peace movement from the Middle Ages up to the war of 1914–18. Almost every one of them was fully clarified in its political and legal essence in the course of these discussions. But a practical expression in clear terms and political, legal and government acceptance, they received only after such a catastrophe and such an enormous democratic revolution as the World War created.

I have therefore stressed and stress again that the League of Nations is a symptom and expression of the democratisation of Europe and the world after the Great War, and that therefore the present League of Nations can exist and function morally only in a democratic world.

The Preparations for the Covenant of the League of Nations During the War

I shall merely touch on the origin of the final text of the Covenant of the League.

It has been described in a number of historical and juridical writings, and it has been shown in detail how the Covenant was prepared in Europe, what were the contributions of President Wilson and Colonel House and of other American experts and politicians, what was taken from early models and what was purely American, and what, on the other hand, was done by the British government and Foreign Office, the commissions appointed for this purpose and the debates in the British Parliament, what France contributed—in fact what were the exact shares of all concerned in the final elaboration of the Covenant at the Peace Conference.

I do not want to discuss the legal meaning of the individual articles, the conflicts and different interpretations of them, nor do I want to formulate debatable legal theses on arbitration, or on sanctions, or on Article 10, 11, 15, or 16. These are matters for specialists which have no place here. I want to show the general and political meaning of the League, what it expresses, what philosophy and policy were embodied in it, and how it is related to the general democratisation of the world during and after the war.

When the war broke out, *the democratic popular feeling and intellectual basis in world public opinion was ripe for a democratic conception of a new peace instrument for Europe and the world in the form of a democratic world League of Nations: The main ideas of the Covenant had been,* as I have shown above, *quite sufficiently discussed* legally and politically, *and they were known generally both to politicians, lawyers, and specialists* and to the more enlightened public opinion. *The ideas of arbitration and an international court had been tested in practical international political life; the idea of limitation of armaments had been the most popular topic of pacifist discussions,* and had been at least theoretically incorporated in the programmes of all progressive political parties; *the idea of sanctions and collective security was only just penetrating among politicians and specialists.*

Further, both conferences held at the Hague had a decisive influence on the attitude towards the general idea of a limitation of state sovereignty. Even before the war it had become obvious that there should be a world community, that state sovereignty should be capable of considerable limitation, and that the principle of mutual interdependence between states and nations must become the law of international life and politics. In spite of this, it was obvious before the war, during the war, and after

it, that no new formulation of international cooperation after the war—even in a future Covenant of a League of Nations—would go so far as to establish a real superstate.

It seems that the expression "League of Nations" was for the first time pronounced during the war in the famous reply of President Wilson to the two conflicting parties, who on the 18th December 1916 were asked by him to state their war aims. Though it had its logical starting point in all prewar pacifist movements, to which even the great powers and their governments had submitted before the war, at least as far as to build up and to accept the work of both Hague conferences, the idea itself appeared during the war as something revolutionary in its magnitude, consistency, and extent. The practical results of this idea, embodied in the Covenant of the League as a system of a new international politics and international relations between the states, were actually revolutionary, just as the war itself and its consequences for democratisation were a great revolution.

The idea of a League of Nations was publicly discussed and studied in detail throughout the four years of the war. In Great Britain, in the United States, and in France the governments pushed and forced by the growing popular sympathy and public discussions about this matter decided rather early in the war officially to entrust certain personalities and commissions with the study of these questions, intending to submit their results in the form of concrete proposals for the eventual peace negotiations of their governments.

In America there was a special "League to Enforce Peace" headed by former President Taft and President Lowell of Harvard University. In England there was a group round Lord Bryce and the Fabian Society which was busy preparing proposals about the League of Nations

as early as 1916–17. The attitude of the British government towards the League was considerably influenced by the debate in the House of Lords, started on the initiative of Lord Parmoor on the 19th March 1918. In the spring of 1918 the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Arthur J. Balfour, appointed a "Committee on the League of Nations" (under the chairmanship of Lord Phillimore) on the initiative of Lord Robert Cecil, and it worked out for the government concrete proposals for Statutes of the League of Nations. This draft was also sent to Washington.

As early as July 1917 the French Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Alexandre Ribot, appointed a commission with M. Léon Bourgeois in the chair, which prepared for the government proposals for a constitution of the League of Nations. This draft was then sent to London and submitted to the Peace Conference. The Foreign Office prepared a special detailed memorandum on this question out of the whole material at the disposal of the British government at the end of the war. This memorandum and other material were used for the formulation of an abbreviated draft for the Covenant of the League of Nations which was submitted to the British War Cabinet on 17th December 1918 by Lord Robert Cecil, and which was also handed to the American delegation (to Mr. David Hunter Miller) in Paris on 1st January 1919. This proposal is generally called by the historians of the Covenant the "Cecil Draft." We must add as further British material the voluminous memorandum of the South African General Smuts on the principles for the formation of a League of Nations: this memorandum, too, contributed to a final clarification of all these problems.

In America, material and direct concrete proposals for a definite Statute of the League of Nations were being

prepared during the course of the war. The arbitration treaties concluded by President Taft and Secretary Bryan were a preparation for it, and the presidency of Woodrow Wilson was naturally a great milestone in this development. President Wilson—who in former times had presided at one of the last peace congresses held in America—was at the beginning of his term as president preoccupied with the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, stressed his own pronounced democratic faith against the Mexican dictatorship of General Huerta, and tried to gain the cooperation of all American states for the spreading and building up of world democracy.

The outbreak of the war in Europe was for Wilson, House, and their friends a proof of the bankruptcy of the old European world and also of the bankruptcy of old diplomacy and a proof of the complete lack of any peaceful international cooperation. It inspired them to reflections on the possibility of building up a system of democratic international cooperation between the states of North and South America, which later could also be applied to Europe.

Thus President Wilson and Colonel House thought first of a special Pan-American Pact, which would guarantee territorial integrity and independence to all signatory powers, which would impose a control on the production and sales of armaments, and which would express the principle of arbitration according to the model of Bryan's arbitration treaties.

These ideas were expressed specifically in some messages of President Wilson during the war, and especially in his fourteen points of the 8th January 1918. In July 1918 Colonel House worked out a text of the Covenant of the League of Nations—apparently with the use of the British draft of Lord Phillimore. This text was then some-

what altered by President Wilson. In the discussions on the League of Nations, besides Wilson and House, Taft and Root also took part.

Up to 3rd February 1919, when the commission for negotiations on the Covenant of the League met for the first time at the Peace Conference, President Wilson had formulated no fewer than four different texts (with the aids of specialists and legal advisors, especially D. H. Miller). The first text contained the main articles on a guarantee of state integrity and independence, on armaments, arbitration, and not very exact formulations of sanctions. The Paris texts, after an exchange of views between the British and American delegations, and other members of the Conference, contained new ideas, for instance on colonial mandates, about the regulation of the conditions of social and labour legislation, i.e., about the establishment of an International Labour Office. Finally, there was accepted the principle of protection for religious and racial minorities (at the instigation of General Smuts).

Thus there appeared on 3rd February 1919 a common British-American text, the so-called "Hurst-Miller Draft," as a basis for discussion in the commission for the League of Nations. The text of President Wilson, in the preceding discussion between the American and British experts Miller, Lord Robert Cecil, and Sir Cecil Hurst, had been supplemented by articles from the British texts—largely from the draft of Lord Robert Cecil; and President Wilson accepted, on the advice of Colonel House, the new common text as the final basis for official discussion about the Covenant of the League of Nations at the Peace Conference. Léon Bourgeois also submitted to the commission his own text on behalf of the French delegation, but he agreed that the "Hurst-Miller Draft" should serve as an official basis for the whole further work of the commission.

This is the history of the last preparations for the final text of the Covenant of the League of Nations. All this confirms what has been said before about the difficulty and length of the course which finally led to the formulations of all the articles of the Covenant. *At the end the great events of the war, the changes and revolutionary upheavals in the sense of the general and far-reaching democratisation in Europe and the whole world,* forced the Peace Conference to go so far and to give expression in the text of the Covenant, to the whole revolutionary democratic postwar alterations, *as well as to the fact that the democratisation of Europe and the world was enforcing a complete revolution in all existing international relations and in the whole practice of international politics.*

The League of Nations as an Expression of Democratisation in Both the Internal and the Foreign Policy of the Principal Nations of Europe and the World

A dispute is still in progress about the nature and ideal of the League of Nations. Some people think that it has a *utopian ideal* of a future society based on the principles of humanity, the mutual love and mutual respect of men who believe in good will and "fair play" in public life and are prepared to conduct their day-to-day policy (especially their international policy) by conciliatory, peaceful, unwarlike methods. According to these views, the League of Nations is mainly an expression of a certain philosophy and morality, the realisation of which should be achieved in practical life by the influence of public opinion—guided by free discussion, reasonable arguments, decent and truthful propaganda: briefly, the pressure of intellectual and moral forces.

Others are of the opinion that the League should be a

strong institution working for the salvation of world peace by practical means; that it should have an effective political machinery with executive powers; that it should have at its disposal material force sufficient to impose peace, to prevent war by the punishment of the aggressor or to remedy the evil consequences of war for the victims of an attack.

In my own view, the League of Nations is, first of all, a logical system of new international relations clearly elaborated in all its consequences. It corresponds to the *new political and social structure of democratic society in the twentieth century,* and is based on a definite system of philosophy and morals, on a democratic and humanitarian philosophy and morality. Anybody who properly considers the political and social supposition underlying its foundation in 1919, and who studies the Covenant of the League of Nations, must share this view.

Secondly, the League of Nations is, in my view, *an institution, endowed with a certain machinery,* the aim of which is the proclamation, application, and enforcement of this political and social philosophy in international politics.

The intellectual conception of such a system—like any abstract entity—may be (theoretically) perfect, while the institution, its machinery and its day-to-day activity, may be—or rather is almost certain to be—like any practical device, imperfect, compromising, and liable to error. The conception and theory remain still the same in principle, as they are the ideal of a new society, to which we draw nearer in daily political activity through the institution and its machinery, at the price of compromise necessary in any slow development. The League, therefore, cannot always give perfect solutions of the daily problems in political, social, and economic life.

As the conception of a new political order in a postwar world the League of Nations was the expression of the philosophy and morality of democracy. *The individual, as the highest value in social life, must be respected as an end in himself and not as a means.* Men, and therefore also nations, are equal: no social class can live at the expense of another; nor must any nation or state live and act as if one were the instrument for the aims of another, since all are equal morally and legally. Humanity must be considered one great brotherhood, and the whole of international life must be ordered accordingly. Conflicts of interests, feelings, and views must be solved by agreement and discussions, by a sensible respect for all justifiable points of view. There is, therefore, no room for war in a society so organised.

Its whole structure must be so planned as to enable its daily practice to be in accordance with these democratic principles. Its nature demands the freedom of the individual, limited only by the same freedom for other individuals; it demands freedom of expression for all social and political groups, parties, and nations, limited only by the equally free life of other groups, parties, and nations.

This conception of political and social life was at the basis of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the Geneva institution and its whole machinery was built on it. The Council of the League of Nations had to solve all political conflicts which were submitted to it: it had to solve them by agreement or arbitration. It had also the right to delegate them to a specially created court—the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, a new and important branch of the League of Nations.

The League established commissions, special departments, and a Secretariat to deal with humanitarian questions and social welfare; with matters of hygiene that had

international importance or interest (refugees, denationalised people; the drug problem, opium, the problem of infected districts in outlying areas—the plague, cholera, etc.); with questions of intellectual cooperation and thus of cultural, scientific, literary, and artistic rapprochement between nations and states.

Further, the League founded a special International Labour Office, whose task was to focus attention on social problems in general and especially on the international aspects of social legislation. This meant bringing together states that differed socially and economically, and that naturally had many economic and social conflicts. It was intended to secure the conditions and chances for peace by better cooperation in social policy and economics as a corollary to political cooperation between states and nations.

The League created further organs and institutions to deal with a whole series of other less important questions, all of which, however, tended to promote a peaceful cooperation among the nations.

But the political field was, after all, still the main field of League activities. In this field the *ideal of permanent peace* was actualised into a political conception which was logically consistent and had no intellectual oversights.

This conception can be formulated in the following manner:

There must not be any war in the future. If there is not to be war, it is always necessary to solve all possible conflicts by agreement. The agreement may take the form of a political understanding or of the acceptance of arbitration. When this method becomes general, when it becomes a principle of international law, we can actually achieve a state of complete political and international security between nations and states. If there is international security, a state of mutual international confidence will be created. Under these circumstances it

will be possible to begin to reduce armaments and to arrive at a final state of limited armaments, agreed upon and adhered to internationally. The remaining armaments will be only those absolutely necessary, according to the respective needs of the individual states.

This whole programme of international politics is expressed in the well-known brief slogan: *Arbitration—Security—Disarmament.*

The formula "Arbitration—Security—Disarmament" means that the states and nations *renounce war* as a means of resolving their political and ideological conflicts. If, in spite of this, some state should violate these provisions and use force against another state, sanctions will be imposed on it; that is, all the other members of the League will use economic and even military measures to bring it back into the comity of nations. This system of collective security enables the members of the League *to limit their sovereignty* quite deliberately in the matter of armaments, since after the acceptance of a disarmament pact its violation would either bring about the collapse of the whole system or would end in the aggressor's renewing his respect for the previous limitation of his sovereignty under pressure of force.

The League of Nations is, then, according to this sketch which we have drawn—both in its theory and ideological basis and in its machinery and practical activity—*a medium for the democratisation of political and social life,* and of course it is especially a medium for the democratisation of all international relationships. *The League of Nations should be an organ of World Democracy in its whole international activity.*

We must add, of course, immediately: as the League of Nations was the expression of a general democratisation of the postwar world and an organ of international democracy and its policy, *international democracy and the democratisation of the world were and are in their turn the*

necessary conditions for the existence and real functioning of the League of Nations. The downfall of democracy anywhere must necessarily touch the League of Nations; the bad functioning of the League of Nations and its defects again must necessarily inflict wounds on democracy and its defenders. Thus the very existence and activity of the League of Nations are inextricably connected with the fate of democracy as a whole.

The Main Causes of the Failure of the League of Nations

A. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

When one speaks of the decline, the impotence or the failure of the League of Nations one should realise that any reproach or criticism which points out the failure or decline of the League is based on exactly the same assumptions and reasons as criticism of the decline and failure of democracy as a whole. One is the condition and the complement of the other.

The first cause of the difficulties of the League is the old and eternal contradiction between theory and practice, between a precise, logical, and intellectually correct conception and the possibilities of its application in the practical activity of everyday policy. The League of Nations demands in theory a just settlement of conflicts by agreement. Everyone demands of it the greatest—that is, almost perfect—justice.

But the settlement of conflicts in politics always means compromise. Practical life is always so complex, so fluid and changing, so diverse in its manifestations, that no simple law, no rule, no directive which deliminates an interest for a time or decides a conflict, is able to include all the details, to respect all interests, to give full satisfaction to all

individuals, parties, classes, and nations or states. In other words: a compromise is usually an attempt at uniform distribution of some kind of *injustice;* it is an equable division of sacrifices, which both conflicting parties have to make in imperfect circumstances, and never the uniform distribution and division of *justice* with *full* respect for the interests of both parties. That ideal of perfect justice is very rarely realised in practical life.

Thus it happened that every day in its activity the Geneva institution had to respect the powerful interests of some state, in order not to create greater difficulties for itself and others than it could overcome. Or, sometimes the leading statesmen made their decisions under the influence of abler politicians, abler experts, abler protagonists, at the expense of the injured party. Or, finally, the general situation or the momentary condition of a country or nation brought about a decision, which soon afterwards under changed circumstances appeared unjust, and which, therefore, should have been made differently at the time of the original conflict.

In other words: the League of Nations is generally conceived as the incarnation of justice or the symbol of integrity in the solution of all political conflicts. In practice the League had to make compromises every day and had, in fact, to violate its own ethical principles, the postulates on which it was founded, and the spirit of its own constitution. *There never was and never can be any other outcome for any body which must conduct an everyday practical policy.*

I have in the preceding section listed those practical instances with which the Peace Treaties and then the League were reproached. These criticisms were exaggerated in detail even if justified on principle, but they were made without any proper comprehension of the real difficulties

of such an institution as the League of Nations. There were complaints that the principle of self-determination was not carried out, that large racial minorities had been incorporated in the new Central European states; there were complaints that the Minority Treaties were being violated, and that they were insufficiently supervised by the League; there were complaints that Article 8 of the Covenant, concerning the limitation of armaments, had not been carried out; and there were complaints about colonies, mandates, and the distribution of international economic resources, especially raw materials. There were finally complaints against the general policy of the League as a whole, for it was said that the League had simply become the instrument of the egotistical policy of individual great powers and their friends.

As one of those who have dealt with these problems at the Peace Conference, and who has taken part for many years in the founding and the whole practical activities of the League of Nations since the war, I can express a general opinion on these criticisms. I shall take as an example only the question of the self-determination of nations and the protection of Minority Treaties and rights by the League of Nations.

I have just emphasised the necessity of political compromises. One could justify them theoretically as follows:

In the application of any moral, political, social, or economic principle one must, first of all, answer the following essential question: Should we apply a principle in practical life consistently and without compromise, even at the cost of making ineffectual the main aim of the principle and so reducing the principle itself to absurdity? Or must we allow for circumstances and limit its application so that its vitality and its preservation will not be endangered? In other words, should we be guided in practical political life

by the principle, *Fiat justitia pereat mundus,* or by the idea that frequently in applying the most important, most far-reaching, and noblest principles in practical politics it is necessary to be content with reasonable compromises which will endure?

This means in practice: Should we, for instance, permit the personal freedom of a single individual in a democracy to endanger the freedom of the other individuals? Should we allow the sovereignty of a single great nation to endanger the sovereignty of a smaller nation? Have we to allow and to apply the self-determination of one nation to such an extent that it completely endangers the self-determination of another nation?

In the field of pure ethics and metaphysics there should not be any disagreement. The majority of moral philosophers actually resolve this conflict between principle and expediency quite clearly and completely in a positive, uncompromising manner: the principles of moral conduct should be applied consistently, completely, and everywhere. In practical life, however, nobody *ever* doubts—in any political camp—that politics by their very essence and by the needs of everyday life require and enforce compromises. This means that the application of every principle in practical political life must be conditioned by the absolutely necessary acceptance of the assumption that the application of the principle in every single concrete instance must not destroy the principle itself in its essence.

This implies, in the question of self-determination,[2] that the Peace Conference could not create new purely national

[2] The principle of self-determination itself would need very detailed and precise explanation. It was misused and continues to be misused in an incredible degree. Everybody gives to it the interpretation that serves his political interests and aims. Postwar political experiences will force political science as well as practical politicians to proceed to a real and complete revision on this matter.

states, that the defining of frontiers in European states—because of the national development of Europe in the Middle Ages and the last three centuries of the modern age—could not be carried out on the basis of the nationalistic principle in all its consequences, and that, therefore, the old and new states had to include racial minorities in their frontiers. There is a large literature on this question, and a discussion of it could be interminable. While I always try to be consistent and to base my policy on principles, I still affirm the necessity of compromise in this question as in others and the impossibility of drawing clear-cut ethnic frontiers in Europe.

There remains, of course, the question whether the detailed drawing of the frontiers was right and whether the compromise was reasonable and capable of lasting. It is more difficult to answer this with complete certainty. While as to the first question we stand on the firm ground of *principle,* as to the second question we are on the ground of *opportunity*. We ask whether the practical solution and the concrete decisions of the leading statesmen at the Peace Conference were or were not *just* on questions of national frontiers.

A dispute about practical solutions in politics is difficult to settle, as it is usually a question of people agreeing not about an absolutely *just* solution, but on the *degree* of that justice. In the struggle between two parties—*two opposite opinions, two divergent interests*—the decision is usually determined by the ability of one side to enforce its point of view. Every political compromise is, therefore, usually in different degrees the expression of the dominance of one of the conflicting parties and, *therefore, almost always contains the germ of a future conflict.*

I do not hesitate to say that the principle of self-determination for the victorious new nations was *supplemented*

by further principles: economic necessities, needs of communication, and sometimes strategic and political needs. The Peace Conference quite openly refused to acknowledge in general the principle of "historical right" to certain territory. In some cases, however, historical reasons for the fixing of frontiers played a part. I do not think that one should *a priori* have everywhere excluded these principles as a supplement to the principle of self-determination. Just the opposite. But the application of these principles should have been as limited, as moderate, and as reasonable as possible.

In other words: the Peace Conference quite rightly applied to the question of self-determination the principle of compromise; but in practice it is rightly pointed out that this compromise could have been in some practical cases better and juster *to the defeated powers.*

A second analogous example is the question of the post-war *minority policy* of the League of Nations. The Peace Conference quite rightly accepted the principle of protection for national and religious minorities, and Minority Pacts were actually signed. But we may emphasise that not all the right and desirable consequences were drawn from the initially right principle. The great powers refused to submit to this principle, and, as they themselves did not always respect the rights of minorities, they suffered, inasmuch as many smaller states which had signed the Minority Pacts did not fulfil their obligations.

One must also add that the racial minorities in the new states were themselves not without their share of responsibility in the situation. In general, they were not sufficiently loyal towards their new states, and lent themselves to the neighbouring powers as instruments against their own states, and all, or almost all, minorities untruthfully exaggerated many of their grievances and did not acknowledge

the good will of their states. In spite of this, the Council of the League of Nations had frequently a too compromising policy towards the minorities and was not always quite just to them.

All this meant that in the different cases, the principles of international democracy, represented by the League of Nations, had been violated. The very same things hold good that were said about the first example: no human contrivance can be perfect, and even the League of Nations could not give perfect justice to racial minorities. We must admit that the League could have and should have given justice in some practical cases in a *greater and more satisfying* measure.

I have quoted these examples merely as proofs of the difficult tasks which the Peace Conference and the League had to solve and the obstacles to a full realisation of post-war democracy and its principles. I could similarly discuss the complaints against the non-application of Article 8 of the Covenant, on the limitation of armaments, complaints about colonies, mandates, and raw materials, and complaints against the general policy of the League as an instrument of the policy of a few great powers. A number of these criticisms are justified. *But a number are exaggerated, incorrect, and used only as a pretext for a general attack against the democracies and the League of Nations. Both sides should have tried to find a sensible compromise by good will.*

I draw then the following conclusions from these reflections:

The Peace Conference and the League of Nations actually wanted to be and were, in their general tendencies, efforts and in a number of their decisions the executors and the expression of a newly born, strengthened and expanded democracy, especially in Europe. But, like all political solutions, the work of the Conference had to contain a

number of political compromises, *which represented a considerable step forward compared with prewar times,* but also, as I have suggested above, sowed the seeds of future conflicts and struggles, as happens with almost any political compromise. I myself, therefore, have complete comprehension of the actual difficulties of the League of Nations on this point.

Every period, every section of political history has its own possibilities of solution and its own needs of certain compromises, according to the temporary conditions and state of affairs. The leading political personalities can make these compromises tolerable for a long time, if they make them at the very start as just and as good as possible, or if they gradually improve them and extend their life during the further political development and the struggle for a moderate, evolutionary change. The greatness of political personalities is measured and judged accordingly.

It is not only a problem how to incorporate democratic principles in as pure a form as possible into the law and institutions of democracy. It is even more important that the leading democrats should apply them in this progressive spirit, and that they should in time find, where necessary, a way to perfect these compromises and this gradual approximation to the ideal or pure principle of democracy.

The great weakness of postwar democracy was not in the system of democracy itself: it is not impossible, incompetent, or unjust; but frequently the democrats themselves did not live up to their ideals and were unable to do what postwar democratic policy in Europe required of them. They were not always able in time to make *reasonable compromises which would have been as just as possible,* as they frequently were unable to recognise when they must not retreat, when a compromise was impossible or unsuitable and when it was therefore necessary to defend the

principle at any price, whatever might happen. Frequently they had not the courage to defend an old compromise in all its consequences, even with the force of arms, where it meant the best and morally most justified solution under given circumstances, or again to reject it boldly and courageously and in time to find a new, even painful solution, based on principle or at least more nearly conforming to a principle, when it was obvious that the old compromise had to be abandoned.

B. DIFFICULTIES WITH ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SANCTIONS

All these are difficulties inherent in all political life and especially in democracy as a whole. Still they should not have proved fatal for the League of Nations. The political world is today mature enough to understand this.

But there appeared greater and even more fateful difficulties in the League of Nations. Individual articles of the Covenant (10, 15, 16, 17) lay down the circumstances under which the members of the League of Nations should assist the attacked against the aggressor power, and when and how military, financial, and economic sanctions should be applied.

I have always uncompromisingly defended the point of view that all the articles of the Covenant mentioned should be observed compulsorily and consistently, and that the duty even of military assistance to the attacked state should be clear and unconditional. But, at the same time, I always realised that, as the League is universal, such an obligation imposes on the great powers an almost impossible task, and that even a minor conflict between smaller states could become a conflict of the great powers and extend to a world war.

In other words: these articles mean that the great powers become the policemen everywhere in the whole world

—just because their interests embrace the whole world—while the smaller states would always profit from them considerably, but frequently would not have to engage *effectively* in the conflict and so would make comparatively small or even negligent sacrifices for peace preserved under a system of collective security. I have, therefore, defended the principle of so-called regional pacts, in which the genuine interests of a certain part of the world would oblige all partners to make equal sacrifices.

This actual state of affairs led frequently to a tension between the great powers and the smaller states at Geneva. The smaller states, which consistently defended the application of the principles of the Covenant, appeared during several conflicts more honest and more consistent; the larger states (the great powers) more cautious and calculating. The great powers reproached the small states with driving them into difficult decisions on principles, the dangerous consequences of which they would have to bear themselves, while the small states were risking little or nothing at all.

This was one of the reasons for a further difficulty of the League of Nations. The great powers were induced by their natural interest and tendency to decide on world interests alone, as far as possible without the interference and influence of the small states at Geneva, and they *always tried to admit for discussion in Geneva only such conflicts as did not run counter to their own interests or ambitions,* or those from which they did not see any other way out.

But this state of affairs—their great responsibility, risks, and possible sacrifices—induced them in general to limit the influence of the small states in so far as possible, in order to enforce their own point of view, despite the principle of the equality of all states at Geneva, or to prevent

such questions from being raised in Geneva at all. For instance, they consistently refused to solve the question of reparations at Geneva. After the failure of sanctions in the Abyssinian War the League consistently refused to discuss the question of the Japanese-Chinese War or of foreign intervention in the Spanish Civil War.

All this undermined the authority of the League of Nations, hurt its important principles and badly damaged the principle of equality of nations and states, which is the essence of international democratisation; this was one of the great factors that contributed materially to the final failure of the League of Nations.

C. THE DISTRUST OF INDIVIDUAL STATES FOR THE POLICY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The third great difficulty, which led to the same fateful consequences as to the authority and importance of the League of Nations, was the fact that for the whole of these twenty years there *constantly prevailed uncertainty about the actual attitude of a number of states, and especially the big powers, towards the League of Nations in general.* The liberal, progressive, and socialist circles in all states of Europe consistently took a positive view of the League, *while conservative circles were reserved, critical, and frequently even frankly hostile.* It must be stressed, however, that the majority of *smaller* states, even if their conservatives held a cautious view, officially based their foreign policy on the League, or at least supported it consistently. Both these circumstances had a decisive influence on the development of the League of Nations.

Up to 1924, for instance, France was on the whole reserved in her attitude toward Geneva, while Italy supported the League very strongly up to 1922. The attitude of Great Britain varied according to the state of her internal political parties and according to the governments in

power. After 1924—after the first MacDonald Government—even conservative governments turned toward Geneva more resolutely. But on the whole the fact remained that the interests of the individual states induced them to take up a twofold attitude toward the League:

1. At all possible opportunities they proclaimed or at least discreetly manifested *a certain distrust for the possibility of consistently carrying out the League policy,* because they asked themselves all the time, with a certain apprehension, whether the League would actually be capable at the moment of a real international crisis, in which the main great powers would be involved, to guarantee their national security and all their vital interests. They asked, besides, the even more serious question: What sacrifices will be demanded from us in any conflict in which, according to a decision of the League, sanctions are imposed against an aggressor?

2. Out of suspicion of the states defeated during the war (mainly of Germany) *they did not always accept certain of their duties under the Covenant with necessary and due sincerity,* if they were favourable to these states—for instance, disarmament. While they had accepted this obligation together with the Covenant, they did not respect it always formally. They took part in the disarmament discussions of Geneva, but they did not put any real trust in disarmament. It is true that in many cases their mistrust (for instance, toward Germany or toward certain circles of postwar Germany) was completely justified. *On the whole, they always preserved a very uncertain and unclear attitude toward the application of sanctions and the other obligations in case of attack on some minor state.* No small state ever knew surely what attitude the other great powers would take towards its obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant—if another great power should attack it.

These were the greatest difficulties of the League of Nations. In times of crisis they resulted in attempts of the great powers to get rid of the obligations of the Covenant

in some way and, in a serious conflict, to reach a compromise, which usually violated only the vital interests of the weaker party. Though such a compromise prevented a more serious conflict for the moment and spared the big powers greater sacrifices, *the League of Nations naturally always suffered the most serious setback.*

This happened in the case of the occupation of the Greek island of Corfu as early as 1923; in the fate of the Geneva Protocol; the failure of the disarmament policy; the case of Manchuria in 1931–32, of Abyssinia in 1934 and of Spain and China in recent years. The conflicts over Austria and Czechoslovakia arose at a time when there was not even hope for a successful solution in Geneva. They were, therefore, not even placed before the League.

Moreover, even the unilateral repudiation of the Locarno Pact in 1936 was not submitted to the League, though individual articles of the Locarno Pact presumed this and even prescribed Geneva as a competent authority to deal with any violation.

All that means that the policy of the great democratic powers in the League of Nations, especially since 1930, has contributed in large degree to its failure; their responsibility for the present state of affairs is undeniable. The power of the League was practically killed in the first place by the failure of the great powers in the conflict about Manchuria and even more in the conflict about Abyssinia.

The Decline of European Democracies as the Fundamental Cause of the Decline of the League of Nations

But the most important factor, which actually decided the ultimate failure of the League in the present period of

world history, was—as I have emphasised already—the current development of Europe, which, on the whole, slowly turned away from democracy and went over step by step to dictatorship, starting as far back as 1922, when the Fascist revolution took place in Italy. *The greatest development and culminating point of the League of Nations should be placed during the years 1924–25. After that its influence waned and later declined rapidly.*

I have shown, in the preceding sections, how the war brought about a great democratisation of the postwar world, and how the philosophy and morality of democracy dominated for a certain time the soul of the postwar world, but also how antidemocratic philosophy and morality did not disappear. Soon after 1919 the struggle between the two worlds began all over again. It led to a gradual decline of the democracies for reasons of internal and of international policy, as I have shown in detail before; *associated with the struggle against democracy, one can speak also of a struggle against the League of Nations. They are closely connected and mutually dependent.*

In the struggle against the League of Nations, we can roughly distinguish three different camps: the democratic in the Centre, the conservative on the Right, and in previous years the communist-Marxist on the Left.

The conservative Right wing in general opposed the humanist, pacifist philosophy of democracy and the League of Nations with a fundamental scepticism which doubted the possibility of preventing war under all circumstances, which did not believe that the nations are all equal (even in the sense that equal rights should be accorded to them), that the equality of people, classes, parties, and nations can find expression in the whole political, social, and economic order to the extent the progressive democrats believed it possible, and especially that this philosophy can find ex-

pression in international politics or permanent peace according to the assumption and ideals expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations and in its consistent international policy.

This wing believed that under the given circumstances one cannot solve international conflicts solely by agreement and by the decision of international law-courts: it, therefore, did not want to renounce the full sovereignty of states and nations and could not fully believe in a policy of disarmament. They considered a certain overlordship of man over man, class over class, nation over nation as necessary; and finally, under given circumstances, they did not exclude a conduct of public affairs by undemocratic means, either oligarchic, autocratic, or dictatorial.

The extreme Left wing started, in the first years after the war, as I have described above, with the materialist philosophy of class struggle: that the evolution of our society, which is still governed by the bourgeoisie, is determined by the economic interests of the ruling middle class, to which are subordinated especially the class of urban and rural labourers; that, as long as there exists a society which is the expression of class struggle, war cannot be abolished; that it is in the very nature of middle-class society that it must exploit the other classes, preserve its economic predominance only by force—inside the state by class coercion and a régime controlled in the interests of the governing class, and in international politics by the inequality of the states and nations, by a struggle for economic resources, international markets, colonies, world-rule, which necessarily must lead to war; that the working class must consistently fight the bourgeoisie, and finally win to a new society in which there will be no classes and no class struggle but only a state and a society of equal people who would not and could not exploit one another, and who, reconciled and

united internationally also, would not have any interest in waging war against similar states and societies; that only then will there be no class struggle and no war, no exploitation either inside a nation or on an international scale.

I have also shown above that the European development of recent years has shaken these theories considerably, so that even the Communist Soviet State—even if it did not reject historical materialism formally—toned down its fatalistic belief in the necessity of war by joining the League of Nations, defending the possibility of bourgeois and communist societies living side by side and therefore also the possibility of a peace policy in the spirit of the League of Nations.

Today there are, then, in postwar society, especially in Europe, two camps in permanent opposition to each other —the Centre, of the bourgeois and liberal democracy (which was joined by several socialist parties), and the Right, the conservatives, who even if they are, as in Great Britain or France, political democrats in their own state, do not believe without reserve in the pacifist ideals of peace, in the possibility of consistent policy of the League, and do not exclude war as a natural and necessary manifestation of human society. The conservatives accordingly take a reserved, critical, and (according to circumstances) sometimes even a hostile attitude towards the League of Nations and consistent internal and international democracy.

The extreme forms of these views found expression *in the dictatorships,* especially in the Italian, German, Japanese, and other authoritarian or semi-authoritarian régimes which took up an attitude first of cautious reserve and later of complete hostility towards the League of Nations. As they are founded on a voluntarist philosophy of

force and power in regard to the individual, party, nation, or state, they proclaim the principle that human life is nothing but a struggle, a struggle with all means, which, as the creative factor, is alone decisive for the position of the individual in society or the nation or state in the international world. Therefore the expansion of the individual and the nation is natural and necessary; therefore the struggle of nations and states among each other is not only necessary, but also natural, inevitable, eternal; therefore in this struggle the downfall of one side and the victory of the other is quite logical and just; therefore the dynamism of one side and the weakness of the other are the natural sequence by which the power and predominance of one state and nation are replaced by the predominance of another state; therefore *war is the natural, inevitable, and justified instrument of national and state policy,* and therefore in the last resort only *pressure, force, and eventually military power decide the temporary legal state of affairs between nations and states.*

This is a view completely contrary to all the convictions and ideals incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations. *There is no compromise, no settlement possible between such opposite views.* One excludes the other. The moment a philosophy and policy of this kind have been victorious in a state there is the end of democracy, the end of a democratic foreign policy, the end of a policy of agreement and cooperation *on principle.* This is only admitted *in some individual cases* as a temporary policy, as the proper policy of the moment, dictated by necessity or opportunity, or the temporary international situation. It will be replaced by a policy of force and power, as soon as the situation is again suitable for the achievement of the expansive aims of the state and nation concerned. *In such a society and with such states and nations there is no room*

for the League of Nations. Simultaneously with a democratic outlook, everything else that concerns the values of the League crashes to the ground.

On the other hand, *the League of Nations by its whole philosophy, attitude, and activity becomes a danger, an opponent and enemy of these régimes.* Hence all these states, as far as they remained members of the League, carried out a negative policy in it, then left it, and finally declared a life-and-death struggle against it. I merely point this out as an obvious, natural, and logical fact.

Such is the situation today. In such terms must we interpret the development of politics in Europe, the development of Italian, German, Japanese, and also Hungarian policy, the policy towards the League of various important political circles in a number of European states, in which democracy was replaced by a totalitarian, authoritarian, or at least semi-dictatorial and semi-authoritarian régime. The opposition of all these states and circles to the policy of the Geneva Protocol, their attitude to the problem of disarmament, their attitude in the question of Manchuria, China, Abyssinia, and a number of questions of present-day Europe in general, is merely an illustration of this fundamental and irreconcilable conflict.

The development of Europe, which led to the downfall or at least *the weakening and decline of democracy and international democratic policy, means at the same time the failure, permanent weakening, and general loss of prestige and power of the League of Nations as the expression and organ of an international democratic policy.*

The secession from the League of Japan, then Germany, and finally Italy, has only confirmed this state of affairs, and even the joining of the Soviet Union could not prevent this development. Disregard for obligations towards the League, which was quite openly announced by some

states and silently carried out by others, and finally the attempts of several other states to weaken the present obligations of the members and to change the text of the Covenant so that the League would be transformed into an institution with moral influence but without any coercive power—all this is part of the same development. *If the authoritarian states should return to the League, they would either have to change their régimes into democratic systems or have to deprive the League of everything which is democratic in it and everything which opposed the ideology of totalitarianism and the international expansionism of the totalitarian states.*

This would mean that the present League of Nations had to die and a new one had to be created. In other words: *a real and effective activity of the League of Nations as it is constituted today—or of a League based on similar principles—will only be possible when Europe and the world again return to democracy.*

Chapter V

MODERN ANTIDEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGIES AND EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY

Two Fundamental Points of Divergence Between Authoritarianism and Democracy

In treating of the modern antidemocratic ideologies I do not intend to explain their complete theory and daily political practice. There are already many books and studies of fascist and national socialist theory and practice, and especially of communism before the war and also in its new Russian Soviet form—Marxism and Leninism—and it is not necessary here to take up in detail these political authoritarian systems. I wish only to emphasise those points in which they fundamentally differ from the basic principles of democracy.

I shall therefore touch a little more widely on two important points in explaining in the following pages some of the principal theses of fascism and national socialism.

I have already underlined that there is a fundamental difference between these systems and democracy in their philosophic starting point: for authoritarianism of whatever kind, human life is based on *struggle*—struggle between individuals, between classes, between social collective bodies, between states and nations. If *struggle* is the fundamental factor of human social evolution, everything is finally decided by brute force. If brute force is a decisive element in social life, *all material forces have the primary*

function—and, of course, the first place in every human society—and speaking from the metaphysical point of view, the basis of existence is material and not spiritual. The inevitable implication of such a point of view is that all morality and the whole system of ethics are based on force also, and that this system of ethics is relativist, cynical, and materialistic. Practical conclusions of these philosophical and moral theses are evident: inequality of men, nations, and states, domination of higher individuals and nations and subjugation of so-called lower individuals, classes, and nations. *It is, therefore, a brutally and materialistically aristocratic conception of public and social life.*

Democracy, on the other hand, is based on a different system of ethics, repudiating struggle as the basic principle of social evolution. It does not deny that there is struggle in social evolution—quite the contrary; but it maintains that, besides this important factor in social evolution, there is the factor of collaboration, of discussion, of agreement, of love, of social attraction, and that *social evolution must be based on the synthesis of the elements of struggle and collaboration, on the solution of conflicts through reasonable and human means.* That means that for democracy what is primary and fundamental for human evolution is not material force *but spiritual and moral force,* which in the final solution of the conflicts of ideas and interests must always predominate.

Here intervenes also another important factor: religion and the religious concept of life. I have previously abstained from treating this question in this book, because it is quite another section of the discussion. But my attitude toward this factor is absolutely positive: *Democracy as a system of thought cannot be anti-religious.*

And so, in speaking of the divergencies between the ba-

sic conceptions of authoritarianism and democracy, we come to the *eternal contradiction and fight between materialism and spiritualism,* which continues to be the perpetual content of the whole history of philosophy from antiquity until the present day. This is a problem of metaphysics in which the final proof cannot be given by one or the other side. In this dispute every human being must simply have the courage to choose and, after having chosen, must elaborate his own system and follow it in practical life. Every man must have the courage to declare whether he is and wishes to be a man of brute force or a man of the spirit; if he wishes, in everything he undertakes in his life, to be on the side of brute power and force or on the side of moral and spiritual force.

Fascism and national socialism publicly and solemnly declare that in their whole system of politics they are on the side of brute force. Democracy, on the other hand, solemnly and publicly declares that it is on the side of moral and spiritual force. *Here there is no conciliation possible, either in theory or in practice.* Not to take this fact into consideration and not to act accordingly is a delusion and a great mistake. This is my first conclusion in this chapter on the theory of fascism and national socialism in their relation to democracy.

The second fundamental point which I wish to emphasise is the conception of the Almighty State held by the authoritarian systems and the opposition of democracy to this conception. Fascism, national socialism, and, of course, communism, are fundamentally anti-individualistic. The idea of the social collectivity is primary. The social collectivity—either the party or the society or the nation or the state—must be considered as the final and supreme element

of social life. The individual, in his activity, in his life and in his development, is dependent on and derives from the collectivity.

Democracy, on the other hand, is individualistic. That means that democracy considers every human being as primary and fundamental and every social collectivity as composed of individuals—who are primary. The authoritarian systems consider their collective bodies—party, nation, state—as almighty and the development of the individual and his freedom are subordinated to the collectivistic conception of human society. Again, in these points the two schools of thought are irreconcilable, and we must simply choose one or the other, and again put it into practice in our entire life and in our political and moral systems and act accordingly.

I have always tried to arrive, in that sociological dispute, at some acceptable final synthesis. Human culture and civilisation were created by the constant interrelation and constant influence of these two social forces—individualism and collectivity—each on the other. Socially speaking, it is not possible to say that one or the other is primary; that is the same discussion which we know from scholastic medieval philosophy as to which existed first, the egg or the hen. Human society exists as a collective body at the same time as the human individual. *But, metaphysically and morally speaking, there can be for me at least no doubt that the individual is a primary force, and that metaphysically and morally the highest value in society is the human being as individual.* For this reason I am an individualist, and for this reason I am for democracy as the system based on the individualistic conception of life. Here again no proof is possible. One is either individualist or collectivist.

Besides these fundamental arguments in favour of democracy, I have a fundamental, practical reason. Every

political system in the history of mankind has been judged on the basis of whether it has solved, justly and rightly, the problem of the relation between the individual as citizen and the state as the form in which every society must live; whether on the one hand the individual has had a sufficient degree of individual liberty to develop freely and to live a free, dignified life, and whether on the other hand the state has had sufficient power and a sufficient degree of influence to maintain a disciplined, ordered, and just society. If on the one side the degree of individual liberty was too great, the state fell into anarchy. If on the other side the degree of individual liberty was not sufficient and the state power was exaggerated, the result was absolutism and tyranny. In either case the inevitable result was revolution and complete failure.

There is no political system but democracy which is capable of solving justly and rightly this eternal problem in human society. Democracy, in its nature and organisation, gives constant expression to the continual struggle of its citizens for just relations between the individuals and the collectivity. For this reason the entire political development of human society is practically the evolution to a higher and higher degree of democracy. Modern political history shows that in almost all civilised states this struggle has gone on, and that after a period of reasonable freedom came a period either of anarchy or of absolutism, followed by a better kind of democracy.

My conclusion is that *it is the essence of human nature on one side, and of human society on the other, that man must struggle constantly for this reasonable, well-balanced relation between the collectivity and individual freedom, and that he can fight for this balanced relation again only in a political democracy.*

No authoritarian system in the history of mankind has

ever established between the individual and the collectivity this reasonable, well-balanced relation—which would be contradictory to its own essence and nature.

In the following pages I give, therefore, very briefly some essential theses of fascism and national socialism from the point of view of these two fundamental principles which I have just explained. Communism and its relation to democracy I shall take up, from the same point of view, in the last section of this chapter.

Some Fundamental Theses of Italian Fascism

A. Fascism as a Reaction Against and Negation of the Political Doctrines of the Nineteenth Century

Italian Fascism and fascism as a doctrine in general derive from a philosophical basis very characteristic of one great part of the philosophical world at the beginning of the twentieth century. Hence the postwar political struggle in Europe is between two fundamentally distinct systems of thought. Fascism belongs to that philosophical tendency of which the leading motif is opposition to all permanent and eternally true values, to all universalism, to any general, world-wide, all-inclusive morality valid for all mankind and all times, to the supremacy of reason and intellectualism in general. It has an aversion to anything *static.*

In other words, it is a consistent, all-embracing *philosophical and moral relativism: a biological dynamism,* which follows from the *a priori* assumption that the only real value in human society is life itself. Life is a constant struggle, and this struggle is the essence of all social, political, and economic development and action, both among individuals and among communities.

This *biological vitalism* of a purely modern type is combined with an *evolutionary* conception, interpreted in a simplified manner on a materialist basis. It is at the same time a *metaphysical materialism* of a special kind. For in accepting the struggle for existence as the principle of all social evolution it necessarily arrives at *physical* strife as the great vital force, of which the spiritual powers are only instruments, valued not for themselves but as by-products of physical strength and violence.

The logical consequence of these philosophical and metaphysical assumptions is the idea that human individuality is determined, characterised, and conditioned only by those sides of its nature which suit dynamism, relativism, and animal, biological vitalism, and which can be more easily reconciled with metaphysical materialism: will, instinct, emotion. *To fascism, voluntarism, instinctivism, and empiricism in their extreme materialist and positivist form are the presuppositions for any judgment on the role, aim, and activity of the individual and the nation.*

Starting from these metaphysical views of the nature of the world, life, and the human soul, fascism created its political doctrine. Here it leans heavily on the thought of the French revolutionary syndicalist Georges Sorel, which after 1900 played a certain part in the French labour movement and which by its revolutionism resembled both the Blankism of 1848 and the early revolutionary and communist beginnings of Karl Marx. It had the idea of struggle in common with them, of struggle as the principle ruling all social and economic life. Like them it thought force and violence to be, in the last resort, the only foundation and the only preserver of law in present bourgeois society, and like them it worked for revolution at any price as the only means to liberate the proletariat and keep it in power. Though only force could gain a new ruling position and

power for the proletariat, this new régime would be able to build up a society without injustice and violence.

Fascism was originally *a movement of reaction* against everything existing, especially a reaction against the current situation in ideas and politics. *At the beginning it had no firm doctrine at all:* it was rather a collection of vague and unsystematic ideas, slogans, and emotional reactions. It yearned for something new: it strove for changes in the imperfect machine of Italian democracy, which was based on quarrelling parties, swaying from one opportunist compromise to another and weakening the state by their dissensions. This condition of affairs seemed to fascism absolutely indefensible, for it produced a stagnant régime, which could end only in the complete decadence of the nation and state.

Such an impasse must be overcome *by struggle, by action, by constant movement,* for life is a struggle full of constant movement, constant change, constant development. Here is the most fundamental article of fascist doctrine. Starting from it, fascism has been elaborated step by step to its present completeness in the incessant daily political strife. The system was developed as a reaction in two directions: first as a political movement against the established order of society, and secondly as a system of ideas and doctrine opposed to the generally accepted ones.

Fascism is, first of all, as we have stressed before, a reaction against and *a negation* of all those theories and doctrines accepted before the war or emphasised and strengthened by the World War. Present-day Europe is, in ideas and institutions, the creation of the French and American revolutions and of the liberal constitutional institutions of Great Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The whole nineteenth century is a child of the French

Revolution—that is, of the humanist philosophy of the eighteenth century, of the universalist cosmopolitism of the Revolution, which proclaimed the equality of men and nations (on the basis of the so-called natural law), universal brotherhood, toleration, political, economic, and cultural liberalism, the peaceful cooperation of all nations, mutual reconciliation, and an idealist enthusiasm for the unity of the world and mankind.

All these ideas were considered the last word in human civilisation, a higher stage in the moral progress of mankind, an ultimate and unchangeable principle of human evolution and world civilisation, dogmas by which mankind should be directed and would be directed in the future.

The whole life of Europe developed from these assumptions in the nineteenth century and arrived at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century at democratic civilisation and a democratic period of European politics, which culminated during the World War; and the entry of the United States of America into the war gave that war the character of a struggle for the victory of this democratic, liberal, humanist, and universalist doctrine in the whole world.

Fascism is a direct and consistent, violent and uncompromising *negation* of this whole conception, of this whole doctrine. In starting with this fundamental concept of the struggle for life, it rejects the democratic conception of natural law for man, for every man and every nation, of the natural law which is permanent, always valid, and generally accepted. There is no such law, there is only a right won by strength. If we define the position and place of every individual in society by struggle, then there is and can be no equality either between persons or between nations and states. If there is no equality, there is no univer-

salism, no humanist brotherhood, there is not and cannot be any equal political, social, and economic liberty; there is then no principle of mutual agreement either among the citizens inside the state or among the states themselves, and even if there were, one could not believe in it. Pacifism is, then, an absurd doctrine, false, impossible, and therefore pernicious.

While Europe up to 1914 was a child of the rationalist, humanist, and democratic philosophy of the French and American revolutions, fascism is consciously *anti*democratic, *anti*liberal, *anti*humanist, *anti*cosmopolitan, *anti*pacifist, *anti*rationalist. Against all these ideas it supports the idea of constant *struggle,* the idea of *action,* of *dynamism,* of constant social *movement* and *development, unrest* and *change,* of life as a torrent directed by will, emotion, instinct, *the will to power,* to *violence,* to *sovereignty,* to *expansion,* to the rule over other persons and other nations. *Against the rationalist, humanist, and liberal revolution of the end of the eighteenth century, which proclaimed the natural rights of man and the citizen, fascism wants to act as counter-revolution of the twentieth century,* the century of power, force, authority, of expansive individuality and national dynamism in some newly rising nations.

Further, fascism is characterised by a consistent opposition to any doctrine which claims to be permanent, final, and suitable to all times and nations. There is no such doctrine, there are no such principles—*except fascism itself.* Fascism is thus the expression of an eternal and permanent *struggle,* the *only* principle which lasts, and which will lead mankind in all future ages. As fascism is the expression of constant change and constant evolution, which implies a rejection, on principle, of all permanent, immovable principles and doctrines, *it itself refuses to be*

bound by any permanent and firm principles and methods in its political practice and in the relations between states and nations. Fascism is, then, the expression of the very fluid nature of life. It does not accept for its theory and doctrine or for its practice any other principle than that *it cannot be bound in its actions or policy by any principle.*

In this sense fascism is a *consistent utilitarianism and opportunism* carried to the extreme. One could speak about *"possibilism"* in the sense that fascism will do anything that it considers advantageous for itself, and that its resources make *possible* in a given moment, while it does not want to be guided by any interest but its own and does not want to respect any obligation, promise, or treaty. Every obligation, every treaty can be and is superseded from day to day, from year to year by constant daily political change, evolution, and never-ceasing strife. In this sense fascism continues the philosophy of Hobbes about social and political strife as the foundation of all politics, and the philosophy of Machiavelli, especially in regard to political practice. Only it gives them a more modern dress and draws all the consequences.

Fascism is further *anti*socialist and *anti*communist. It emphasises that, as a purely nationalist doctrine, it rejects everything in liberalism and democracy, socialism and communism which is international and humanist, everything equalitarian and pacifist—briefly, everything that in these doctrines is claimed as valid for all times and all nations, as static and unchangeable. On the other hand, it takes from these and other doctrines everything that, in its opinion, remains alive and can be retained from the nineteenth century by the twentieth century *of fascist collectivism and fascist authoritarianism.*

It is most important and characteristic to observe what

fascism preserves of these doctrines: from liberalism and democracy it takes opposition to the principle of *class* war; from socialism and communism it takes mainly the zeal for *social justice* for the wide masses of the people, the application of which is entrusted to the hands of the nation and state as a whole. It thus accepts to a considerable degree the extension of the state's economic and social functions in the sense of a *socialist economic collectivism:* in these conceptions it approaches not only socialism but *even communism.* It thus accepts and at the same time stresses a further essential idea of socialism and communism: the full and free *sovereignty of the state or national community over the individual.*

Fascism does not consider it contradictory to take these principles from other openly inimical doctrines. It invokes as justification its thesis that no doctrine is absolutely new and original, that every doctrine should be based on constantly changing practice, that it should derive from *action* and should accommodate itself to the circumstances, conditions, needs and reactions of the moment. It claims that its system of ideas can be formed only gradually, as events dictate.

B. THE CONCEPTION OF AUTHORITY IN THE FASCIST STATE

By the acceptance of these elements from opposing doctrines fascism arrives at *its central problem: the principle of authority.* As it is a negation of liberalism, democracy, and socialism, fascism must be also a negation to liberal and constitutional states and all those foundations on which these régimes base the principle of authority in their society and state. Monarchy is considered as something completely secondary and unnecessary. It can be admitted, but absolute monarchy as it was before the great

revolutions, and monarchy "by the grace of God," are obsolete. The church and religion are excluded from political life. Their activity is limited to the spiritual field and there only to its small purely religious section (e.g., the influence of the church on the direction of private schools and on private education of youth in general is rejected). The principle of medieval ecclesiastical authority, the principle of authority in absolute or constitutional monarchies and in those "by the grace of God," the principle of authority in a liberal and democratic state or a state of evolutionary socialism, derived from the consent of the people on the basis of equality, freedom, and free vote—none are satisfactory: theocracy, monarchy, and democracy as sources of social and state authority are all superseded and obsolete in the view of fascism.

This means that this postwar revolutionary régime rejects and destroys all those principles on which a former state and society built their idea of social authority as the indispensable foundation of every social organisation, solidarity, morality, and human collaboration. At the same time this régime proclaims that life is a struggle, that the principle of strife is the only principle which governs, rules, and permeates the whole social, political, economic, and cultural organism of any nation. *How can fascism, under these circumstances, escape social anarchism and revolutionary chaos,* the preconditions of which seem to be created by its doctrine to such a high degree?

It escapes it by attempting to create and accept a new authority, the *authority of the absolute, deified state,* based on the conception of a strong national community. *On the whole this resembles the authority of the communist class state,* which puts the sovereignty of the proletarian class and the proletarian class state above the individual consistently and on principle.

On this point the relationship with communism seems closest—possibly just because of this closeness are fascism and communism such ruthless enemies. This thesis, whether fascist or communist, leads necessarily to its logical consequence: the suppression of individual freedom, the rejection of any criticism and of freedom of conviction. In the end it must accept the principle that all means should be used against the rebellious individual for the preservation of this new authority. Thus fascism and communism come into close proximity in their conceptions not only of state authority and social authority in general but also of its preservation—this is in regard to *all the expedients of practical daily policy and all the methods of government in general.*

While fascism is thus with all its "anti" and "contra" slogans mainly a reaction and negation of all the existing forms of state, government, political, and social doctrines, it takes, on the other hand, from socialism two main ideas as pillars of its state structure and as essential, *positive, and constructive* theories:

(1) a change of the existing economic and social structure in the direction of social justice and a levelling of class distinctions in favour of the broad masses of the people by a sovereign decision of state authority;

(2) the identification of the movement and the party with the nation (which does not admit of class struggle or other parties and classes) and of these with the state; then the deification of the nation or state as the only factor exalted above the individual in its full sovereignty, as the only source of every authority in the social organism.

The principle of strife is a disruptive, anarchist, negative principle. An organised normally functioning society cannot be built only on it. Several ancient, medieval, and

modern philosophers, who defend theories similar to the sociological and biological vitalism of present-day fascism, got over this contradiction either by invoking the principle of absolute monarchy endowed with the grace of God, or by the sanction of religious or ecclesiastical authority. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and De Maistre are the most outstanding thinkers of this type. Fascism, which could not count either on an absolute monarchy "by the grace of God" or on God through the medium of the authority of the church and Catholic or orthodox religion, *makes a god of its party, its nation and state.*

Here we have the theory of the absolute state, which is not quite new, and which bears traces of its medieval models. But fascism has an absolute state without the absolute medieval monarch, who has had to be replaced by a modern absolute "Duce" or "Führer." Fascism embellishes this theory with a curious irrational, sentimental, and emotional, almost religious, mysticism, which has its effect on the unthinking masses and which makes it easy for tired postwar mankind not to think at all. In former times the masses entrusted themselves to the hands of almighty God and his church; later to the hands of the all-powerful king or tsar—today they put themselves into the hands of this "Leader" inspired by genius. From the purely political point of view, there is scarcely any difference.

According to the fascist thesis, the fascist state is, of course, *a great new creation, a great new revolution.* The individual, the group, all other social organisms, are *relative,* while the state (in the sense of its identification with the nation and Fascist party) is the *Absolute.* Everything is and should be subordinated to it: it is the last source of all authority and power in society, of all will, activity, and all interest in the nation. The state as such has its will, its conscience, is the source of all morality, has its ethics; and

as such is not only a material organisation, comprising territory, population, material riches, and technical organisation, but also a moral and spiritual force.

The fascist state is a manifestation of the spirit of the nation; it lives in the present, past, and future. The nation is a permanent entity which manifests itself in its ever living language, customs, beliefs, and traditions. The state, identified with the nation, far exceeds the life of an individual and represents the permanent spirit and conscience of the nation as a whole. As it has its will and conscience, as it is a permanent factor and the source of all authority above the individual, *it should and must decide sovereignly all problems of its internal organisation.* It determines thus fully and consistently, and of course *sovereignly, all political, legal, economic, social, and cultural activity inside the nation and the whole social organism.*

As soon as this conception of the state begins to decay among the members of the nation, as soon as individuals are not fully conscious that their life means only service to the state in this spirit, and that their life is only one great obligation to the state and nation, as soon as individual interest, the interests of groups, material and spiritual interests—that is, the desire for freedom and free cultural life, independent of the state—prevails, then the state itself begins to decline, and finally the state and the whole nation either fall into complete political and moral decadence or they collapse completely.

Thus fascism emphasises that the fascist state is a strong entity built on the whole national community. The millions of its members are identified with it; it is based *completely and exclusively on a broad popular basis* (hence the occasional statement that the fascist régime is actually democratic). According to fascist theory, the fascist state is not the absolutist medieval state; it has nothing and does not

want to have anything in common with the absolutism of the time before 1789. The individual is not suppressed, according to fascism, as he was in absolute régimes of all types in former times; he is, on the contrary, strengthened, multiplied, as a soldier is multiplied in his regiment. The fascist state represents, in their opinion, a new organisation of the nation in its fullness and actuality, and leaves enough room to the individual for individual activity in his identification with the state, nation, and party. It refuses to him superfluous and pernicious liberties, but leaves him with the essential liberties.

Only such a state can, in their opinion, wage a successful struggle with the present great moral, political, and social crisis, and especially with the present economic crisis. The present problems of capitalism and the reaction against it, of collaboration among different classes and a solution of the economic and production difficulties, can be found only by the state—the fascist state.

One can then summarise: According to fascist doctrine —as far as its positive and constructive side is concerned— the state as an organism fully identified with the nation, and as the source of all authority, law, and morality, takes on itself all political, social, cultural, and economic functions, unites all material and spiritual forces of the nation in its power and sovereignty, guides and organises them, arbitrates between them, and is *generally the all-powerful and sovereign factor in the entire life of every single citizen.*

C. THE CONCEPTION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE FASCIST STATE

It remains to show how fascism arrives at its concept of "Leader." The medieval absolutist state had its monarch "by the grace of God," who was the expression of its will,

its traditions, its political aspirations and destiny. *The state was all-powerful and sovereign through the person of the monarch.* The fascist state, which excludes religion and the church from politics and considers monarchy a mere form of secondary importance, must find a method by which the sovereign and deified absolute state and its will, its conscience, its national spirit can manifest itself and intervene in practical daily political life. It does so through the Leader. It simply reverses the whole theory of the absolutist medieval monarchy: *the Leader becomes sovereign and all-powerful through the sovereign and all-powerful state, nation, and party.*

It thus creates the theory of "Leadership." While rejecting the equality of citizens as an absurd lie, and the principle of universal equal suffrage, a democratic parliament and its constant voting machinery as a pernicious levelling, it asserts that a democratic régime never actually makes a real government of the people possible; every democratic system leads in the end to the tyrannical oligarchy of a few opportunist leaders, and the so-called government of the people is, anyhow, an illusion, because the "people" never really govern.

By natural selection *the fascist revolution finds its leader, who becomes the genuine expression of the national will, spirit, and conscience.* Just as it identifies its party with the nation and state, by the same mysticism *it identifies its leader with the state and nation.* The Leader, like the state, is surrounded by a curious, almost religious mysticism, by a sentimental and emotional halo. As he is identified with the state and nation, he is, like the state and nation, himself sovereign, infallible, the last authority, whose word is decisive in the end, at every time and everywhere.

Such is the general theory of fascism and the fascist state in relation to the democratic outlook. It is not necessary to dwell on fascism's practical steps in internal and foreign policy, in order to clarify these theories by examples from daily conduct. They are in themselves clear enough, and at the same time so crude and so little original that it is really sufficient to glance either at an ordinary textbook of the history of philosophy and political science, or at the individual phases of practical politics in Europe from 1920 to the present moment, in order to see that the downfall of the European democracies after the war means a return to the politics of the Middle Ages, both in regard to views about the nature of political life and in regard to methods for the solution of political problems.

According to fascism, the twentieth century is the century of *a new modern revolution,* the century of great changes in ideas and of *great fascist discoveries* in political science—*according to democratic critics it is a return to medieval despotism as it was advocated by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and De Maistre.*

D. FASCIST PRACTICAL POLITICS

As to fascist practice, I want to say only this, in the meantime: in its system of ideas fascism starts with the negation of all the philosophy and principles of the American and French revolutions, and, consistently and on principle, combats their heritage—all the European doctrines ruling before and after the war; it is also in practical politics a negation of the state of affairs that prevailed before the war and especially that was established after the war, this state of affairs being to fascism both the inheritance and the expression of an inimical system of ideas, carried into

practical life. Italy emerged from the war dissatisfied. The Peace Treaties did not give her what she demanded and created several things to which she objected. Fascism is thus a revolt also against the Peace Treaties and the whole present division of power in the world among individual nations.

If life is a struggle between individuals, and also between nations and states, then the nations and states which are inspired by fascist doctrine are expansive and *dynamic* states. War is for them the strongest manifestation of their life, their will to power, and their expansion. The desire for expansion in great nations is a desire to create an *empire*. This desire is a proof of vitality and growth, while the desire to preserve the *status quo* and to avoid war is a sign of decadence and approaching downfall. *Therefore the imperialist nations and states have a right to share in world rule and a right to demand a new share-out of all the sources of riches and power which are today dropping from the hands of the static, decadent nations.*

All practical Italian policy from the moment fascism in Italy felt secure—that is, from about 1925—has been inspired by this theoretical philosophy and its practical conclusions. Hence, first of all, its policy in Central Europe and the Balkans; hence its systematic support of the states defeated in the war; hence, finally, the last phase of Italian policy both in colonial expansion (Abyssinia), and in supremacy in the Mediterranean (Spain and Tunisia). A systematic policy of weakening the democratic régimes and speeding up their fall in different parts of Europe is a logical supplement of fascist theory and fascist practice (Austria, Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia).

The emphasis on Italian *supernationalism, and the exploitation of the idea of nationality* and of national self-

determination for the disruption of the postwar legal status in Europe and for Italian expansion, the emphasis on national pride and prestige, the imitation of German anti-Semitic racialism—all are merely supplements to fascist practice which follow from the antidemocratic and anti-humanist theory.

As is obvious from what we have said, fascism, both as a doctrine and as a practice, is a political force the importance and influence of which must be seriously considered in the present state of European affairs. *On its success, as well as on the success of German national socialism, depends also the fate of democracy in Europe and the world.*

Some Fundamental Theses of German National Socialism

A. National Socialism, Prewar Pan-Germanism, and Present-Day Pan-Germanism

While the theory of fascism is based on a few simple axioms of sociology and the philosophy of history, and has gradually developed according to political practice into as consistent a system as possible, national socialism has been, from the very beginning, an attempt at a complete view of the world, at a "Weltanschauung," even if it has also been later supplemented, more closely defined, and somewhat changed in a number of points, in the light of later events.

It is also theoretically more and more a conscious attempt at something new as theory, at a certain special type of philosophy of history and at some sort of political religion. In contrast to Italian Fascism (which, except in a few respects, wants to remain purely Italian) it is thought valid not only for Germany, but also for the rest of the world. While Italian Fascism desires to work for the re-

generation of Italy and the strengthening of her position in the world, National socialism wants to regenerate Germany and beyond it wants to establish the political predominance of Germany in the rest of Europe and the world, and transform them then in the spirit of Nazism.

National socialism, like fascism, is, first of all, a reaction against the rationalism, humanism, and intellectualism of the French and American revolutions and the whole period of the French encyclopedists and of all political theories which arose on this basis (cosmopolitism, humanism, equalitarianism, pacifism, etc.). Against Western European rationalism, Nazism looks for support in the German philosophical and literary movement of Romanticism, and accepts the philosophical theses of irrationalism, intuitivism, and the so-called German "Lebensphilosophie," which is either similar or on many points identical with evolutionism, utilitarianism, vitalism, and also in some respects with the Darwinian materialist conceptions of the development of life and the cosmos. In this respect Nazism has a common philosophical basis with fascism.

While fascism, however, simply starts from the general thesis that life is a constant struggle, development, movement, and change, Nazism *adds to this as the second great pillar of its system a new element* which in its whole conception plays a decisive part: *the element of race.* This factor played a considerable role in the reflections of German politicians, sociologists, anthropologists, and other scientists even before the war. It was taken by them from the well-known theories of the French Count *Arthur de Gobineau,* who in 1854 published an "Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines." This book became in Germany after 1870 the object of intense study and gave rise to an entire movement. Much attention was also paid in Germany to the books of the modern French anthropologist *Vacher*

de Lapouge, who like Gobineau built up a theory of the inequality of human races and of *the undisputed supremacy of the Aryans over all other races.*

While these works and theories were diffused and studied by German science long before the war, another non-German, the Englishman *Houston Stewart Chamberlain,* applied these politics in a brilliant manner. Chamberlain published in 1890 a work called "The Foundations of the 19th Century," which was not highly regarded by philosophers and historians, but was already before the war widely diffused in political circles and also used successfully in practical politics. This book describes in broad outlines and vague, though clever, generalisations the role and mission of the Aryan race in the development of mankind. The Teutons are typical Aryans, and to them must be ascribed everything great that the Aryans have achieved in history. Therefore this race is the best and highest and is destined to rule the lower races, first in its own neighbourhood and later in Europe and the whole world, according to Nazism.

The Emperor William II approved of this movement before the war, and the political theories of prewar Pan-Germanism throve on it, while at the same time going back to the earlier purely German champions of Pan-Germanism, *Lagarde* and *Treitschke* and supplementing their theories with the romantic mysticism of *Wagner* and the extreme voluntarism of *Nietzsche.*

This movement put forward two political theses even before the war: *the gradual national unification of all Germans,* and, as a consequence of this unification, *the great world-wide expansion of this eighty-million nation, first in Central and Eastern Europe, then in the Near East and North Africa—and then in the whole prewar world.*

The present national socialist Pan-Germanism differs

in some points from this prewar prototype. It has its origin, first of all, in its theory of race. History, according to this conception, is a constant struggle, from which rise, decline, and fall the different human races. These races are part of the order of nature and are unchangeable. In their original differences and in their innate dispositions and qualities they implicitly contain all possible creations and forms of human civilisation and its further development. Climate, soil, geographical and other conditions of life and environment can influence their material growth, development, and decline, but not their essential nature.

In their essence the different races are, however, completely distinct from one another. There are higher and lower races, worse and better, from the very start; this difference in quality and nature cannot be made good by any evolution, and no theory about general humanity, the equality of men, and human universalism can possibly get rid of these natural inequalities.

Among the different races the highest and most nearly perfect is the so-called *Aryan, Nordic race.* It created and is the carrier of the best and most nearly perfect human civilisation. In the course of evolution it established, it is true, while advancing from north to south, contacts with other and lower races, imposing on them its civilisation and in some cases absorbing them. It thus became the bearer of a higher civilisation to the other races whilst still preserving its purity, and thus giving a firm direction to the history of mankind, even though it was in some places and in some periods in too great a danger of racial promiscuity.

According to the Nazi philosophy of history, *the history of mankind is, then, simply a struggle of the higher race with the lower races, and the meaning of history should lie in the effort for the victory of the higher race, which then*

should lead and rule mankind. This view consistently and on principle rejects the assertion that all races and nations are equal, and on the contrary proclaims their inequality. It considers it its duty to fight for the victory of the better, higher race and to demand that the lower and worse races should submit to the guidance of the higher. Adolf Hitler in "Mein Kampf" puts it trenchantly: "The difference which exists between the lowest, so-called people and our highest races is greater than the difference between the lowest people and the highest apes." (See also the speech of Hitler at the Congress of the Nazi party in 1933.) As this higher race is the Teutonic Aryan race, human civilisation and culture are inextricably bound up with the development and victory of Germany. Its downfall would mean the actual decline of human civilisation and culture in general.

Such a decline threatens to result from the mixing of races. It is therefore necessary to defend oneself against this danger in the interest of Germany, its development and power; to preserve the German race in its purity and thus to preserve its great mission.

The enemy that endangers this purity and that lives like a parasite on other races and nations is the *Jew.* Jews diffuse pernicious views and non-racial, non-national cosmopolitan, universal feelings among the other races and nations. They proclaim the equality of people and races, defend liberalism, toleration, equality, and formal democracy, and displace the real leadership of the masses, which should belong to a select élite, in favour of anonymous forces like capital; or else they divide the nations into classes according to Marxist views, and thus justify the rule of one class over the other classes. Thus, Nazism.

These ideas explain *national socialist anti-Semitism,* rejection of intermarriage between the pure, higher Aryan

race and the Semitic, and all the persecution of the Jews in present-day Germany.

National socialism produced in Germany an exaggerated experimentation *in eugenics,* aiming at the improvement, cultivation, purification, and perfecting of the race to the ideal of the Nordic Aryan, to the ideal biological type of the German race in general, which has become a complete system of mythology. The main task of the nation is, it is said, to expel all non-Nordic elements from its organism, to increase as much as possible the vitality of its own pure national race, to preserve its body and blood from all contamination with another race. Moreover, the people must cultivate manly strength by sports, fighting, efforts, and struggle and thus create a strong nation. Especially important is a numerous offspring to ensure for the nation victory in the conflict of races and civilisations.

This general theory of racialism and of the mission of the German race in human history is the fundamental basis for the creation of the present system of German internal and international law. That is one of the most extraordinary and surprising achievements of the German national socialistic system of thought and will surely be considered in the future as one of the greatest perversions of the human spirit in the twentieth century.

B. NATIONAL COMMUNITY, BLOOD AND SOIL, LEADERSHIP

To purify the German nation by gradually eliminating all foreign racial elements means to strengthen all its fundamental qualities, with which it was endowed originally by Nature or Providence in virtue of its race, and to return to it its firm character and pristine strength. The whole national socialist theory is distinguished by this constant emphasis on the original qualities of the Germanic race, by

a constant return to the far-away mythical times of Germanic antiquity, to the productions of the original Teutons in literature, arts, legends, deeds, and aspirations, to the original German character, as it has developed in the whole of German history under the influence of racial, climatic, and geographical factors and also by intercourse with the surrounding nations and states, either in peaceful relationships or in conflict with them.

All this gives rise to another essential element in the theory of national socialism—*the well-known idea of "Volkstum."* The idea of the "Volkstum" is again only a nebulous, vague, romantic myth, similar to those adopted sometimes by very primitive nations, who formed their different myths either from nature or from their past life and history. But this myth of "Volkstum" today plays a great part in practical German politics.

The romantic conception of "Volkstum" is, after all, only the current primitive conception of nationality and patriotism, which uncritically and in an exaggerated fashion proclaims the return from urban civilisation, higher literary, artistic, and generally intellectual culture to the vital sources of action and creation in simple people. We are asked to share this primeval national spirit, to be inspired by it, to accept its provincial, local, mass and anonymous character, to see in it the genuine manifestation of the nation, its spirit, its original qualities—and to defend it against everything foreign, non-national, cosmopolitan, and international.

As far as such tendencies are cultivated with moderation, and as far as they simply and realistically search for the character, individuality, and qualities of the essential folklore of any nation, without mythical and philosophical-historical explanations, they are well and good. But national socialism long ago overstepped these bounds, and

has used these tendencies unscientifically and tendentiously to erect far-reaching sociological and political theories. Hence it is only a small step to the acceptance of an intolerant, fanatical, exclusive, narrow-minded chauvinism.

With a return of the people to its primitive, original profession of agriculture, Nazism stresses attachment to local customs, ties with the immediate locality, and thus with the soil. *To the racial force of blood it adds the further pull of the soil.* It thus invents the well-known slogan of "Blut and Boden" (*blood and soil*), which, in spite of its hazy form and vague meaning, unites two strong concrete ideas. Blood relationship and attachment to the soil and home are ideas which fill the whole life of primitive man: it is not strange that such elemental passions should still have potency in the practical political struggle of the present German régime.

National socialism binds together all Germans, wherever they live, into one unity and reminds them of the national solidarity. From this develop two great political tendencies:

(1) A determination to increase the spiritual unity of the nation, *to diffuse the national socialist outlook to all members of the German race and German civilisation, wherever they live.*

(2) *A constant striving for the territorial expansion of the national socialist state,* which, in pursuance of the national idea, *would like to annex all soil, all territories where there reside any Germans,* whether these territories have belonged to other states for many centuries or whether they have been more recently incorporated politically into neighbouring states.

The idea of the "Volkstum" (containing especially the objective elements of nationality) is also the foundation of

another political idea—the idea of the full, deep, unshakable community of all members of the German race. *Volksgemeinschaft* (containing especially the subjective elements of nationality)—*the consciousness of national solidarity, the consciousness of belonging to a society whose members are bound up with one another by the characteristics of the national "Volkstum,"* blood, race, soil, language, tradition, culture, art, etc.—this consciousness forms one great national community, which includes every single German and the whole German nation in indivisible unity.

The conception of such a community, of such a collective consciousness, comes from below, from the people, and it is a feeling similar to that which manifested itself best during the war, e.g. between soldiers in the same platoon, and which manifests itself in a group of workmen united in a common task, in a community of students, or among members of a labour camp, among members of a national conspiracy, in groups of young students or workmen. *Such a spirit, such a consciousness, is and should be the sentiment of the whole nation;* in it is rooted the whole spirit, all the aspirations and manifestations of national life. *This national and popular community is the real sovereign nation.*

The sovereign nation is complete master of all its members; to it everything must be sacrificed; for it everybody should live; everything should serve it. Every young German should be inspired only by it, should prepare to do with his life, quite simply, devotedly, and without regard for his person, only what serves this national community, its life, growth, and expansion—its excellent working. He should live in the spirit of the youth of ancient Sparta.

Thus the national socialist system arrives at the *concept of social authority.* We have already described how the

sovereign state is for fascism the source of all authority, and how the state is identified with the nation. But the fundamental factor in fascist social authority is the state and not the nation. In national socialism the order is different, reversed to a certain extent—the state is only the secondary factor: the nation takes first place; the *national government* and the state are only a framework in which the nation lives, works, and develops. The state is an instrument, adapted, altered, increased, or diminished: the nation is the original factor, the only permanent and undiminished, fighting for its expansion, supremacy, culture, and power, with the state as its instrument.

This conception of social authority and sovereignty, with its source in "Volkstum" and "Volksgemeinschaft," *leads to its natural consequence—totalitarianism,* just as in fascism the conception of the absolute state led to the very same conclusion. The state is the instrument of the national community, which is sovereign. The state carries out what the national community needs and demands. *Right is everything that is good and advantageous to the national community, to the nation of national socialist conception; and everything that is useless and injurious to it is morally wrong.* The national community is the highest element in all life, all activity, all political struggle—the state is the simple executor of the will of the national community, and in this respect it contains and embraces all social activity, all departments of spiritual and material life, all cultural, political, social, and economic functions. The individual is completely subordinated to the national community, is submerged in the national community, and has value and rights not as an individual but only as a part of the community.

These theses explain then the two important ideas of

national socialism which it has in common both with fascism and with socialism and communism:

(1) *The idea of the absolute subordination* of the individual to the national community and state,

(2) *The idea of social justice* and a new juster economic structure in the national socialist society, which will create such a structure as far as it will profit or meet the needs of the health, advantage, and growth of the national community. *In this respect Nazism is a kind of socialism and collectivism, and in this respect also many of the principles of its practical social and economic policy approach socialism, or rather communism.* This very nearness explains, as with fascism, its ruthless enmity to the two doctrines.

There remains for us to explain the last element in national socialist theory: *the idea of "leadership."* The concept of social authority is founded on the idea of the "Volksgemeinschaft" and "Volkstum." The idea of leadership is based, in one respect, also on these two ideas, since only through them can we derive the sovereign "leader" from the sovereign national community, just as in fascism we derive the idea of the absolute "leader" from the absolute state.

The authority of the "leader" in the national socialist system is not derived from his intellectual superiority, from his special moral qualities, or from any special personal greatness. In this system—which has so many irrational and romantic elements in it, and which draws its most important concepts from the myth of "Volkstum" and the myth of "Volksgemeinschaft"—*even "leadership" is a myth.* Leadership is simply a "mission"; it is something supernatural, rationally undefinable, irrational. The "Führer" is the incarnation of the nation, the expression of the "Volksgemeinschaft." He does not stand above the

nation and people: *he is of it, he is in it, he is somehow its medium.* The national community manifests itself through the leader; through his strength and actions, grows, strengthens, and acts the national community. To be led by this leader means to give up freedom, but also to increase the strength of the whole national community; means to enhance the power and expansion of the whole national community. *These theories are at one with the expansiveness and dynamism of the whole régime.*

The acceptance of this kind of leadership and the creation of such a solidarity between the leader and the community have nothing in common with democratic leadership, where the leader is selected by some intellectual process, as by universal equal suffrage. But national socialist leadership is, *in Nazi opinion,* not a leadership gained and preserved by force and violence. It entails a special kind of comradeship between the leader and the millions of his followers, who are united by one spirit and one idea in the national community. A special tie of honour binds both sides. A great consciousness of responsibility on the one side follows from the belief of the leader in his special personal mission, and complete trust on the other side is felt by the masses for their leader, whom they believe to be the real expression of their emotions, needs, aspirations, and interests.

C. THE CONCEPT OF LAW IN NATIONAL SOCIALIST THEORY

There are many other national socialist ideas and theses which it could be very interesting to discuss in connection with my subject. It would lead us too far if we should consider them all. But I must in any case devote a little more time and space to the national socialist concept of law, which characterises probably the whole essence of the

ethics and of the practical politics of present-day German life.

There is nothing in the world which can surpass in cynicism, inhumanity and unhuman unscrupulousness, brutal nationalistic materialism and egocentric national expansionism, these impossible juridical conceptions of national socialist authoritarianism.

The conception of law and the whole juridical system of the national socialist state has a fundamental importance for the whole national socialist régime. As every manifestation of social and spiritual life has its roots, according to the national socialist philosophy, in race and "Volkstum," the whole system of national socialist law must be based on these factors. *In their opinion, every race, every nation has its own peculiar law, the expression of its own individuality, its own nationality. The concept of a generally valid, abstract, formal law,* detached from nationality and *good for all mankind, is the product of rationalist, individualist, abstract, disintegrating thought,* on which the society of liberal democracy had been built. National socialism rejects such a law as pernicious, impossible, simply nonexistent.

National socialist jurists define their conception of law somewhat like this: According to national socialism, for which Race and "Volkstum" are the foundation of law, *law is everything that preserves and supports life and its growth, race, the German race, and its development and expansion;* the aim of law is to preserve the purity of the race, the German race, and to defend it; *law is simply anything that profits the nation,* the German nation. The theoretician of national socialism, *Alfred Rosenberg,* adds to this in his book "Der Mythus des XX. Jahrhunderts": *"Law is for us only that which serves German honour.* Therefore the national socialist state is only an instru-

ment of this law, and its task is to enforce it, to execute it and to defend it. The law of liberal democracy is a purely formal law, based on an abstract general concept of law, on the abstract concept of human equality, which does not exist."

This concept of law justifies the legislative activity in favour of eugenics and the improvement of race, and the laws against racial promiscuity and thus against the Jews. By the whole legal theory of national socialism, as well as by its racial mysticism, political anti-Semitism is justified as the supplement of a general theory of the perfect Aryan race.

With this general conception of law the national socialist conception of *international law* is closely connected. *This again is merely a simple system of theses to justify and defend national socialist foreign policy:* here also the principle holds good that law is anything *that profits the German national community;* here also the *only aim of all international conduct must be the advantage of Germany, its only and highest criterion the profit, growth, and expansion of the nation.* It is then a purely *subjective* conception, which rejects any external and objective criterion. *The German national community and its advantage are here the only and final arbiter of right and wrong.*

Though in a certain sense and with certain very decisive restrictions of principle it may be possible to conceive and to defend such a conception of law inside a state—it must necessarily lead in internal politics to complete totalitarianism and authoritarianism—in the relation of one state to the other states such *a conception of international law is entirely exclusive, fragmentary, and conducive to international anarchy.* Every state, according to this conception, has its own international law, serving exclusively its own interests, without taking into consideration the existence

and interests of other nations. These different laws must, therefore, necessarily clash with one another, must lead to conflicts, must reject all international conceptions of a common authority, a common judge, a common international organisation with any international jurisdiction, everything which would imply limitation of state and national sovereignty.

Without any arbitrating international authority, the different subjective, purely national conceptions of international law cannot reach a decision otherwise than by pressure, force, or war, that is, by the *right of the more powerful and stronger. The whole system of national socialist law means absolute totalitarianism and authoritarianism inside the so-called national community, and the simple right of the stronger in the international field, the preparation for war and the domination of brute force.*

One must judge the practical policy of present-day Germany on these presuppositions: inside Germany there is a complete subjection of the individual in all manifestations of his cultural, political, social, economic activity, a complete suppression of individual freedom, the freedom of press, religion, science, art; the whole economic life of the state and nation is subjected to a systematic planning; everything is guided and directed. All that is done in the name of the interest of the German nation and state, under the supposition that all this serves the interests, the strength, power and expansion of the German nation.

The theories on the cultivation of pure race have led to the laws against the Jews; the view that no opinions or creeds, whether religious or political, are admissible which do not suit the interest of the national community in the spirit of racialism and national socialism, has led to the suppression of all political parties and to a struggle against

all religions which object to national socialist teachings—and against Catholicism and Protestantism as collective social forces.

In foreign policy expansion abroad has followed the slogan *"Volkstum—Blut und Boden,"* that is, the unification in one empire under one leader of all parts of the German nation and soil; and any territory inhabited by Germans comes under this description. Spiritual pressure has been exerted on all Germans in the whole world, in order to ensure a proper influence on the development of world civilisation for the Aryan race, or to gain a proper share in all the resources of the rest of the world, and thus to make the fulfilment of its cultural mission possible. Every international collective action and every international authority have been rejected. The League of Nations has been repudiated, because its decisions depend on equality among all states; and any international judicature must be obnoxious for its limitation of state sovereignty.

Against collective action of several nations the principle of concluding only bilaterial treaties is extolled as the rule of practical foreign policy. Nazism recommends negotiation with one state after another, assisted by pressure and propaganda. Temporary and changeable agreements are made according to the changed proportions of strength, according to the growth of the population and its needs. An agreement, a treaty, remains valid only up to the moment when it ceases to be considered as advantageous to German interests. At that moment it is changed either by force or by pressure, if the partner does not accept the obligatory changes voluntarily. *Alliances* are concluded openly not for defensive purposes or for the preservation of the status quo *but, on the contrary, for the definite purpose of accelerating changes which will bring positive ad-*

vantages, and which are to be achieved either by diplomacy or even by war.

In order to characterise the whole conception of international law and the practical international policy of national socialism I shall quote two passages.

In his book "Mein Kampf" Adolf Hitler says: "The National Socialist movement does not want to be the defender of other nations, but the champion *Vorkämpfer* of its own nation. . . . Especially we are not the police protector of weak small nations, but the soldiers of our own nation—this means *that National Socialism is not the champion of the general idea of nationalism, or of some right, belonging to other nations or races: it serves only its own nationalism and its own rights.*"

In "Der Mythus des XX Jahrhunderts" Alfred Rosenberg says this (page 644): "We want to support nationalism as a force and other internal values for national regeneration only in those nations whose fateful development, we believe, will not come into conflict with the evolutionary tendencies of the German nation. . . . *We know that under the principle of self-determination utterly valueless national elements could ask for freedom.* But all this either does not concern us at all or only in so far as a far-sighted German policy can expect an increase of German strength from their exploitation."

To this general outline of the German national socialist concept of law I must add that in the last three years the German universities and all the faculties of law have been obliged to reject the ancient system of teaching of law. The universities and in general the whole system of teaching of law in present Germany have been forced to adopt all these ideas as the basis for the creation of juridical thought and of every concept of law. The entire young generation of Germany is educated today in these impos-

sible, immoral, and inhuman ideas. No other theory of law is permitted to be taught.

A certain number of German professors of law are composing today great volumes of this new juridical science, believing probably that they are preparing a great new period in the evolution of law, and that their achievements signify a profound revolution in the science of law. And they place their erudition at the service of the present German dictatorial régime, being convinced that it will be a great contribution to the future of their nation. Such an incredible state of things has been created as well in the field of ideas and culture as in practical political life by the present dictatorial régime in Germany.

That is briefly what I think it is necessary to know about the present German theory of law which today dominates the whole German National Socialist internal and external policy. It is a great pity that there is in the world today such a lack of knowledge of this situation. The real knowledge of this state of things would throw such light on the whole German policy that—I am convinced—many statesmen and many important political figures would not have committed some terrible mistakes in the last years, months, and weeks in dealing with the present German dictatorship.

If such conceptions can be publicly proclaimed and accompanied by the development of such material force as in present-day Germany and imposed on other nations in many cases—as in the case of Czechoslovakia—it demonstrates in what state of disintegration Europe today finds itself, it demonstrates the political, material, and spiritual disaster which has come to Europe, and which is tolerated by the European nations. It demonstrates by what chaos and profound revolution Europe is agitated.

One must add that during the last phase of practical

national socialist policy the sharp outlines of the original theory of a German international policy were, according to the international situation, either weakened or strengthened: thus, in the colonial question, it was at a certain moment stressed that the colonies are demanded *on the basis of equal rights among the great powers.* To other small nations it was declared that there is no intention of denationalising them, and that their national community and "Volkstum" would be respected; one heard further much about German equality of rights, "Gleichberechtigung," and about respect for eternal frontiers (Brenner, Alsace, Lorraine, etc.).

In these formulations there are some contradictions to what had been proclaimed from the beginning as the original and orthodox principles of the national socialist movement. *All are formulas required by the momentary circumstances of practical politics.* There is no question for me that they *cannot be interpreted as a change of principles or a development of the doctrine.*

As the very essence of the doctrine, like that of fascism, lies in the ability to accommodate itself at every moment to the momentary circumstances, without abandoning ever the final and permanent aim of the whole doctrine, one must look at these formulas as momentary and the most dangerous opportunism.

As far as their practical political means and methods are concerned, they are the most brutal and most vulgar materialistic Machiavellism and cynicism that have ever existed in the history of politics and of political science.

All these divergencies from the original doctrine will be kept only as long as they serve the German interest and profit the German nation. When they cease to serve this interest, the pure fundamental doctrine will resume its validity, for this is the only authentic expression of the

genuine movement and the real "Weltanschauung" of the national socialist revolution.

Maintaining the same line of political attitude, this régime and this school of thought will never hesitate for a moment *to violate its own principles* if it serves the interests of the régime and of the German nation.

During the September crisis in 1938, the chief of the German dictatorial régime proclaimed publicly before the whole world public opinion in a public meeting in Berlin that after having realised the principle of self-determination for the German minority in Czechoslovakia, the German Reich did not desire to include in its territory one Czech or Slovak. Almost immediately after this public declaration this government convoked a secret meeting of its generals and party leaders and decided to occupy the purely Czech and Slovak regions and to establish in this territory a "German protectorate."

On the 15th of March 1939, in spite of the solemn pledges signed in Munich, the national socialist dictatorship invaded Czechoslovakia, divided the whole country, and since that time has imposed on the whole Czechoslovak nation the most abject political and cultural terrorism and the most brutal denationalising and Germanising régime.

For this kind of procedure the régime must unfold a new theory in the national socialist system of thought. And when the moment comes, in which *it will serve the German interest better,* the régime will come again to the theory of the pure German race, to the theory of the full respect of the sacred rights of the German nationality, to the theory of self-determination for the Germans, etc.

This is the nature of this régime and the morals of its leaders.

General Conclusions About the Relation Between Fascism and National Socialism and the Theory of Democracy

I should like to conclude these reflections with a general view of the relation of this body of doctrine to the philosophy and practice of the democratic system.

First of all, one can say this quite briefly *about the relation between the fascist and the national socialist doctrine:*

(1) Both doctrines have a number of theses in common. Both are reactions against the whole philosophy of the French and American revolutions and against the traditions and ideas of British constitutional and democratic parliamentarianism. They are antirationalist, antihumanist, antiequalitarian—they are based mainly on a philosophy of intuition and instinct, of voluntarism and extremist psychological subjectivism.

(2) In some points they are close to each other, even though they use different formulas. At the base of each is the principle of strife as the only element which moves all life, and governs its evolutions, its continuity and perpetual change. In fascism it is shown in the struggle of people, of individual against individual in nature and in the world; in national socialism it determines the development of human societies, and is shown in the struggle of races, their growth, victory, or decline. The concept of totalitarianism in fascism follows from the absolute state, with which the nation is identified; in national socialism it is the people's national community which is sovereign and from which the state only derives its sovereignty.

The extreme utilitarianism of state and nation in fascism follows from the idea of a struggle for existence, from the belief in the preponderance of material force,

and from the assumption that there are no principles valid for all times and all nations: in national socialism it follows rather from the subjectivist idea of a higher race and its right to use everything for its expansion and advantage, and from the idea of its higher mission in the history of mankind.

From all these instances, a rather essential difference between the two doctrines becomes obvious. Fascism, in spite of its antirationalism and anti-intellectualism, has, after all, some characteristics of the Latin tradition: it starts from more universal generally valid principles. National socialism is more German, more Teutonic: it starts from theses purely subjectivist, created only for the Nordic race and merely serving German aims.

(3) This is even more true of the theses in which the two systems differ openly: the concepts of *Volkstum, Volksgemeinschaft, Blut und Boden,* and also that of a "Führer," are in their national socialist formulation typically German concepts. They have a mysticism derived purely from the German past and the German, or rather Prussian, spirit.

(4) In practical politics both systems are equally reactions against the political order of Europe and the world, derived from the ideology of the nineteenth century, the democratic philosophy, and the World War.

As to the direct relations of national socialism to democracy as a system of philosophy and politics, one may say the following:

(1) Just as democracy is the expression of philosophical universalism, humanism, equalitarianism, as it has its starting point in rationalism and the philosophy of natural rights, so national socialism is antihumanist, antiuniversalist, antiequalitarian; it is a national exclusivism as a re-

action against the theory of the equality of nations; it is voluntarism, a doctrine of intuition and instinct as a German reaction against the French, British, and American rationalism, intellectualism, and humanism.

The history of modern European philosophy moves between two opposing philosophical tendencies: on the one side rationalism of all shades, and on the other side intuitivism, instinctivism, and the so-called German "Lebensphilosophie" with its vitalism and Darwinian evolution. In Germany this second tendency gained great victories in the last years before the war, and present-day Germany has drawn extreme consequences from these theories. The philosophical theories of national socialism are a *simplified picture* of this local victory in the struggle of these two philosophical doctrines and these two different worlds.

All the three main textbooks of national socialist theory and practice—*Moeller van der Bruck's* "Das Dritte Reich," published in 1921, which served as an inspiration of Hitler's own book on many points, *Adolf Hitler's* "Mein Kampf," and *Alfred Rosenberg's* "Der Mythus des XX Jahrhunderts"—are nothing but paraphrases of the main crude theses of the German "Lebensphilosophen," whose most typical representative was *F. Nietzsche.*

(2) The whole *racial theory,* and everything on which the nationalism of Nazism is based, is aristocratic. It refuses on principle to admit anything generally valid *for all nations and races.* This is the second pillar of national socialist antidemocratic teaching. The whole conception of social struggle between individuals and races excludes any democratic settlement of peaceful agreement on a basis of equality.

(3) The idea of *Volkstum* and *Volksgemeinschaft* leads in national socialist theory logically to a *state totalitarian-*

ism, to the suppression of the freedom of the individual, the freedom of religion, science, and art, that is, to the suppression of everything that characterises democracy in contrast to state absolutism.

(4) The whole conception of law in general and of international law in particular is in national socialist theory extremely subjectivist, utilitarian, Machiavellian, antidemocratic, materialistic, and unhuman.

On the whole, National Socialism is, then, in its theory of race, a social form of materialist Darwinism; in its idea of *Volkstum, Volksgemeinschaft,* and *Leadership,* a misleading social mysticism and antirationalist romanticism; in its conception of law, an extreme exclusive, unhuman subjectivism and utilitarianism. It will come to be considered one day in the future as one of the most fateful and most disastrous ways of thinking. It is also the way which leads present-day Germany to its inevitable social, political, and moral collapse.

Communism, Authoritarian Régimes, and Democracy

I do not intend to give here a detailed explanation of the fundamental theses of communism, nor to discuss the practical, daily political internal and external policy of the present communist state, the Soviet Union. My intention is to emphasise only the essential differences and relations between communism and democracy and to show why, as a democrat, I cannot accept communism in its fundamental political and philosophical theses.

Communism, as well as fascism and national socialism, accepts the factor of struggle, of the battle for life, as one of the fundamental principles of human evolution. But, for communism, it is the struggle of classes and not the

struggle between individuals or between nations. If there is a fight between individuals, or between nations, according to communism, it can always be reduced to the class struggle. This struggle in society has as its aim, according to the principles of communism, the destruction of all classes and the establishment of the classless society, the completely equalitarian community.

This establishment of the community without differences of classes can be realised only through a social revolution, exactly as the other dictatorial régimes can be established through their authoritarian revolution. The communist revolution ends also with the establishment of a dictatorship; but this dictatorship, according to communist theory, is only *temporary,* and that is the difference. The dictatorship in the other authoritarian systems is a permanent institution. It is in the nature of the whole system. Communism wishes to establish the dictatorship for a certain period, until the moment at which the new social machinery of a completely equalitarian community without classes is definitely established. Afterward, in the opinion of the communists, the equalitarian society will continue to live peacefully and real democratic liberty, better than in the bourgeois democratic society, will be re-established.

According to communist theory the state, exactly as in the other authoritarian régimes, is a supreme, almighty organ, and to this supreme, almighty organ individual liberty must be sacrificed. This is certainly true during the period of temporary dictatorship. In this sense the communist system is also totalitarian and is also a one-party system which does not permit the individual liberty, freedom of conviction, of press, and of assembly, as we know it from the liberal democratic system.

We see, therefore, that there are certain similarities be-

tween communism and other totalitarian régimes. Communism also accepts struggle as the basis of social evolution, but this struggle has as its final aim the establishment of equality, collaboration, and permanent peace, internal and external. Communism also accepts the principle of dictatorship; but this dictatorship is to be temporary. Communism also accepts its kind of totalitarianism of the political party and of the state; but after a certain period of dictatorship it wishes to achieve a new liberty and democracy, which, in its opinion, will be a greater liberty and a better democracy. If in the practical life the communistic theory can be realized or not—that is the question, and many critics of communism believe not, repudiating communism in its fundamental theses and the régime as a whole.

On the other hand *communism in its philosophy and morality has certain similarities with democracy.* It is also for the equality of man and of nations. It is also humanitarian, universalist, intellectualist, and rationalist. It is also pacifistic, internationalist, and for the League of Nations policy. From this point of view its moral and philosophical basis is the same as that of democracy. There is, of course, one fundamental difference between democracy and communism in their philosophical conception: communism, being based on the materialistic conception of history—believing in economic materialism as the real foundation of historical evolution and as the expression of the theory of class struggle—*accepts metaphysical materialism as its philosophy; democracy in its essence and nature is spiritual.*

One can say in general: *In theory,* communism is *nearer to democracy. In certain sections of its political practice* it uses in a large degree the methods and means which the other authoritarian régimes use, and is, therefore, *nearer to fascism and national socialism.* But also in theory, there

are certain communistic theses which are identical with the theses of the authoritarian systems and philosophies. In principle, therefore, my criticism as to the question of the relation between communism and democracy is the same as that of fascism and national socialism.

I do not accept the communist conception of the class struggle; I do not accept the communist theory of revolution and temporary dictatorship based on class divergencies; I do not accept the theory of the domination of one class by another—neither the working class by the bourgeoisie, nor the bourgeoisie by the working class. But, if there is no doubt that the divergencies between individuals and classes practically do exist, there remains only the democratic method which must be used for harmonisation between the classes and the progressive disappearance of inequalities. That means the evolutionary method—the method of democracy: discussion, cooperation, agreement. I know it means also in a certain sense a struggle, but between human beings we must try always to solve these problems by the humane, non-violent, non-sanguinary means and methods. That is democracy. I underline this point of view, knowing full well that there are periods of human evolution when revolution or war becomes inevitable and even justified.

Chapter VI

THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

The Struggle for a New European Democracy and Freedom

During the twenty-five years since the outbreak of the Great War, Europe has gone through important and rapid changes and upheavals. Only very few periods of history can show anything comparable. There have been material changes through the downfall of four great empires (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey) and the rise of new national states, great social and economic revolutions (Soviet Russia), civil wars and violent changes of government and régimes (Italy, Spain, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, Germany), the disappearance of whole social classes and castes and the formation of new ruling classes and nations; there have also been profound changes in the spiritual and cultural sphere. The quick succession of changing régimes, accompanied by the quick succession of intellectual systems, new theories and doctrines, new philosophies and new moral systems, new economic and social views, new legal principles, and new political systems—*all this has scarcely any parallel in history.*

In previous chapters I have explained that the Great War was a clash between the old aristocratic and militarist system and the new liberal and democratic conceptions as they had grown out of the French and American revolutions one and one-half centuries ago. The democracies won this conflict, tried to build up a democratic Europe, and

with idealistic fervour tried to create a democratic and pacifist international order on the basis of the League of Nations.

But, as we have seen, a few years after, there came a reaction in the shape of authoritarian governments and a general return to the old national power politics of the great European powers. Against democratic and humanitarian philosophy and morality and the legal order based on them, there arose again theories which gave first place not to humanitarianism, to universal human morality and tolerant religious conviction, but to the separate and exclusive theories of the nation and state, of the separate social class or political party, to whose power, honour, needs, and interests it is, according to the opinion of their protagonists, necessary to sacrifice everything else.

War, which was to be abolished for good during the first years after the Great War, became again a topic of daily discussion and a constant menace, something that was natural, honourable, and even right and good according to these new theories (which were old as the hills in reality). Treaties, which in early legal theory were inviolable and could be changed only according to principles previously agreed upon, were subjected to curious new rules: they were valid only as long as they suited the given situation, that is, as long as they were favourable to one side, or as long as there was not enough force to change them by violence or by a simple breaking of the pledged word without regard to anybody else.

Times like the present, when all traditions are ruthlessly broken, when there are no firm, stable philosophical, religious, moral, and legal concepts generally accepted, when political and social régimes are abolished brutally without thought of treaties or loyal methods of agreement, and when new régimes are created in violent and frequently

sanguinary social and political struggles—*such are, as we all know, times of moral and intellectual crisis and chaos, times of upheaval and revolution.*

That is, of course, nothing new. In the history of mankind, we have seen how times of universal, humanitarian philosophy and morality have alternated with times of national and state philosophy and party or class preponderance. From the flowering of Egyptian and Jewish civilisation through classical civilisation up to the growth of Christianity, from medieval Catholic universalism through humanism and Renaissance to the time of feudalism and monarchist absolutism, from the "enlightenment" through the French Revolution to the reaction after it and up to the time of constitutionalism and liberalism in the nineteenth century, with the first socialist experiments in Europe, from the World War and the temporary victory of Wilsonian democracy and the universal League of Nations up to the present reaction against it—*we have constantly oscillated between a struggle for humanist universalism, fighting for freedom and the free development of the human personality on one hand, and on the other hand the exclusive rule in the state of a religion or a political system which must be based on violence, oppression, and lack of freedom.*

After the triumph of one of these systems and régimes there come necessary and inevitable attempts at the installation of the alternative system. In the majority of historical periods these two intellectual systems have fought continually with each other in the individual national societies, and only very rarely can one of them suppress its opponent completely and gain perfect mastery of this or that society. In abnormal times, in times of great crisis, of wars and catastrophes, in revolutionary times such as ours, this struggle, however, increases so much in intensity, in

fanaticism and passion, that at last the forces of reaction, power, and violence use all methods to eradicate the movement for freedom. There are a number of states where in the last ten years they have succeeded: Germany, Italy, Japan, and smaller states.

It is the essential nature and quality of every revolution that it contains in its evolution and in its consequences the elements of the reaction against its own principles and results. We have seen how the French Revolution produced different, strong, and violent ideological and social currents, each opposite to the other. We have seen the same phenomenon in the last world war as well as in today's violent crisis. It seems to be a sociological law. In any case, *it is a real historical experience.* Every revolution uses exaggeration in its first revolutionary enthusiasm, uses exaggeration in the application of its revolutionary principles and aims beyond what the real conditions of the social organism (which is in social processes of the revolution) can admit, uses exaggeration further than the forces of the revolutionary movement itself are capable of putting into practical life and making it sufficiently lasting.

The revolutionary enthusiasm, the revolutionary collective forces, and hotheads among the leading revolutionists trying to realise their exaggerated revolutionary aims are generally obliged to use force and violence—*and so you can see that almost every real revolution passes through a period of revolutionary terrorism and almost inevitably also through a war adventure.* And when the moral, ideological, and real forces of the revolutionary movement and of its principles are consumed by terrorism or an expansionist war, if in this critical moment of the revolution leaders are not capable of moderating and adapting it to the real conditions of the state and nation passing through this social upheaval, the new, antirevolutionary reaction

begins, based on opposite currents of thought, on the opposite classes, parties, and other conservative social forces, which have continued to exist underground and prepare themselves to regain their ancient positions.

This sociological law is a normal phenomenon of every great political and social revolution. The fall of the Roman Empire through the revolution of Christianity, the religious revolutions and wars in the Middle Ages, the French Revolution in 1789, the revolution of 1848 in Europe, the French Commune revolution in 1871, and finally the Russian Revolution in 1917—all these great revolutions have passed in a greater or lesser degree through such stages.

Sociologists, historians, and psychologists see in these social processes a natural phenomenon and a necessary phase of this political fight. Just the force of this natural reaction gives them the possibility of judging how profound the revolution is or was, if it can really be successful, and if it is capable of creating the new and lasting conditions of new social and political life, and if the new, revolutionary principles can be accepted as a real and lasting basis for the reconstruction of the state and of the whole social organism of the nation.

Europe, then, is once more in the throes of a great regeneration, and we all live in a time of great intellectual transition and revaluation of all hitherto accepted values and actions. The historical development of mankind has been one gigantic, heroic struggle for the realisation of a constantly higher and juster, a socially and morally more advanced, freedom of the human personality, which by its high moral standard and its fine education will comprehend its duties to the authority of the state, to society as a whole, which will be disciplined and yet have an inner freedom of the spirit, which will show a spontaneous readiness to understand its social, national, and civic duties and

at the same time not need to be subjected to such violent forms of mechanical discipline or authority as we see today in the authoritarian states.

It is a social fact that the fight of man for this higher culture and civilisation, for this higher degree of freedom and development of human personality, *does not go forward in a straight line by peaceful evolution; it does go in social waves.* You have a period of liberty which, in the first moments of revolutionary enthusiasm, goes too high, which because of inexperience and mistakes of the freed generation and their freed leaders makes mistakes and failures, and is followed by a reaction—sometimes violent. After a period of decline a new wave of liberty follows. This time, the newly freed people are more prepared, more ripe; they do learn and they must learn from their mistakes and failures in the past, and they realise in this new period a higher degree of culture and civilisation, of freedom and respect for human personality. *And so a new wave, a higher wave of evolution of human civilisation comes.*

It is hard and regrettable that humanity must pay so dearly for its progress and perfection. This may be considered as too pessimistic a conception of the philosophy of history. But it is simply an historical fact produced by the natural qualities of the human spirit, by human psychology, and by the law of the collective psychology in human society. Nor is this really pessimistic. I do not accept absolute pessimism or optimism as the predominant character of social life. If human life were only a brutal fight and the expression of brute force, that would be a pessimistic conception of social life. *But human life is also collaboration, love and sympathy,* the fight for ideals as the expression of the highest qualities of the human spirit. The men and society who are fighting on the side of the spirit and of the ideal against

the sword and brute force are the expression of the true, objective, and realistic optimism, which in reality is a right conception of human evolution.

The present reaction in Europe against the democratic régimes has, therefore, a very natural basis not only in the political, economic, and social conditions in different individual states, but also in the general law of social evolution and of the philosophy of history.

I have already underlined that not many of these states were, by their internal conditions, sufficiently prepared; many of them were not capable of dominating the enormous and unexpected postwar difficulties in the different sections of public life, political, economic, financial, in the questions of currency, in the questions of modern administration, in the question of nationality, etc. I must add that there were also in Europe, in certain states, exaggerations in the application of democratic principles and in the rapidity with which the popular movements tried to replace the old antidemocratic régimes with new régimes: the communist revolution in Hungary, the agrarian revolution in Bulgaria, certain measures of nationalistic character in almost all Central European countries, great and small. All that had its very serious effect on the vitality of this new democratic revolution and helped in a very large degree to provoke the authoritarian reactions in Europe.

But the same law—the inevitable and fatal law—of antirevolutionary reaction applies today to the authoritarian régimes. It is today a great and obvious truth that the authoritarian states pay heavily for their antidemocratic revolutions, for their new antidemocratic measures and experiments. *Dictatorship is always a temporary régime.* History confirms this sociological fact. Every dictatorship settles the difficulties which are the necessary product of a

democratic régime only for quite a short period. Generally a dictatorship creates a situation which very soon appears worse than the situation under the previous régime. In almost all cases, the situation which it provokes remains insoluble for a normal evolution, and either a war or an internal upheaval is necessary for a final outcome from the conditions of authoritarian confusion.

Besides the inevitable consequences of such a régime—the destruction of every individual freedom, of freedom of the press and public opinion, of freedom in education, in the church and religious life, in culture, science, and the arts, the destruction of tolerance in free development of the social classes and of every kind of minority—all these provoke inevitably in every society internal demoralisation, social dissolution, open hatred and bitterness in social and public life.

Today, also, there is no more secret about the real financial and economic situation of such régimes. The need of these régimes to prove their effectiveness, their successful policies, and their capacity to settle the most difficult economic questions such as unemployment, budget difficulties, trade and export problems, questions of currency, has caused them to make economic and financial experiments which, being revolutionary, artificial, and not in conformity with the general possibilities of the respective countries, have shown themselves already today to be complete failures. Economically and financially, as everybody knows very well today, the dictatorships, in contrast with the democratic states, use methods and means which push them towards inevitable downfall or violent social and economic revolution. They have to lower their standards of living systematically and gradually, they get poorer and their population gets poorer, suffers privation and will suffer for a long time to come. *And they do not hide the fact*

that they are in very profound social and economic revolution which will change profoundly the present situation of the middle classes; they go rapidly into state capitalism and collectivism, and in economics and finance they go exactly the same way as the communistic state, crying at the same time as violently as they can that they are the only true and real enemies of the barbarian communistic civilisation.

In conclusion, politically, morally, economically, and socially *these régimes have passed today their culmination point* of the processes of their building and growing, *and we are approaching the moment when this line of evolution of the authoritarian régimes in Europe will reach the breaking point.* It is inevitable not only because of an abstract sociological and political law of evolution, but because these authoritarian régimes are, in fact, régimes of social and political illness. Everywhere in Europe that democracy has fallen, there were already signs of illness in the organism of the state and nation. The establishment of the different dictatorships was not a cure but an expression of malady, and meant that the respective nations and states became more abnormal and more ill.

At the proper moment this illness shows itself as death-illness: in the moment of a powerful internal reaction of the forces of freedom or in the moment of a war adventure entered upon by this dictatorial régime, which is self-condemned to a venturesome internal and external policy, *the final collapse inevitably comes.*

Will It Be a New World War?

All that I have explained in the previous chapters about the present state of things on the European continent, and that I have said about the laws of social evolution means

that the present turbulent period of European history *will soon be followed by a revulsion.* No nation can live for ever in slavery. The reaction will come in the darkest hours or is then already on the way. It will not be otherwise in the present age. Today in the United States, in England, in France, even in Germany, you can watch a very violent and profound reaction in the form of new spiritual currents, struggles for a new philosophy, a new morality, a new international law, and a new political science, as well as in the form of practical political currents, movements, and power political decisions by certain states which have the concrete aim to overcome the present crisis, caused by the whole development of the nineteenth century, the World War and its consequences, and to overthrow the inhuman, violent, barbarian, and antidemocratic political, moral, intellectual, and social conceptions of the European authoritarian states.

If this is the real state of things, and if then the authoritarian states are now near their culminating point, in which way and how will their passage to a new régime be realised? *Through a war, through a revolution, through a slow process of adaptation to new conditions?*

First of all, I maintain that there is already a real and great war in Europe and in the world, and that there is already a kind of revolution in Europe.

Has it been peace since 1931, when a great invasion of China was planned in Japan? This was realised before the eyes of the whole world in 1932, and since that time a regular violent and barbarian warfare has been waged by this nation on Chinese territory. The intervention of the League was invoked—without success. Was it peace in 1934, when another invasion—the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy—was prepared; and in spite of the intervention of the League and in spite of the vote of sanctions in Geneva,

the invasion was executed and the independence of this state destroyed. And there followed other military adventures of the authoritarian states: the military occupation of the Rhineland; the invasion of Austria; the war in Spain; the menace of force against Czechoslovakia and two mobilisations in May and September 1938 of this state for the defence of its territory against German invasion; the military occupation of Czechoslovakia; the invasion of Albania; the new military threats against Lithuania, against Poland, against Greece, and Rumania, against Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland. All these were followed by the new enormous rearmament of all European states and by the call to the colours of millions and millions of men in Germany, Italy, France, Russia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and all other states.

I repeat: Is it peace? And how long can all this continue?

Is it not a violent, brutal, and barbarian social disruption and moral revolution, when today the whole system of international law is destroyed by the political practices of the authoritarian states—followed unfortunately in many practical cases by the failures of the European democracies? Since 1932 the Covenant of the League of Nations has been systematically sabotaged and violated in its most fundamental articles; one treaty after another violated and destroyed; the intrusion of the authoritarian states in the internal affairs of their neighbours has become a system of their daily politics; their leaders continued to make public speeches, declarations, and manifestations which have been revealed as a lie, a public treachery, and a misleading of their own peoples and of foreign governments; they have hundreds of times given their word, and they have hundreds of times broken it; they have made every kind of pledge, and they have respected none; they have solemnly signed new treaties; and they have violated them all.

They have destroyed their parliaments and all their public liberties, their free cultural life, their free schools, their legal systems; they have established complete lawlessness, with their camps of concentration, with the incredible martyrdom of their political and national opponents.

We all see the hundreds of thousands and even millions of suffering emigrants who used to be free persons and citizens, driven from their centuries-old homes and told they must never return: they must now look for a new home in the world. We see hundreds of thousands of those who prefer the way of misery and suffering to that of humiliation, dishonour, and tyranny. And we see whole nations in constant terrorism and uncertainty as to what will come tomorrow, in incredible moral and nervous tension, trying to impose silence on themselves for the time being, even for a time accepting humiliation, in order to rise once again the stronger. That is in the present day the case of my country, Czechoslovakia.

Is not all that the most uncivilised and barbarian moral disruption and revolution?

In stating all these facts, I do not think I look at the present ideological and political struggles with passion, hate, prejudice, or delusion.

We saw in September 1938 and in March 1939 what happened to Czechoslovakia. And in speaking of my country I have no intention of making either reproaches or recriminations. I give only an example which has become famous, and which is a real warning to the whole world not to go further along this way of disaster, that must inevitably lead to the complete ruin of democracies everywhere. During the so-called September crisis of 1938, Czechoslovakia was asked to make a tremendous sacrifice for the sake of peace. My people were prepared to make sacrifices. We tried again and again to negotiate a reasonable agreement, and

we wished to make reasonable concessions which could be accepted for our country. We wanted to show the world that Czechoslovakia—a real, sound, prosperous, developed democracy—did not desire to create difficulties for other nations but was prepared to contribute to the general appeasement in Europe.

We, of course, did not foresee such an agreement as was finally evolved at Munich without any participation by the Czechoslovak government. It was surely an unjust decision, which in the name of the self-determination of the Sudeten-German population, gave more than 1,200,000 Czechoslovaks (more than 10 per cent of the whole nation) to other countries—that means a free, tolerant and democratic country to a brutally oppressive, authoritarian, intolerant and nationally Germanising country—an agreement which almost destroyed the economic foundations of our state and which imposed on the Czechoslovak Republic frontiers so artificially traced that the whole state was, from the economic and strategic point of view, practically given into the hands of its powerful dictatorial neighbour. The annexation of this country by Germany a few months after the Munich decision has proved that the plan was impossible, unjust.

But when we saw that our nation of ten millions of people, surrounded by a nation of eighty millions, with its mighty military machine, could not resist alone the overwhelming force of this neighbour prepared for the invasion of our country, we had to submit to the Munich decision, which—as its western democratic signatories, I think, honestly believed—was to bring us peace. *One of the main reasons of the submission was that four great European powers solemnly signed a document which absolutely guaranteed to the Czechoslovak people its independence*

and its new frontiers, if it accepted the Munich agreement.

Yet, we have seen that in spite of all our sacrifices, in spite of the solemn declarations at Munich, in spite of these guarantees signed by the four great powers, the German dictatorship after a new, violent pressure on Prague, after new, barbarian threats, and after new public lies and treacheries against the Czechs on one side and in the case of Slovakia on the other, invaded our Republic on the 15th of March 1939, occupied the whole territory, and declared it a German protectorate. In spite of the agreement freely accepted and solemnly signed, *the Hungarian government* also invaded the Carpatho-Russian and East-Slovakian territory and annexed it by military force.

The German government, as a signatory of the Munich Pact, once again broke its word, destroyed by force and violence a prosperous, democratic state, subjugated a free nation, declaring cynically that Nazi Germany needed this territory, that she has taken it, and that she will never give it up. The Czechoslovak people, broken morally for the time being by what happened in September 1938 when they were abandoned and forced to accept an impossible and unjust decision, and left by the military conditions of this decision completely without the power to defend their country effectively, were simply obliged to submit. The Munich decision was destroyed by the very power which demanded it *and the Munich guarantee has revealed itself as without any positive value.*

How is all that possible in the twentieth century, in the century which has been praised so often as one of high civilisation, of high culture, of high moral, spiritual, and technical values which have put our era at the top of human culture and progress? How is it possible that in this

enlightened age there are governments in Europe which openly and cynically proclaim the domination of brute force, which refuse to accept the humanitarian and Christian conceptions of life, which destroy every idea of international morality and honesty, and which respect no given word, no pledge, no agreement, and no treaty?

I know that these are not the principles of the whole German nation. *The German nation itself is subjugated.* For seventeen years democratic Germany and Czechoslovakia collaborated with each other in peace. It is the present German régime and the dictatorships in Europe that create this situation of utter confusion and disruption, hatred and violence, war and revolution. Take what they have done to the Jews. Take what they have done to their political opponents. Take what they have done to the churches, to the sciences and arts, to the whole spiritual life. Take what they are doing today to all their neighbours. All this must be considered as the complete disruption of modern human civilisation, of every human moral and legal conception to which humanity has come through thousands of years of its evolution. *That is war and revolution.*

During the last years, and especially last September, the democratic states publicly declared that they were forced to yield again and again to the authoritarian threats of war because they were not sufficiently prepared with their armaments to resist pressure and threat of war and to win in an eventual military conflict provoked by the dictatorships.

Are we to believe that the military preparations are now complete, and that there will be resistance now, resistance that could lead to war? Or is it expected that the dynamic states will now be more cautious in putting forward new claims, and that a conflict, in which they would meet with

real resistance or which could lead to war, would not be started at all? Is it expected that now all these dissensions, all these difficult vital interests which stand against one another, will be somehow settled peacefully; that is, that some kind of permanent agreement will be reached between these two conflicting camps and that the authoritarian states will in the future continue to live peacefully and collaborate loyally with the democratic states without changing their internal structure, without changing their ideology and their whole political education and psychology?

After a twenty years' experience since the war, *I do not believe it,* although I myself have always wished it, of course, as I feared that these differences would otherwise lead inevitably to great catastrophe. Taking into consideration what has happened in the years since 1931, taking into consideration the education, psychology, and dominating political conceptions in the authoritarian states and the condition of their internal policy, *I absolutely deny the possibility of the coexistence of these two contrary régimes—democracy and dictatorship. Either one or the other of these régimes must disappear if the peace and collaboration of nations in Europe is to be re-established.*

Will, therefore, the present disintegration, as many people think, continue for a certain number of years, until the present Europe falls to pieces in some great revolutionary movement gradually sweeping all its countries and states, overthrowing the present political and social régimes and unleashing revolutions, here national, there liberal, and there again communist? *Or will everything be solved finally in a great war?*

Nothing is further from my mind than to prophesy certain events or to proclaim the coming of certain catastrophes. For twenty years I have worked for a constructive peace policy; for twenty years I have strenuously fought

for peace at Geneva and have helped to organise the League of Nations; for twenty years I have done everything possible to preserve peace for Czechoslovakia and the whole of Central Europe. Finally, when as President I was only a few steps away from war, and when the Czechoslovak people were prepared to defend themselves by arms to the last breath, urged by the two friendly great powers, we made our great sacrifice. This is, perhaps a unique example in history of the sacrifice of a nation for the benefit of others. But, that sacrifice failed to solve the question of peace or war in Europe, and by the invasion of Czechoslovakia which followed, the whole situation created by the Munich Agreement became worse, more dangerous, and more tragic than before.

The fight between democracy and dictatorship therefore continues. Every day conditions in Europe are going to be worse. But this uncertain, unsound, abnormal situation cannot last for long. There must come a solution, there must come some evolvement that will finally bring for a longer period order and tranquillity out of the present chaos, tension and confusion.

Applying the inevitable law of social evolution according to which moral, political, and social upheaval will provoke by its inner, inherent forces of reaction and by the necessary reaction of the hostile forces in other countries being constantly menaced by the revolutionary dictatorships, inevitable changes in Europe do approach. Europe will pass through a period of new, great difficulties, of new sufferings and vast upheavals. *The present Europe, politically, intellectually, morally, is condemned. Dictatorships* with all their weaknesses, exaggerations, mistakes, failures, violences, cynicism, and barbarism *will inevitably come to their collapse.*

The most probable eventuality is that it will come through a military conflict provoked by the authoritarian states, directly or indirectly; less probable is the eventuality of an interior disruption or a series of revolutions, although that is not excluded. But an exterior clash of some kind would be necessary for it in any case. A progressive, peaceful liquidation, lasting several years, I consider as almost excluded.

But to my mind this end will be for a better Europe, for a more free, more emancipated, more moral and more normal, more democratic and more peaceful Europe. And with the better, freer, and more democratic inner structure of the different European states a new and better *external* organisation of Europe will come too: *a kind of federative Europe will be the final result of the present profound European crisis.* The European nations are already tired of the present international chaos in the relations between the states. *All will revolt finally against the idea that every ten or twenty years Europe has to pass through a world war. A kind of United States of Europe will be, in the end, the only solution which can save Europe from complete and final collapse and moral and material ruin.*[1]

What Politics Should Be in the Democratic Régime

There is no doubt that very severe criticism could and should be passed on the practice, procedure, means, and methods of the European democracies—the great old democracies as well as the smaller, newer democracies—which they have used in their daily postwar politics.

[1] *Everybody will be interested to read in connection with these ideas the recent book of Clarence Streit,* Union Now, *published in 1939 at New York and Boston.*

Their general conceptions of what democratic politics, and politics in general, should be, was very often only slightly different from some important theses of the authoritarian states. Their lack of belief and faith in their own principles, their lack of civic courage, their inacceptable utilitarian opportunism as to principle, in the most decisive cases of political importance, their lack of real knowledge of concrete problems, and the unconsciousness and *légèreté* with which responsible officials have taken the most far-reaching decisions,—show that it is necessary not merely to oppose the principles of authoritarianism, to preach democracy, and to speak in highly laudatory terms about freedom of men and nations. *One must have also a right conception of democracy as theory and one must have the courage to put these theories into practice rightly, justly, and courageously.* Otherwise all these great words about democracy are but *vain words, words, nothing but words* intended to cover the most vulgar, egoistic interests of ruling classes, parties, and individuals.

Let me make quite briefly a few statements about the theory of politics as it should be applied in practice in a really democratic régime.

Politics, from the democratic point of view, must be considered and treated *as real science* and a special scientific activity, and as *a special kind of art,* of artistic activity.

In the whole range of human activities politics is one of the professions of highest social importance, whether the standard of valuation be spiritual, moral, or only practical. It is a science and an art. I add immediately: it is also something of a philosophy.

A scale of social values might arrange the sciences in this ascending order: astronomy, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology, sociology being the last and highest science, since it deals with man as a member of

society and with social phenomena in general. Political science is the practical application of sociological science; it is, then, a main part of sociology. As it is practical sociology, politics is the science of man in all his social manifestations, actions, and aspirations. It requires a many-sided knowledge of all the special sciences of man and his social activity (history, law, economics, geography, statistics, the study of population, comparative religion, etc.).

In its function as a science, democratic politics enquires what are the actual conditions of man: it studies, with the help of the special sciences (law, history, geography, economics, etc.) the actual state of man in his relation to society and to his whole environment; it asks what is regular, planned, and constant in society. As a science, democratic politics must look at society and the world objectively, must search for truly objective reality, must analyse society thoroughly and widely, and must, so to speak, dissect it alive. All social sciences, psychology, and to a certain extent also biology, should thus be the concern of the politician, who should have an understanding of scientific method and should be able to use the analytical capacities of *reason*.

Politics is not only a science but also an *art*—according to some authors, even *the highest art existing*. Like every artist, the politician creates. He tries by his political activity to direct, modify, and change, to give new expressions and new forms to his material, which includes everything that has been mentioned as the subject of sociology and politics as a science, just as the sculptor gives different forms to his material.

The politician as an artist puts into this material of social life his spirit, his ideas, his feelings, his plans, his individuality, his self. The politician as a scientist contemplates, studies, searches for reality: the politician as an

artist creates, transforms, directs what he has found as a scientist into something that he considers right, necessary, and good. *Creation* requires *imagination.* Without the power of imagination, combination, and synthesis, no politician can successfully create his new social reality.

The politician as a scientist must, moreover, be a psychologist, both in theory and in practice. He should know of psychological theory everything central, everything fundamental. As to practice, the politician must have an innate talent for psychological observation, for the comprehension of other minds, for knowing man in all his mental activities. A politician cannot be without psychological experience, which one can never learn completely from books. There never has been great politics without politicians who were not also first-class psychologists.

Finally, a politician is and should be a philosopher, and politics should be *philosophy.* As a scientist, the politician discovers the nature of social reality, anaylses and defines it; as an artist, he prepares its adaptation, assists its development, and changes its direction; as a philosopher, and especially as an historical and moral philosopher, he must enquire *in which direction,* with what ends, material or spiritual, ideal or practical, *this adaptation and changing of social reality must be accomplished.* I add as an essential condition: to be a philosopher and moralist in politics *means to have a firm, inflexible, iron character, means to stand firmly by one's conviction, means to have no fear, means to be honest.*

It means that the ideal democratic politician should not be an empty, superficial opportunist and cynical time-server, should not be a professor of current Machiavellism and venturesome hazardousness. It means to have exact, constant, firm personal convictions, based on universal

morality, and it means to strive for them under all conditions.

Here sociology passes into the philosophy of history, politics into practical philosophy and ethics.

The democratic politician stands, then, as a scientist, artist, and philosopher, at the crossroads of the present, choosing the way of the future. Not only by information and analysis of the actual situation, but also by virtue of an aim defined in terms of the history of philosophy, by intuition, and by guesswork based on knowledge, he must see what should be his momentary and what his final aim. He should, by his political art, know and understand how far, in what direction, and at what price he is allowed, can, and should change this or that present state of affairs at this or that moment into future shapes. Or in other words he must be able to recognise *what is and what is not possible politically*. Here is the *secret of political success*.

For a politician to be a real democratic statesman and leader, then, he must fulfil the following conditions:

1. He must be able, as a scientist, to analyse conditions, to recognise reality and by exact observation form a correct idea of actual conditions (personal, party, national, international, economic, etc.).

2. He must, as an artist, have a synthetic mind; he must be able to comprehend things, events, and developments, and be able to see them synthetically in longer periods of their evolution. He must have a strong enough imagination to understand at any normal or critical moment how to deal with ideas, events, and people, how to combine, to rearrange, or briefly how to adapt and to create new realities from old conditions. To know this means to be a really creative politician. It is not sufficient to administer, to let events have their course, to wait patiently, and to settle things as they turn up. A statesman

and leader must foresee by his imagination and must prepare the solution of everything in advance.

Artists have the synthetic and combinative mind; scientists, the analytic mind. The politician must, as scientist, use well the analytical capacities of *reason*. The politician, as an artist, must have the synthetic qualities of *feeling* and *intuition* and a great power of *imagination*.

3. He must further have the talent to distinguish between people, like a good psychologist; he must see the psychological and therefore all the other consequences of his actions or the actions of other persons and parties, and of public opinion, etc. In this sense a democratic politician must have a fine psychological tact in his behaviour towards other people, which is only another expression for his sense of practical psychology.

4. He must have a well-defined philosophy of his own and must hold it in practical life consistently, imaginatively, and inflexibly—if he is to be a courageous democratic politician of firm principles. He must apply the ideas of philosophy, history, and morals to practical life and political problems, and he must thus always know where he is going, and what practical, near or distant aims to set himself. A politician is a real democratic statesman, if he is a strong and well-defined *intellectual personality* and especially if he is a real *moral personality*.

I could continue enumerating all that could be demanded from a politician to make him a democratic statesman. What I have mentioned are the main requirements. If a politician is too *much of a scientist or scholar,* if he merely looks at reality and draws conclusions from it coldly, he is rarely a creative politician. He is merely an analytical intellectualist, who knows not how to combine, to create for the future intuitively, to see the consequences of events—he is a limited politician, dry, lifeless, without intuition and spontaneity. Such are frequently the politics of professional scholars.

If a politician has too little comprehension of scientific analysis, of objective investigation of reality, and if he is *too much of an artist,* he is necessarily often carried away by intuition, by feelings, by the synthetic and imaginative power of his mind and by his extremely individualistic character. He then frequently chases fancies, impossible combinations, emotional excitements, pursues a policy of passion, love or hatred, despises philosophical and scientific training; and his knowledge of facts—which every politician without exception must have—is usually superficial and shallow. He relies on his talent and intuition.

This explains why, for example, so frequently good writers suffer shipwreck in politics, why professional artists are usually considered fools and visionaries in politics, why people otherwise talented conduct a romantic policy, which shows a lack of practical psychology, is merely intuitive, emotional, and therefore personal.

Dictators, adventurers, occasional politicians, many of those who consider themselves political geniuses, belong frequently to this category of people—intuitive, imaginative, romantic, emotional. Their whole political activity is sometimes permeated with such an artistic individualism, constant improvisation, experimentation, emotionalism, and egocentricity, and thus leads frequently to catastrophe.

From these theoretical reflections, I conclude:

A great politician and a real democratic statesman can only be a person whose mind possesses a correct harmony and equilibrium of all the mental faculties as mentioned: of the analytical rational element, and the synthetic, combinative, imaginative, and artistic element of feeling and intuition; a person who understands that in politics he must be a philosopher of history and a moralist. All this is essentially also a problem of epistemology: *Politics has al-*

ways been a struggle for the right knowledge of existing reality in the present and of the possible reality of the future, interpreted in the spirit of some doctrine or philosophy of history and of ethics.

This is something entirely different from the current German saying: "Politik ist die Kunst des Möglichen" (Politics is the art of the possible). This formula contains nothing but the notoriously cynical current conception of everyday political opportunism and superficial narrow-minded amoral or immoral Machiavellism.

What a Statesman and Leader Should Be in the Democratic Régime

Speaking of the true democratic conception of politics and of the ideal democratic politician we come naturally to the question of leadership for democracy and to a consideration of what the leader *should be* in democracy. In a previous chapter I touched on this important matter and indicated briefly what kind of reproaches have been addressed to democratic leaders from the side of authoritarian critics. Here I try to complete these criticisms by some general observations about democratic leadership and about leadership in politics in general.

The matter of leadership in politics is one of the most interesting and, at the same time, one of the most involved and far-reaching questions in political science and in practical political life. In postwar politics, and especially in the political arena of recent years, when such remarkable events have been happening in the world, the question of leaders has been fundamental and decisive in understanding the political history of these years.

In the feudal and monarchical period leadership was based on birth into the aristocratic class and in very large

degree on property. Political leaders were born to leadership. They did not attain position by reason of personal merits or achievements. They inherited leadership as they inherited class position and property.

In the modern democratic period the leaders have been elected. But even so in the democratic states—for instance, Great Britain—there are remnants of the ancient aristocratic system and because certain democracies are really and practically only half-democracies, there is a situation in which the leadership is decided not only by election, but also in connection with and as a result of the inheritance of class position and property. Again as an instance, actually you have in England first of all the leadership in the House of Lords still inherited, nominated, and decided in very large degree by birth and property. There is a governing class, the origin of which is class distinction, property, and nomination from the king. In other democracies these remnants of feudalism are not so prevalent—for instance, in France where the Revolution overthrew the aristocracy. Here election plays a more important and significant role in the creation of leadership.

In the authoritarian states leadership and leaders are created always through revolution. Besides, the conception of "Führer" or of "Duce" is, in national socialism and fascism, based on a special philosophy of the state. Fascism and national socialism first of all accept, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, the conception of the absolutist and almighty state and this "all-might" of the state is personified in the Duce or Führer. According to the theory of these two authoritarian systems the Duce and the Führer are the real expression of the state. The Führer especially —but also the Duce—is a conception to a very large degree mystical and religious, as well as revolutionary. It is, however, true that both of these régimes refuse to accept the

conception of the head of the state "by Grace of God." They have a mystical conception of the people and of the nation. They deify the nation; they deify the state; they identify state and nation. And the Duce or Führer is the natural leader as the expression of the nation and of the almighty state, as opposed to parties, classes, and other individuals. As to succession in leadership, they have not yet formulated their theory.

To summarise, the differences between leadership in democracy and authoritarian states are as follows:

Democracy, being a system of applied science, of rationalism, of the equality of man, of discussion, of evolutionary methods of daily politics, of honesty, has the natural inclination to produce leaders who are the expression of analytical science and of reason. They are people who must have a high sense of responsibility; who must carefully weigh and constantly consider public opinion; who are obliged therefore to proceed slowly and with great conscientiousness. Hence they are generally people inclined to close analysis and to profound reasoning. Very often, because of this procedure and the method, the leaders of democracy become very easily people of indecision. Because they must do everything by discussion in Parliament, among the political parties and with their eye on the voters, and their ear to the ground, their position, of course, is much more difficult than that of the leaders in the absolutist or authoritarian states, who are free to make swift and final decisions.

Leaders in authoritarian states—where the state is based on the idea that life is a constant battle and struggle, that the relation between nations and states is a battle, because they accept in daily politics methods of violence and force—such leaders must reflect such characteristics; they must be men who accept the principle that human

life is a constant battle, and that the relation between men is a relation of force. They therefore have characters of violence and must be men of action rather than men of reflection. They are generally people who make decisions at once without taking into consideration the advice of others and very often without taking into consideration historical facts and realities of the day. They are generally adventurers without scruples, cynical, ambitious, egocentric, emotional, and amoral. For this reason the countries which are led by such types of men must—because of the very nature of their régime and of their leadership—finish in catastrophe, generally in war.

Again the leader in democracy is on the other hand a man who first of all must be or should be extremely well educated and informed as to general conditions in his country, and who must be of wide erudition. He must therefore apply all his energies and abilities to the fullest in the pursuit of his official functions. He must be a sort of hero of industry, of honesty, of self-sacrifice and patience, because he must constantly discuss problems as they arise; he must always be prepared for the attacks of his opponents and must steadily undertake by reason and logic to persuade the opposition. He therefore is often exhausted much more rapidly than leaders in the authoritarian states. Leaders in democracy grow old more rapidly. Almost every democratic leader must pass through a period of general unpopularity. The real democratic leader is actually condemned finally to be unpopular and to fall. He is wise if he is conscious of these facts. He must be prepared for unpopularity and eclipse and he must accept all this as his contribution to his state and nation and not consider it as due to ingratitude or as something which is not normal.

The final judgment on both types of leader is made ultimately by history. Consider the famous dictators in history

through the lens of history and see what the verdict of history has been!

If you compare what I have said about democratic politics as science and art and what I have said about political leaders, you will understand how—in my conception—the ideal statesman should have all the qualities of the real democratic leader combined with some of the qualities of the authoritarian leader. He must be something more than the man of analysis, of reason, and of science. He must not only be an intellectual—for in the field of politics intellectuals have very often proven to be quite incapable—but must also be a man of decision and of courage. *He should combine in his personality in a very harmonious synthesis a high type of man of great intellectual culture and scientific erudition with keen intuition and instinct, of spirit, of rapid decision and quick action, and of physical and moral courage.*

Such a combination occurs *very rarely in practical political life*—but it does occur. It is a question not only of education, but also of innate qualities and abilities. *For these reasons, leadership, especially in the democracies, will always be a question of good education and of careful selection of leaders.* And it is therefore necessary that the higher types of individuals should become more interested in politics in a democracy. The so-called intellectuals must therefore interest themselves in politics because in the last analysis real leadership can come also in democracy first from their ranks. Leaders emerge, of course, from time to time, directly from the ranks of the people—generally after revolutions or periods of upheaval. But they are leaders who, although they came directly from the people, either are already intellectuals or become intellectuals, through education and effort, by force of circumstance. In any case, *in modern life and in the democratic states, to*

engage in politics without very hard intellectual work, without very great erudition, without very high comprehension of all divisions of science, is simply impossible.

All that I have said about democratic politics as science and art and about the ideal democratic statesmen and leaders enables me to declare that I do not believe that the leaders of authoritarian governments can ever be leaders of moral integrity, of honesty, of real human education and erudition. The judgment of history will not only condemn their undemocratic, authoritarian system. *It will also condemn its leaders.* By all that happened in postwar European policy *they are already definitely and inexorably condemned.*

A General Outlook on the Future Tasks of the New Democracy

It now remains for me to make some brief and general conclusions about the future tasks of the new European democracy.

We have shown the evolution of democratic ideas and institutions during the course of the last five centuries. We have passed through the period of feudalism, through the period of absolute monarchy, of the establishment through the French and American revolutions of the democratic bourgeois middle-class system, and the whole evolution of democratic institutions in the nineteenth century. We have explained how twentieth century liberal democracy has passed into the period, in which social problems have been developed. We have explained how the struggle for political democracy has been changed in the struggle for a kind of social and economic democracy, and how especially on the basis of socialism, collectivism, and communism on

the one side and of fascism and national socialism on the other—combined with the power-political questions of European states and with the question of national quarrels in Europe—the great crisis of democracy has come in the period after the war and in the present days.

By this crisis we mean also the crises of the power-political conflicts between the present European great powers and their direct consequences as well as the ideological struggle between the new systems—liberal democracy, fascism, national socialism, and communism. And the question must, of course, be put: what will be the next stage of this whole evolution?

If in the future, therefore, when the present profound European crisis has ended, either by a great conflict or by the disappearance of the dictatorships, we shall have to draw conclusions or make a synthesis from the present struggle between these four ideological systems of government, we can, in broad outline, see what will be the evolution of the democratic system after the present period of crisis of democracy. I think, of course, that either a war or a series of revolutions in Europe will inevitably accelerate this process of the creation of a new synthesis of the future democratic system in Europe, and *this passage from the one stage to the other will not be without profound and violent conflicts and extraordinarily difficult moral and political crises.*

I shall indicate, therefore, only a few of the quite general characteristic signs of this new period.

First: There is no doubt that democracy in the future will accept in very large degree what is practically accepted and realised today by the three other governmental systems—fascism, national socialism, and communism; that is, *a certain augmentation of power and of several new functions of the state.* The state, in its functions and in its

power, will in any case intervene in the future more in individual liberties than it did in classical prewar democracy. One can see that already the present democratic systems have accepted this principle of augmentation of power and functions in very large degree. This will come especially in the fields of economy, finance, communications, and other material things in which the democratic state of the future will have greater functions than it has today. In any case there will certainly *be a re-enforcement and consolidation of the executive power* as compared with the last phases of European liberal constitutional democracy. The position of the executive power in the United States of America can be used, in any case, as an example.

There is no doubt, of course, that the communist, fascist, and national socialist governments *have gone too far in this direction.* They have made the state almighty. They have practically destroyed the power of the legislative and judicial organs of the present democratic system, making of these two organs simply instruments and almost slaves of the executive power. The inevitable reaction against this tendency will come. This exaggeration will be rejected, and a *better harmony and equilibrium between the three organs of the democratic rule in some way re-established.*

Second: The democratic state in the future will have to take into greater consideration *all the weaknesses and deficiencies of the present democratic party and voting system.* The system of political parties and the state, the difficulties of leadership, the problem of the press, its independence on one side and its corruption on the other—all these must be and will be reconsidered. If the future democracy does not better harmonise the functioning of the organs of democracy—because the political parties, the press, public

opinion, the elected corporations and the leaders are the necessary instruments of every democracy—if they will not be more appropriate to the real interests of the state and nation than they were, the inevitable and final collapse of the democratic system will come. It would, of course, be very interesting to go into detail on this aspect of the problem; but that would be a very long study, and I do not have the time and place to go into it at present. I hope I shall have the opportunity in the future to return to this question.

Third: The social problems which came with the establishment of the fourth estate (as I have called the participation of the working class and of the peasants in political power after the last war) will be one of the greatest preoccupations of the democracy of the future. Socialism and collectivism have forced the liberal democracy to take into consideration this question. Communism was practically the most radical manifestation of the necessity to discuss, study, and settle these problems in practical political life. But also, as we have seen, the fascists and national socialists understood that they must include all these problems in their programs, if they were to be successful in winning the masses of the people, and if they were finally to come to power. Sometimes sincerely, sometimes only apparently, they accepted practically the program of socialism, collectivism, or even of communism.

Democracy must understand that in the future *this will be its problem too. All remnants of aristocracy* must, in the future democracy, be replaced by more democratic solutions. There is no doubt also that the remnants of bourgeois capitalist exaggerations will be one of the great preoccupations of democracy, and that, without the reasonable and evolutionary solution of these problems, democracy of the future cannot maintain its existence. All

that remains of the landed aristocracy will be, of course, a question which will have, and must have, *its final solution.* Everybody knows the enormous literature which exists about socialism and communism and the struggle of socialism against the bourgeois democracy. And still democrats must continue to examine and study these questions in order to arrive at *an evolutionary* conception of the solution of these social problems in their future, better democratic system, in order to avoid revolutions, upheavals, and communistic exaggerations.

Fourth: The problem of nationalism will also be one of the great preoccupations of the future democracy. There is no doubt that fascism and national socialism are the greatest exaggerations of nationalism in all history. Especially their racialism must be considered as outspoken barbarism: they deify the nation and nationalism; they have brought national and racial feeling to a paroxysm; they have made of it such a dynamic force that—I think, I hope, and I am convinced of it—just this exaggeration *will in the future kill the exaggerated nationalism and chauvinism of the present days.* Before the war there was a very often used German slogan criticising nationalism which said, "From nationality to bestiality." I think that the present development in Europe has shown that in many cases this slogan became a truth. In my opinion, *the present practice of Aryan racialism is really a bestiality.*

Communism often underestimated the force of the national idea. Future democracy must again try to arrive at a permanent synthesis between real patriotism, nationalism, and genuine human internationalism.

Fifth: This harmony and synthesis can probably be reestablished *in a new system of a real and effective collective security and of the League of Nations* after a certain period of struggles, difficulties, and sufferings in Europe.

That can mean not only a new system of international policy, more peaceful, more moderate and more acceptable to all nations; but also—as we have already underlined in the preceding chapters—*a kind of federative reorganisation, first perhaps in certain regions* (the Danubian region, the Baltic region, the Balkans, or northern Europe) which, I hope, will be extended later, to the whole of Europe.

There is no other possibility if we wish to avoid a repetition of war and a crisis in Europe similar to what we have today, every ten or twenty years.

* * *

CONCLUSION

Everything I have said in these chapters about the present situation of Europe and about the inevitable battle between democracy and authoritarianism of every kind in Europe shows that all of Europe—morally, socially, and politically—is in a state of profound disintegration. And whatever happens, whether it be war or revolutionary upheavals or momentary peaceful settlement of the present power-political and ideological conflicts, will not resolve this disintegration at once, because such a disintegration must be exchanged for a new general moral and political renaissance of a very extensive and profound kind and a general adaptation of the different political systems and ideologies of the European states and nations. That means that such an evolvement will be long, lasting many, many years.

And so the outlook on the future of Europe could be pessimistic. But I repeat that from this point of view I am not pessimistic. Democracy cannot die. Freedom cannot die. The fight for the free development of the human per-

sonality cannot cease. This is in the nature of man and of human society. Freedom and democracy may be suppressed for a time and in certain places. But different conditions in various countries make it possible to begin the struggle again, and there is no power in the world which can stop the passing of ideas—especially the ideas of freedom and democracy—across frontiers. The fight will continue; it cannot be stopped and it is already the fundamental condition of its final triumph.

I do not, therefore, fear for the future of democracy. Neither do I fear a so-called catastrophe to Europe, through war or revolution. We hear very often the slogan that war or revolution in Europe will mean the end of human civilisation. That is a mistake. Modern human civilisation cannot be destroyed. One can destroy in one country, through war or revolution, some of the remarkable monuments of human culture and civilisation, ancient and modern; but the present organisation of the world does not allow anybody to destroy human civilisation. Human civilisation is, first of all, the moral conception of modern mankind, although including of course all economic values, all achievements of technological progress, all great cultural monuments, buildings, cities, universities, libraries, museums of art and science; many of them are of inestimable value and could be of course destroyed in a great catastrophe. And that would be a loss which never could be replaced.

But that does not mean the destruction of human civilisation. The human spirit, in its great creative power, having saved in innumerable places the results of modern science, technology, and progress—material and moral—will continue in any case its great creative work. And we will rebuild, replace, reconstruct, and re-create the so-called modern civilisation in new forms, which probably

cannot have at once the same value and the same moral and material perfection as many of the destroyed monuments of the past. But the great struggle in human society for the continuation of past culture and civilisation and for future culture and civilisation will continue with the same noble results and the same great success which is, again, in the nature of the human spirit and the human personality. Humanity will simply continue its daily life, its daily creation, and its daily fight for new and better forms of human existence.

Everyone must, of course, understand what such conflicts, suffering, and disaster would mean. Everyone must do everything possible to avoid it. But the slogan prophesying the end of civilisation is meaningless.

The present crisis in Europe and in the world is the continuation of the eternal fight for a better justice, for a better life, for a better political, national, cultural, economic, and social existence for the greatest number of individuals in the greatest number of countries in the world; the fight for a peaceful settlement of the conflicting interests; the fight for a longer period of peace and for better forms of collaboration between the individuals in the particular nation and between the nations and states in the world. *In a word, it is the continuation of the fight for a better society.*

That is the ideal of democracy. This ideal is something so high, so valuable, and so dignified that it is worth believing and living. It is worth being a democrat.

APPENDIX
FROM DR. BENEŠ' PAPERS

Protest to Four Powers

Message sent on 16th March 1939 to President Roosevelt, Premier Daladier, Prime Minister Chamberlain, Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinoff:

"The Czech and Slovak people are victims of a great international crime. The people of Czechoslovakia cannot protest today, and because of the happenings of the last months cannot defend themselves. Therefore, I, as ex-President of Czechoslovakia, address this solemn protest to you.

"Last September the Franco-British proposals and a few days afterwards the Munich decision were presented to me. Both these documents contained the promise of the guarantee of the integrity and security of Czechoslovak territory. Both these documents asked for unheard-of sacrifices by my people in the interest of European peace. These sacrifices were made by the people of Czechoslovakia.

"Nevertheless, one of the great powers who signed the agreement of Munich is now dividing our territory, is occupying it with its army and is establishing a 'protectorate' under threat of force and military violence.

"Before the conscience of the world and before history I am obliged to proclaim that the Czechs and Slovaks will never accept this unbearable imposition on their sacred rights and they will never cease their struggle until these rights are reinstated for their beloved country. And I entreat your Govern-

ment to refuse to recognize this crime and to assume the consequences which today's tragic situation in Europe and in the world urgently requires."

EDUARD BENEŠ

Ex-President of Czechoslovakia
Professor at the University of Chicago

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ACTION BY LEAGUE OF NATIONS INVOKED

March 17, 1939

Secretary-General
League of Nations
Geneva, Switzerland

I have today sent to President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Chamberlain, Premier Daladier and Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinoff the following telegram:

"The Czech and Slovak people are victims of a great international crime. The people of Czechoslovakia cannot protest today, and because of the happenings of the last months cannot defend themselves. Therefore, I, as ex-President of Czechoslovakia, address this solemn protest to you.

"Last September the Franco-British proposals and a few days afterwards the Munich decision were presented to me. Both these documents contained the promise of the guarantee of the integrity and security of Czechoslovak territory. Both these documents asked for unheard-of sacrifices by my people in the interest of European peace. These sacrifices were made by the people of Czechoslovakia.

"Nevertheless, one of the great powers who signed the agreement of Munich is now dividing our territory, is occupying it with its army and is establishing a 'protectorate' under threat of force and military violence.

"Before the conscience of the world and before history I am obliged to proclaim that the Czechs and Slovaks will never accept this unbearable imposition on their sacred rights and

they will never cease their struggle until these rights are reinstated for their beloved country. And I entreat your Government to refuse to recognize this crime and to assume the consequences which today's tragic situation in Europe and in the world urgently requires."

I herewith submit this telegram to the President of the Council of the League of Nations and invoke such articles of the League of Nations Covenant as are involved, especially Article Ten. I am convinced that no League of Nations member will recognize this crime and hope that all members of the League of Nations will, in due time, do what their commitments under the League of Nations Covenant impose upon them.

EDUARD BENES

Ex-President of Czechoslovakia
Professor at the University of Chicago

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THANKS TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

April 15, 1939

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D. C.

On behalf of all Czechoslovak people who remain free, and as former President of the Czechoslovak Republic, I have the honor to express to Your Excellency the most sincere thanks for your message to the heads of the German and Italian governments.

The maintenance of peace and the necessity for the settlement of all political difficulties in Europe through pacific means was always the fundamental principle of Czechoslovak policy. The present unfortunate situation of my country, which is now under the temporary occupation of German military force, has, of course, made it impossible for you to enumerate the Czechoslovak Republic among those free countries which could now be involved in the immediate negotiations

for the conclusion of Non-Aggression Pacts. I understand perfectly this situation. But I believe that in your mind and in that of other governments which have not recognized the illegal occupation of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of the German protectorate, is the idea that the other unsettled questions—and of course also those connected with Czechoslovakia —will, during the eventual further negotiations inevitably be presented and settled according to the principles of justice and in the spirit of international agreements which have been made with Czechoslovakia and which continue legally to exist. In this spirit, may I assure you, Mr. President, that free Czechoslovakia will follow with great satisfaction your appeal and will participate in all the peace work which your message envisages.

In thanking Your Excellency once more for your new, far-reaching step for the peaceful settlement of European conflicts, in which my nation was obliged to make such great sacrifices for general peace, I remain, Mr. President,

Yours respectfully,

Dr. Eduard Benes

* * *

Second Appeal to League of Nations

Pittsburgh, Pa., May 13, 1939

S.E. M. Bonnet
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
Paris

H.E. Lord Halifax
Foreign Secretary
London

M. Viatcheslaff Molotoff
Commissaire aux Affaires Etrangères
Moscow

Monsieur le Ministre:

Je prends la liberté de vous communiquer le texte de la dépêche que je viens d'envoyer au Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations.

"Monsieur le Secrétaire Général:

"Le 16 mars, à la suite de l'invasion militaire de la Tchécoslovaquie par l'Allemagne actuelle, je vous ai envoyé la dépêche de protestation en vous priant de la transmettre au Président du Conseil pour une action appropriée. Vu la session actuelle du Conseil de la Société des Nations, je me permets de vous adresser cette prière en une fois en y ajoutant la protestation nouvelle suivante:

"A la suite de l'invasion militaire allemande de la Tchécoslovaquie et de l'établissement du soi-disant protectorat allemand sur la Bohême et la Moravie d'une part et sur la Slovaquie de l'autre part, le gouvernement hongrois a violemment, et contre ses engagements territoire de la Slovaquie et de la Russie Subcarpathique ayant forcé le pays et les autorités locales qui n'ont eu aucun moyen de se défendre avec succès à la suite de la mutilation de la Tchécoslovaquie, à laisser occuper tout le territoire de la Russie Subcarpathique et une partie de la Slovaquie orientale.

"Vu que les articles fondamentaux du Pacte de la Société des Nations ainsi que les principes généraux du droit international reconnus ont été ainsi, indignement violés; vu que le Conseil de la Société des Nations a été chargé par le traité spécial qui garantissait l'autonomie locale de la Russie Subcarpathique dans le cadre de la République Tchécoslovaque, de veiller sur le maintien de cette garantie—droit et l'obligation, que le Conseil de la Société des Nations exerçait consciencieusement et avec succès pendant vingt ans; vu qu'ainsi non seulement les droits de la République Tchécoslovaque et du peuple Carpathorusse, mais aussi les droits et les devoirs du Conseil de la Société des Nations ont été illégalement détruits et que cette violence ne peut être tolérée par aucun Membre de la Société des Nations sans lui infliger une

humiliation nouvelle et sans porter un coup violent à son existence, je m'adresse au Président du Conseil en ma qualité de l'ancien Président de la République Tchécoslovaque avec la prière respectueuse de ne pas passer outre ce crime nouveau contre le droit international et de soumettre en vertu des Articles du Pacte qui se trouvent ainsi violés la question à l'action appropriée du Conseil.

"J'ajoute que la Tchécoslovaquie tout en continuant son existence légale n'a pas temporairement moyen, étant soumise à un régime d'oppression et de violence, de se présenter à Genève dans la plénitude de ses droits. Il sera donc permis, comme j'espère, à l'ancien Président de la République, qui au nom de la Tchécoslovaquie a travaillé pendant dix-sept ans à la Société des Nations avec tout son dévouement au maintien et à la consolidation de la paix internationale et qui a été élu President de l'Assemblée et à plusieurs reprises Président du Conseil de la Société, de s'adresser aujourd'hui au Conseil en invoquant non seulement les droits de la Tchécoslovaquie, mais aussi ceux de la Société des Nations.

"Edouard Beneš,

"Professeur à l'Université de Chicago"

En vous priant de vouloir bien la prendre en connaissance et d'aider la cause tchécoslovaque à Genève, je vous exprime d'avance mes sentiments de gratitude.

Edouard Beneš

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AN APPEAL TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

A University of Chicago Round Table Broadcast

Edouard Beneš, Former President of Czechoslovakia, Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago, under the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation.

Quincy Wright, Professor of International Law, University of Chicago.

DR. WRIGHT: Last Friday, Dr. Beneš rose from his professorial chair at the University of Chicago to send telegrams to the President of the United States, to the Prime Ministers of England, France and Russia, and to the President of the Council of the League of Nations. He asked the heads of governments to refuse to recognize Germany's proclamation of its protectorate over Czechoslovakia. He recalled to the League of Nations the obligation of its members "to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members." Because the present government of Czechoslovakia was incapable of acting under the guns of the German occupant, he felt called upon as ex-president to speak for his country.

The world crisis has intensified. Hitler proclaimed a German protectorate over Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia last Thursday, after his troops had occupied Prague. Prime Minister Chamberlain of England, in his Birmingham address on Friday, recognized the failure of his policy of appeasement and the duty to resist "any attempt to dominate the world by force." England, France and, according to most recent cables, the Soviet Union, have formally protested Hitler's act as "a complete repudiation of the Munich agreement" of last September, and have declared that the changes effected by it are "without legal basis." It is reported that these three powers are considering economic measures against Germany. Hitler has replied that these protests "lack every political, legal, and moral basis." The British Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, has consulted with the American, French and Soviet ambassadors. The British Cabinet sat in extraordinary week-end session on Saturday. The British and French ambassadors in Berlin have been recalled. The Prime Minister of France, M. Daladier, has asked for dictatorial powers and the Chamber of Deputies has given its consent.

Last Friday President Roosevelt recalled his message of January 4, asking for modification of the Neutrality Act, to make possible "methods short of war" but "stronger and more effective than mere words" for dealing with aggressors. Four bills

to this end have been introduced, and Senator Pittman, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has announced immediate hearings. Under-Secretary of State Welles, with approval of the President, issued a formal statement "condemning" acts of "wanton lawlessness" which have resulted in the "temporary extinguishment of the liberties" of the Czechoslovaks. The United States has dispatched a formal note to Germany declaring that its established policy of refusing to recognize the fruits of aggression is applicable to the Czech situation.

Rumania, with its rich oil fields, has rejected recent economic demands from Germany, and is vigorously developing its defenses. Poland feels that its former German territories, the Corridor and Upper Silesia, are in peril. Propaganda for the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia has been reported.

German troops, in the meantime, are moving east from Prague. Refugees are fleeing from the country; concentration camps are being established; and Germany has seized the Czech gold reserves. Hungary is occupying Ruthenia, and has declared its annexation. Hitler has successively defined his policy as dictated by the need of "self-preservation," as a step towards the re-establishment of the medieval German Empire, and as a "German Monroe Doctrine in Central Europe."

This is the most recent stage in the progress of the dynamic powers which began with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and continued with Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia; Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland, contrary to his Locarno pledges; Mussolini and Hitler's intervention in Spain; Japan's renewed hostilities in China; Hitler's seizure of Austria; and his acquisition of the Sudetenland last September, as a result of the Munich agreement. These acts were all in violation of solemn treaties and in that respect they differ from conquests of the past. The democracies have retreated step by step, forgetting their pledges to resist aggression, under the League Covenant, the Locarno Treaties, and special mutual assistance pacts.

We are all aware that respect for international law and treaties has degenerated, that dictatorship has advanced, that democracy has retreated. These problems have been discussed in the Round Table before, but today we are to listen to a historic pronouncement concerning them.

Dr. Beneš, the founder, with President Masaryk, of the new Czechoslovakia, has not only given prosperity and order to his country, but has labored to establish order and peaceful procedures in Europe. For twenty years these efforts were successful, and his people honored him by making him successively Prime Minister and President of the Republic. Dr. Beneš will for the first time make a public declaration concerning the meaning of these recent events for his country, for Europe, and for the world.

DR. BENES: In this tragic moment of European history I am addressing this appeal to the American people.

There is today in Central Europe a nation of Czechs and Slovaks whose territory has been violently invaded. Might has occupied a free country and subjugated a free people. Those who might fight for their liberty, for democracy and for freedom have been thrown into concentration camps by an invader. This invader has no right in this territory, but by force of might has taken all the wealth, property, industry, raw materials, gold and moneys which the great efforts of 15 million people have created in the last twenty years. For centuries these people—workers, peasants and modest middle class people—have patiently and laboriously built their prosperity, without ever menacing and threatening others. They have asked for themselves only the God-given right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness within their own ancient frontiers. A most brutal crime is perpetrated against this people. They have suddenly been robbed of everything they hold most dear and this crime has been committed as part of a carefully prepared program—just as a common criminal plans for the robbery of an individual. The crime is committed within the framework of invasion by several hundred thousand soldiers,

with hundreds of airplanes and tanks and military motor cars. And this tragedy occurs—this invasion comes—in time of peace and without provocation or excuse.

The Czechs and Slovaks have always lived in a very difficult geographical position. Today they are surrounded by a nation of 80 million inhabitants and have been subjugated by the present government of that nation. But for ten centuries, from the time of the "Good King" St. Wenceslaus, this small nation has been obliged to fight for its existence, for its liberty, and during the last century for democracy and for free development of the individual. In the fourteenth century they fought for religious tolerance under Jan Hus. For a hundred years they fought. And although finally there was a conciliation, they had paid a great price for their ideals. They were subjugated by the Habsburgs in the sixteenth century. By the middle of the seventeenth century their national state was annihilated because of their love for tolerance and liberty and respect for individual rights. For three centuries they were under the yoke of the Germans and the Magyars. The last war—the World War—liberated them, to which liberation the people of the United States contributed so much. And the national state of Czechoslovakia was established.

During the past twenty years the Czechs and Slovaks have steadily and continuously constructed a prosperous republic—its social structure extraordinarily in equilibrium, its legislation progressive, its economics and finances in order, its budget in balance, its debts met, its export trade thriving—and with real political liberty and religious tolerance. While the state had minorities—a question with which Europe has always been confronted and therefore Czechoslovakia was not peculiar in this regard—it has been universally recognized by the most objective statesmen, historians, scientists, economists and sociologists that they had established a very liberal system and one of the most tolerant policies in national and international affairs of any of the new European states. Czechoslovakia was known in all Europe as the asylum for free people and the most ardent supporter of the League of Nations. There were no

persecutions of any church, no persecutions of Catholics, no persecutions of Jews, no racial persecutions of any kind. It was a really awakened, developed and progressive democracy. It was the really successful democracy east of the Rhine. It was the republic of that great humanist, Masaryk.

Yet it was for these very reasons that this little republic was destroyed by a dictatorial régime.

Don't believe that it was a question of self-determination for a minority. From the beginning it has been a battle for the existence of the state. A dictatorship cannot tolerate freedom. A dictatorship can permit no liberty, no freedom, no democracy in its vicinity. It was and is and will be a battle for the existence by a free nation opposed by a totalitarian state which denies freedom. The latest move of the German dictatorship in the occupation of Czechoslovakia proves it.

This last tragic event must now finally open the eyes of the whole world to the fact that the Czechoslovak nation was from its beginning condemned by the dictatorship. With the subjugation of Czechoslovakia, freedom is being guillotined. And nobody in the United States or in the world should forget that régime which is now attempting to kill freedom in Czechoslovakia is based on these three groups of conceptions:

First of all, the régime does not recognize any obligations unless it is expedient for it to do so; it will fulfill no promise; it will respect no law; it will keep no pledge; it will show no tolerance, either political or religious; it will admit no right to property either of state or of individuals unless it considers it expedient to do so. And for its every crime against human decency it will always discover a pretext.

Second, the only principle on which this régime is based is the rule of force and violence. This régime can maintain no respect for the idea of right. It preaches that the only right is might—force and violence. If you look back through the pages of history you will find that this is the system which was always termed the Age of Barbarism. Today it would rule the world as the Age of Brute Force.

The third basis of this regime is the simple use of the old

slogan "the end justifies the means," and in their minds that end means one thing only—the success of their rule of brute force, which is combined with the propaganda of lies which they have elaborated both internally and internationally as a weapon, and as a most important factor in maintaining this régime, and in deceiving the whole world as to their real intent. This whole theory has been elaborated into a state system, a system which today undertakes to subjugate Czechoslovakia, a system which has begun to rule thoughout my country and which tomorrow will extend its terrorism still further. And the people of the United States and of what remains of free Europe must be prepared for a continuation and extension of this rule of Brute Force.

Five months ago, during the so-called September crisis, the Czechoslovak nation was asked to make the sacrifice of territory, and pressure was put upon my people not to fight for their freedom, integrity and independence, in order to save the world from war. The appeal was made to that little people to sacrifice themselves for the peace of the world. That little people did it. And that little people received the promise of the integrity of the remnant of its national territory and of the security of its national state. That little people, having made these sacrifices under pressure of the decisions at Munich, accepted, because the four great powers at Munich signed an obligation to guarantee the new state.

Because of this guarantee, I repeat, this little people made their sacrifice; and I resigned because I wished to give personal proof that I would not be an obstacle to the good-neighborliness and good relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and because I wished to give to the world the proof that I participated in this self-sacrifice of my nation.

For the past five months I have imposed on myself absolute silence and complete reserve, hoping that this would contribute to give finally to my country a little peace and quiet, and to other powers concerned the opportunity to work out the agreed solutions.

After my resignation I received thousands of manifestations, thousands of telegrams, thousands of letters from France, England, Holland, Switzerland, Scandinavia, the United States and other countries calling down the blessing of God on the contribution of my people to the cause of peace. The whole world praised the sacrifices of Czechoslovakia! Its patience, control, discipline, steadiness—its self-domination in one of the most tragic moments of history—were outstanding; and I dare to say that no other nation could surpass Czechoslovakia in its behavior. Mr. Chamberlain, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, spoke Friday of this people as "a brave and proud people." Yes, it was and is a brave and proud people and it will be brave and proud of all its achievements in the last twenty years and of what it has done in the last five months for peace, for liberty, for humanity. It is indeed an example which it would be difficult to match in all history.

And yet, in spite of everything, in spite of its sacrifices, in spite of its self-discipline, in spite of all promises and all guarantees, one of those powers which signed the Munich pact so solemnly after declaring for self-determination and pledging that it has no further territorial aspirations in Czechoslovakia and Europe, and in spite of the fact that the Munich agreement has taken 1,200,000 Czechoslovak people into the frontiers of other states, this power has now brutally broken all its pledges and obligations, has invaded the territory of the Czechs and Slovaks, has established a so-called "protectorate," has imposed its régime of terror, of secret police, of racial and religious persecution, its régime of concentration camps, its régime of complete suppression of free press and free speech, its régime of brutality and inhumanity—and that power has declared that all this is done in the name of peace in Europe. This same régime began by asking self-determination for a minority. Its second move was to press its need for self-defense against action by this small, disarmed, surrounded nation. The third step was the envelopment and encirclement of this little nation by Germany. And the final argument was that as

a consequence of this third step by envelopment and encirclement, this national Czechoslovak territory must be taken over in the interests of general peace.

So by these four moves this dictatorship has assured peace—the peace of the cemetery!

These are the facts. And I put these facts before the whole American people and before the conscience of the entire world. Let the facts speak for themselves.

For twenty years I have worked for peace, for real peace. But today there is no peace in Europe. What is considered a state of peace is but a terrible illusion, an illusion which will one day take its toll in the enormous sacrifice of all the nations of the world. Because there is war already! Yes, there is war today in Europe; but there is war on one side only, and while one party makes war, the other can merely look on.

And again I say to the world that everybody must understand that there will be no peace, there will be no respite, there will be no order until the crimes that have been committed in Europe are wiped out, until there is again respect for the given word, until the idea of honesty—personal honesty and state honesty—is re-established, until the principles of the individual and international liberty are secured, and until real courage takes command and requires that brute force must stop.

Don't forget that it is not only Europe that is involved, not only Central, South, and Eastern European nations, the French nation, the British nation, the Scandinavian nations, the people of the United States, but the whole world that is in danger, not only from war but from the destruction of every high concept of human morality, by the demolition of every fine concept of liberty, by the disintegration of every concept of honesty and decency. That is the danger today. A society which continues to tolerate such a state of things will be destroyed and will disappear.

I place before the world court of public opinion these facts and in at last stating clearly what I mean and what I feel, I continue to be a believer in the ideals of liberty and in the

simple concept of human honesty and dignity. I know that in the history of mankind brute force has always fallen after every such brutal and terrible misuse of power. The man who in modern history has been taken as a symbol of brute force, Napoleon, has declared: "There are in the world two powers —the Sword and the Spirit. The Spirit has always vanquished the Sword." In this statement I agree with the words of Napoleon.

I declare that the independence of Czechoslovakia was not crushed; it continues, it lives, it exists. And I solemnly declare that those who have perpetrated this crime against the Czechoslovak nation and against all mankind are guilty before God and will be punished.

During the last months, and especially in the period that preceded and followed the September crisis, I have many times been attacked personally. I have never answered. I never shall answer. But until my last breath I shall continue the fight for the freedom of my people and for their rights, and I am sure that my nation will emerge from this struggle as it has done many times before in its history, as brave and as proud as she has been throughout the past, and having always with her the sympathy and the recognition and the love of all decent people in the world. And there is no more fitting place for me to make this declaration, than in this free country of Washington and Lincoln.

So I must end with an appeal to the American people. I would beg that they do not permit such conceptions and ideas as are now trying to dominate Europe to be tolerated *in this free country*. Because in the approaching battle for the victory of the Spirit against the Sword, the United States has a very great role to play. Be ready for that fight and be strong—O people of Democracy!

To all right-thinking men and women everywhere I give the motto of my beloved nation—*"Truth prevails."*

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